The Tomcat Legacy; 35+ years from Fleet Air Defender to Recce to Precision Strike

[HackerF15E]

Classic example of the phenomena of seeing what you want to see: F-15s did an overhead VID and thought they were looking at Hinds instead of Blackhawks. One of incident pilots was the CC so no excuse for misidentification.

That said, I've seen aircrews make amazing misidentifications from calling an AN-12 a C-130 to aircraft entering break over a Brit CV thinking it was their "mother".

One of the things we focus on in our case study is the role of intra-flght comm in the mis-ID of the helos.

After Wickson's first ID pass, he asks May (the wingman) if he agrees with his assessment that the helo is a Hind. The phrase he used was, "tally two Hinds, confirm?". May heard this and assumed it was a statement from Wickson rather than a question.

May replies using the term "tally"...because he thinks that Wickson has confirmed that the helos are Hinds and by default bandits.

Hearing May use the term "tally" over the radio, Wickson then thought that was May's affirmative answer to his question as to if he thought the helos were also Hinds.

So, basically, they talked each other into thinking that the helos were badguys.

As you mention, there were other human factors that went into that scenario, like "wanting" and "expecting" to see Hinds there because of several reasons. Plus the lack of VID training and recognition of the MH-60s with the outriggers.

I'll have to look around...I have the transcript of the HUD tapes around my office here somewhere.

 

[HeyJoe]

One of the things we focus on in our case study is the role of intra-flght comm in the mis-ID of the helos.

After Wickson's first ID pass, he asks May (the wingman) if he agrees with his assessment that the helo is a Hind. The phrase he used was, "tally two Hinds, confirm?". May heard this and assumed it was a statement from Wickson rather than a question.

May replies using the term "tally"...because he thinks that Wickson has confirmed that the helos are Hinds and by default bandits.

Hearing May use the term "tally" over the radio, Wickson then thought that was May's affirmative answer to his question as to if he thought the helos were also Hinds.

So, basically, they talked each other into thinking that the helos were badguys.

As you mention, there were other human factors that went into that scenario, like "wanting" and "expecting" to see Hinds there because of several reasons. Plus the lack of VID training and recognition of the MH-60s with the outriggers.

I'll have to look around...I have the transcript of the HUD tapes around my office here somewhere.

Exactly what I was referring to as far as opportunities to avert the tragedy* (link to Wiki Article on incident for uninitiated). If you take Visual Recognition seriously, it's not difficult to tell these two apart. Lots of tippers to discern which is which especially color scheme:

Note: May was the Commanding Officer and a rising star; at least until then.

*Also note that AWACS had controllers taking to F-15s and another controller talking to helos yet did not intervene when the F-15s began runnign on the friendlies.

 

[HackerF15E]

If you take Visual Recognition seriously, it's not difficult to tell these two apart. Lots of tippers to discern which is which especially color scheme:

Be that as it may, there was a study done for the investigation of May and Wickson that had USAF fighters make several dozen individual "cold" VID passes (I think the number was somewhere around 20) against a UH-60 with a 3-foot by 5-foot American flag painted on the side.

Even passing at 300 knots and with between 500 and 1000 feet of slant range, NONE of the pilots were able to VID the American flag. Only after looking at the helo head-on, and seeing the width/shape of the nose, were they able to ID the helo as a Blackhawk positively.

I'm not condoning Wickson and May's lack of VID skills in any way, but the study showed that there was a lot more to VID at 300 knots while flying a jet than there is looking at them at zero knots sitting on a ramp.

From personal experience, I flew against a MiG-29 that I -- swear to God -- thought was an F-15C until it was passing my wing line, opposite direction, 3,000 feet away. I consider myself a pretty damn good ID'er of aircraft in flight, but this was the first time I'd actually seen a Fulcrum in flight and I was completely wrong until we were well within the WVR arena.

I'm always very careful before I start throwing stones at other pilots' abilities to VID.

 

[busdriver]

I read a paper that dealt with the human factors of the Blackhawk shoot down. The lead Eagle pilot mentioned in an interview that he wasn't comfortable flying that low in the mountains, and was more concerned with hitting the ground. So add that onto the lack of VID training. Also, as was mentioned they had probably already convinced themselves these were bandits due to lack of proper codes.

 

[HeyJoe]

I'm not condoning Wickson and May's lack of VID skills in any way, but the study showed that there was a lot more to VID at 300 knots while flying a jet than there is looking at them at zero knots sitting on a ramp.

