Rand study on USAF pilot retention

[insanebikerboy]

OK, so how do you actually do that? Exactly who do you hold accountable? By what administrative process you you implement that? Every decision maker from that time has moved on or retired. Do you write them a bad FITREP in their current job? Does their current RS legally have the power to weigh in retroactively? Do you have an IG investigate and provide recommendations to CNO? If they just missed the mark on a issue where opinions varied, does that constitute the basis for DFC? People do make mistakes, and we claim to be against zero-defect mindsets. If they lied, can you prove it? Do you know all the facts? Perhaps they did know but a decision was made to minimize the issue in public while working quietly in the background.

I list all these questions not to obfuscate, but to demonstrate what a complex undertaking that kind of thing would be. So, my question to you if this: What would be enough of a rebuke to satisfy your desire for example-making? Then, what is the administrative (or legal) process that gets you there? The guy who was ultimately in charge of PERS at the time, ADM Bill Moran, is about to be the next CNO.

Go.

"Loss of confidence" comes to mind as the reason why.

Someone getting an early PCS or even a "chance to retire" isn't unheard of.

It's obviously not blatant misconduct, but at some point the buck needs to stop and letting folks with that much responsibility just shrug their shoulders and continue their upward climb without actually fixing the problem seems to smack in the face of what being an officer and in command is all about.

 

[Angry]

OK, so how do you actually do that? Exactly who do you hold accountable? By what administrative process you you implement that? Every decision maker from that time has moved on or retired. Do you write them a bad FITREP in their current job? Does their current RS legally have the power to weigh in retroactively? Do you have an IG investigate and provide recommendations to CNO? If they just missed the mark on a issue where opinions varied, does that constitute the basis for DFC? People do make mistakes, and we claim to be against zero-defect mindsets. If they lied, can you prove it? Do you know all the facts? Perhaps they did know but a decision was made to minimize the issue in public while working quietly in the background.

I list all these questions not to obfuscate, but to demonstrate what a complex undertaking that kind of thing would be. So, my question to you if this: What would be enough of a rebuke to satisfy your desire for example-making? Then, what is the administrative (or legal) process that gets you there? The guy who was ultimately in charge of PERS at the time, ADM Bill Moran, is about to be the next CNO.

Go.

I think you're mistaking my asking the honest question for being on a witch hunt. I don't expect anyone to be punished. Even if we could identify who and when and why, I wouldn't suggest legal charges as a solution unless someone was dumb enough to write "I'm doing this to screw over the navy for my own benefit" in an email.

But think about what we have all agreed on so far in this thread.

1. There was information suggesting a problem existed.
2. Those in the lower rungs began asking questions about the potential problem.
3. Those in authority did not acknowledge or denied the problem existed, essential saying "we have the info, trust us, its fine".
4. Years later it turns out there was a problem and those individuals were wrong or being untruthful.

I get it, there is no ready solution for holding people responsible once they leave a job. But that's the real problem. I don't know the Vice CNO; I dont know what he knew and didnt know. But if he was in charge and the system developed a major problem, why ISN'T he held accountable?

 

[RedFive]

Send everyone to API and primary.

Uhh...if I'm capable of getting through T-6 primary, why the fuck would I want to fly a UAV when all my friends are going to do cool shit with real airplanes? This will only build resentment and a community-wide inferiority complex. The Air Force already saw this, must we repeat it too?

 

[Brett327]

I think you're mistaking my asking the honest question for being on a witch hunt. I don't expect anyone to be punished. Even if we could identify who and when and why, I wouldn't suggest legal charges as a solution unless someone was dumb enough to write "I'm doing this to screw over the navy for my own benefit" in an email.

But think about what we have all agreed on so far in this thread.

1. There was information suggesting a problem existed.
2. Those in the lower rungs began asking questions about the potential problem.
3. Those in authority did not acknowledge or denied the problem existed, essential saying "we have the info, trust us, its fine".
4. Years later it turns out there was a problem and those individuals were wrong or being untruthful.

I get it, there is no ready solution for holding people responsible once they leave a job. But that's the real problem. I don't know the Vice CNO; I dont know what he knew and didnt know. But if he was in charge and the system developed a major problem, why ISN'T he held accountable?

No, I think I get what you were talking about. As I said before, it gets complicated pretty quickly once you get into the details. So, whether you're looking at it through a legal lens, or just looking for someone to raise their hand and admit that they fucked up, it's not a simple matter.

As to your four statements - those are opinions, and I think you'll get different reactions from different people.

WARNING​

I'm role playing the mindset of someone at PERS. These are not necessarily my own opinions. Some of you have a hard time distinguishing between the two.