Even more reason to err on side of caution. The fact that helos were solid Army dark green is a HUGE giveaway. Our "spies" drilled Visual ID into for decades and we were tested on ID of aircraft and markings. That said, I've see laughable MIS IDs over the years, but this one was deplorable. A F-15 is NOT at risk in this type of encounter and can dictate the terms until sure. Lots of contributing factors, but it's a bif Lesson Learned to go through hwo the Error Chain got linked together,

From personal experience, I flew against a MiG-29 that I -- swear to God -- thought was an F-15C until it was passing my wing line, opposite direction, 3,000 feet away. I consider myself a pretty damn good ID'er of aircraft in flight, but this was the first time I'd actually seen a Fulcrum in flight and I was completely wrong until we were well within the WVR arena.

This is very common with a lot of aircraft. Although we learned from slides, we advocated Spies using film clips from movie videos in which aricraft were indistinct.

I'm always very careful before I start throwing stones at other pilots' abilities to VID.

As am I, but May's comment after downing his helo is very revealing.

During Desert Storm, we were vectored on a helo behind the FLOT and cleared to fire. I remembered that our Spy had said there could be a FARP established ahead of advancing troops so I was cautious and wanted a VID first.There were puffy cluds at 5K so we had to go down below our hard deck and we in Sparrow range. I could tell my wingman wanted to shoot, but I called to check fire unless we had a VID. AWACS was getting impatient so down we went. I swallowed hard wondering if it was a lure to draw us into a SAM trap. I just didn't feel right so I called us off was we encountered too many clouds to see our "Bogey". As we pulled up, AWACS declared him to be a friendly in a rather anxious voice.

Back to F-15 pilots, they could have made as many passes as needed to confirm the identity of the helos in question. They were not threatened by presence of the helos nor had the helos done anyhting to indiicate hostile intent against them of anyone on the ground (F-16s vs Galebs had to monitor their activity until they saw a hostile act...different AOR and timeframe but illustrative of how a fast mover can maintain a hawk position until identity and intent are clear as they need to be....I also think AWACS shares culpability for not having Situational Awareness on the helos after working with them. The cues were there, So sad nobody put it together.

 

[HeyJoe]

. Also, as was mentioned they had probably already convinced themselves these were bandits due to lack of proper codes.

Wish I had a nickel for every time ship said I had a bad IFF squawk only to check fine with E-2 or after a 360 degree turn. Trons and aspect, terrain, attenuation, etc. can do funny things to IFF transmissions so lack of IFF is NOT a valid shoot criteria. Conversely, a bogey squawking correct modes and codes means DO NOT SHOOT.

 

[HackerF15E]

Wish I had a nickel for every time ship said I has a bad IFF squawk only to check fine with E-2 or after a 360 degree turn. Trons and aspect, terrain, attenuation, etc. can do funny things to IFF transmissions so lack of IFF is NOT a valid shoot criteria. Conversely, a bogey squawking correct modes and codes means DO NOT SHOOT.

Any fighter guys who actually use on-board ID know how amazingly unreliable it can be -- in both directions. Both showing bad guys as squawking correct codes, and not finding correct codes in friendlies who are squawking appropriately.

IFF is simply one piece of an overall ID puzzle.

If you read any theater air-to-air ROE, it always includes several methods of identification that ALL have to be filled, both for finding a "lack of friendly" indication ALONG WITH a "presence of enemy" indication.

 

[HackerF15E]

A F-15 is NOT at risk in this type of encounter and can dictate the terms until sure.

Back to F-15 pilots, they could have made as many passes as needed to confirm the identity of the helos in question. They were not threatened by ppresence of the helos nor had the helos done anyhting to indiicate hostile intent against them of anyone on the ground

Absolutely no argument from me there -- I am firmly in the corner of the blame being laid at the thumbs which pushed pickle buttons.

There was a steady chain of decisionmaking errors on their parts which were causal to the mishap.

 

[stalk]

Sea Story Warning (condensed version for AW brevity, bar version involves hand flying, wristwatch pointing and many beers)...

During Desert Storm just off the tanker overhead the ship, my section was vectored onto "Bandits" coming down the Al Faw, low fast. I get radar on a section barely feet wet nose hot, on the deck. AWACS calls are off a distant Bullseye so I'm trying to correlate. To add to my helmet fire and elevated heart rate was the fact that some our Intruders buddies used to troll that area on the deck, squawk off, looking for what was left of the Iraqi Navy. Bandits turn south toward Faylaka Island and I now have two specks on the FLIR. As they approach the island 37mm popcorn starts to come up. I think, damn have I've been chasing A-6's and now have no SA on the bad guys? FLIR picture is getting better and can see two single tailed aircraft, which is not helping my good guy/bad guy dilemma. Wingman and I are making like R2D2 checking six and calling for help. We are lagging to avoid the AAA but close to just inside of a max range shot. Not sure of their ID, I just can't convince myself to shoot. We pursue but are called off and get to watch a Saudi F-15 bag what turned out to be two Iraqi F-1's (that's a story in itself).

For several years I kicked myself in the ass for not taking the shot but I know not squeezing that trigger was the right thing to do.

 

[navyao]

You'd think being an AO in a Hook squadron in the 90's I would have heard of FIREBREAK, but until you wrote about it HJ, I'd never heard of it. While on the loadteam I up/down loaded sooo many freaking CATM-9's and 7's, my God! But then after you mentioned it, while on cruise, especially in the IO we always flew with live ordnance.

Hea! Great reading all the replies, I'm glad I asked the question. I learned a lot. If you guys ever have any questions on safety wiring or PMS'ing the M61A1 feel free to ask, (I'm kidding).

 

[jfulginiti]

Well, shit...... I can't tell you how many times I was declared hostile and
subsequently got shot in the Prowler at an LFE. No one ever bought me a beer. Not even a "Oops, sorry 'bout that".

 

[Cron]

Sea Story Warning (condensed version for AW brevity, bar version involves hand flying, wristwatch pointing and many beers)...

During Desert Storm just off the tanker overhead the ship, my section was vectored onto "Bandits" coming down the Al Faw, low fast. I get radar on a section barely feet wet nose hot, on the deck. AWACS calls are off a distant Bullseye so I'm trying to correlate. To add to my helmet fire and elevated heart rate was the fact that some our Intruders buddies used to troll that area on the deck, squawk off, looking for what was left of the Iraqi Navy. Bandits turn south toward Faylaka Island and I now have two specks on the FLIR. As they approach the island 37mm popcorn starts to come up. I think, damn have I've been chasing A-6's and now have no SA on the bad guys? FLIR picture is getting better and can see two single tailed aircraft, which is not helping my good guy/bad guy dilemma. Wingman and I are making like R2D2 checking six and calling for help. We are lagging to avoid the AAA but close to just inside of a max range shot. Not sure of their ID, I just can't convince myself to shoot. We pursue but are called off and get to watch a Saudi F-15 bag what turned out to be two Iraqi F-1's (that's a story in itself).

For several years I kicked myself in the ass for not taking the shot but I know not squeezing that trigger was the right thing to do.

Amazing story! It's a damn shame the Marines haven't had an A/A kill since 'Nam (not counting the one F-15C exchange pilot during the Storm).

I always wondered why the Air Force was allowed to monopolize the airspace in the beginning stages of Gulf War I, and practically get all the kills...

 

[stalk]

Amazing story! It's a damn shame the Marines haven't had an A/A kill since 'Nam (not counting the one F-15C exchange pilot during the Storm).

I always wondered why the Air Force was allowed to monopolize the airspace in the beginning stages of Gulf War I, and practically get all the kills...

It came down to matching the asset to the mission. F-15Cs do one thing and they do it very well. They used AMRAAM and the rest of us were still in the AIM-7 world. Hornets and Vipers were primarily strike assets, though some CAP and Escort missions were assigned. The Tomcats were used in a strictly fighter roll but initially they were coming all the way from the Red Sea. When we launched on the first strikes the only F-14's on the Persian Gulf side were from TR and they just arrived on station. Midway's airwing was all FA-18s.

 

[HeyJoe]

It came down to matching the asset to the mission. F-15Cs do one thing and they do it very well. They used AMRAAM and the rest of us were still in the AIM-7 world. Hornets and Vipers were primarily strike assets, though some CAP and Escort missions were assigned. The Tomcats were used in a strictly fighter roll but initially they were coming all the way from the Red Sea. When we launched on the first strikes the only F-14's on the Persian Gulf side were from TR and they just arrived on station. Midway's airwing was all FA-18s.

Concur except AMRAAM was not introduced to Southwest Asia until many moons after Desert Storm (Sept 1991) and, even then, it had some integration issues when mixed loads were carried. A large factor was Air FOrce served as JFACC and wrote the rules. We had a rep in country daily tryign to negotiate for the CAP stations Air Force manned 24/7. We didn't get any decent assignments until last couple weeks of Desert Storm when all the MiGs and Mirages were either shot down, smacked down in their shelters, hidden away or safely in Iran. A wall of Tomcats was established between Iraq and Iran (plenty of Iraqi fighters had successfully run the gauntlet of Eagles, but never heard of a single one venturing close to the Tomcat barrier known as BONGCAP).

 

[stalk]

Concur except AMRAAM was not introduced to Southwest Asia until many moons after Desert Storm (Sept 1991) ...

My bust...I left with CAG5 in April '91 and I came back for round two with CAG7 in September '91. I'm probably mixing things up somewhere in the back of my pea brain. Old age I guess