Here's how someone at PERS in 2014 might respond:

1. We had data that hinted at a problem in two communities, but we made a judgement call that it didn't warrant across the board changes to policy.
2. Those LTs asking questions didn't have access to our data, or were making broad generalizations that didn't apply to most of the aviation communities.
3. We thought we had the problem under control. We can handle this by tweaking bonus numbers in worrisome communities.
4. This is worse than we anticipated. Hindsight being 20/20, there weren't a lot of policy options at our disposal that could have prevented the exodus to the airlines. We did the best we could with the tools and info we had at the time.

WARNING​

Back to my take:
Whether you agree with the above or not, it's very likely (IMO) that people were trying to do their best to solve a very difficult problem with incomplete information and insufficient authority to make changes. I have no doubt that on some level, a lot of wishful thinking, confirmation bias and group-think was in play. Was there some CYA going on? Tough to tell for sure, and impossible to prove. Honestly, a lot of the noise coming from the JOs and DHs at the time was an exercise in admiring the problem with very few workable solutions available to PERS-43.

The retention issue has been a perfect storm of airlines hiring, aircraft readiness/availability catastrophes in key communities, and Naval Aviation reaching the pinnacle of operational fatigue brought about by 15 years of forever wars. These consecutive and cumulative shocks would have had a serious impact regardless.

How would you frame the discussion if you have an opportunity for a 1v1 w/ ADM Moran?

 

[Swanee]

Uhh...if I'm capable of getting through T-6 primary, why the fuck would I want to fly a UAV when all my friends are going to do cool shit with real airplanes? This will only build resentment and a community-wide inferiority complex. The Air Force already saw this, must we repeat it too?

The Air Force fucked it away when they drafted guys into Predators with the promise of their #1 choice of airplane after a 2 year tour, and then didn't deliver, leaving dudes stuck in a 10 year winging commitment in a 12 on 12 off 6 days a week schedule in Creech with no real ability to earn additional quals and no ability to get out and do something else for a tour.

And yes, UAV guys need that much more training. I train 2nd Lts straight from Randolph/RPA school- the knowledge, ADM and attitudes are on the lacking when you compare a regular RPA guy to a regular traditionally winged guy (or even a guy who medically attrited out of advanced).

As far as the inferiority complex- I don't buy it. UAV guys are doing good work in just about every theater of operations we've got going. We've had guys embedded with MARSOC and other coalition partners in those places. And we're contracting those guys to come in as UAV guys from the start. They know what they're getting into.

Do Helo/Maritime/tiltrotor/prop/whatever guys feel inferior because they didn't get jets? I doubt it. Everyone has cool shit that they do and everyone has their own flavor of bullshit to put up with.

 

[thump]

No, I think I get what you were talking about. As I said before, it gets complicated pretty quickly once you get into the details. So, whether you're looking at it through a legal lens, or just looking for someone to raise their hand and admit that they fucked up, it's not a simple matter.

I don’t think it’s that complicated really. When Big Navy wanted to “hold a guy accountable” for focsle follies videos a few years after the fact, Big Navy found a way.

Such accountability has not been forthcoming for poor programmatic decisions (LCS, OBOGS, etc) or poor personnel management decisions. This indicates that on the Big Navy JIPTL, such things are of lesser importance than goofy videos.

These perceptions may be unfair. But as we’re taught since day one - “perception is reality”.

 

[squorch2]

“Hey, VCNO - you, and the Navy at large, have a credibility problem, and it’s affecting the capital condition of the Navy, posing a large strategic challenge to the Navy’s ability to continue as a credible military service. (See “War for Talent,” NPS studies, “First in Class” series of papers, demographics analyses, etc)

In the past, the Navy has repeatedly taken action in a short sighted manner (ERB, PTS, SWOS in a Box, aviation officer management, LCS spiral development, 2.0 carrier presence, availability management, 355 ship navy, FDNF optempo, OBOGS).

This short term focus cannot be solved with more money, more staffing, or shuffling control grade officers around. It can be addressed with a long term (>15 years) effort centered around renewing the Navy’s promise, with several phases (establishing trust, recapitalization, etc, et al)

First and foremost, a break must be made with the past decision-making mentality - and indeed with the past itself. Such a break is critical to starting to establish trust with existing and upcoming military populations, who are themselves critical to keeping even a modest capability baseline.

(Etc etc etc, I did this in about 10 minutes, and others could/will do better - tl;dr- the navy has an ongoing credibility problem with just about everyone. What’re you gonna do about it, flags?)

 

[Flash]

I want buy in, I want money for legitimate training and a legitimate training pipeline. I want my peers to have to have the same level of aviation knowledge that we were required to have when we winged. I want my peers to be better and I want the bar to be higher. I want the "It's just a UAV" attitude to go away.

And yes, UAV guys need that much more training. I train 2nd Lts straight from Randolph/RPA school- the knowledge, ADM and attitudes are on the lacking when you compare a regular RPA guy to a regular traditionally winged guy (or even a guy who medically attrited out of advanced).

I wonder just what kind of training will be necessary for UAV types in the future, especially since the USAF is trying to move away from the Predator/Reaper model of having pilots having to actively fly the UAV's and move more towards the mouse and keyboard type control. Developing an 'air sense' would be very valuable for UAV controllers but how to get there is a good question. Don't the USAF UAV types go through flight screening with their pilot counterparts?

 

[Brett327]

When Big Navy wanted to “hold a guy accountable” for focsle follies videos a few years after the fact, Big Navy found a way.

Are you talking about VFA-31 on TR? If so, please remind us of the facts of that particular case.

 

[Gatordev]

Don't the USAF UAV types go through flight screening with their pilot counterparts?

Again, only a data point and not data, but the guy I mentioned earlier went through T-6 AF primary before then going on to UAV land. They're specifically titled winged pilots (whatever that term would be in the AF) and can continue to fly while doing the UAV thing (assuming they can find an empty seat and flight hours, which supposedly is a thing at some locations).

 

[Flash]

In the past, the Navy has repeatedly taken action in a short sighted manner (ERB, PTS, SWOS in a Box, aviation officer management, LCS spiral development, 2.0 carrier presence, availability management, 355 ship navy, FDNF optempo, OBOGS).

As disappointed I am with some of the leadership decisions in my time in the Navy quite a few of them can be traced back not to uniformed Navy leadership but to civilian and national leadership coupled with budgetary decisions, made by national and civilian leaders, out of the Navy's control. Implementation of some of those decisions could have been better in many cases but sometimes the Navy couldn't really question why or how but just do. All of that certainly doesn't absolve Navy leadership but the blame doesn't rest solely on the shoulders of Admirals.

 

[Flash]

Again, only a data point and not data, but the guy I mentioned earlier went through T-6 AF primary before then going on to UAV land. They're specifically titled winged pilots (whatever that term would be in the AF) and can continue to fly while doing the UAV thing (assuming they can find an empty seat and flight hours, which supposedly is a thing at some locations).

I think there are several paths that have been tried by the USAF to include that one but they definitely have just UAV 'pilots' now with their own UAV wings, it is those folks that just go through their own version of IFS in the DA-20 getting ~40 hours and then off to train in UAV's (Edit: Link added).

 

[Flash]

Are you talking about VFA-31 on TR? If so, please remind us of the facts of that particular case.

Pretty sure that is a reference to Captain Honors from the USS Enterprise.

 

[Jim123]

We might be looking at this accountability thing the wrong way.

How about a spot defense superior service medal/legion of merit/something or other? It's all in the citation, but in 7½ lines I think you could fit some flowery language about exceptionally meritorious leadership acumen, lasting impact for years to come, taking it to the next level by setting new benchmarks of statutory and admin board metrics, and being the inspiration behind service-wide lessons-learned and case studies in personnel management for future generations of leadership to disregard in turn.

It's kinda passive-aggressive but I think it elegantly sidesteps those pesky legal issues, ye-as?

#disruptivethinking

 

[SlickAg]

That's a nice sentiment, but the IG doesn't do process improvement. They focus on fraud/waste/abuse and misconduct for the most part. This one from the IG website might apply:

• Mismanagement/Organization Oversight (Significant Cases)

But, as with so many things, the devil is in the details. Before we even get to your complaint, have you attempted to resolve the situation through the formal grievance process, or through your chain of command? In most cases the IG will not accept a complaint unless these steps are taken and documented.

Next, you're going to have to provide some specific details: Name the person responsible. Provide the exact date and time of the wrongdoing. Exactly what action did this individual take or fail to take? What was the impact?

Piece of cake.

So, the real question is, why haven't you clicked this link and taken the action you're recommending?
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/ig

You were asking about how exactly this accountability thing would go down. Replace with IG with self-sponsored study in my post. Not super familiar with this stuff, but clearly you are. So it's not surprising at all that you bore down on the IG thing instead. Thanks very much for the education. I'm now a better selected reservist for it.

So, with that being said, what's to prevent PERS from publishing a report about the ADHSB fiasco of recent years, to include the increasing number of DPMs and resultant lack of selectivity, a final report on the FY-15 and FY-16 O-4 boards, and the recent trend reversal on fleet manning from "not a crisis" to "crisis"? I'm sure it'd be some great reading. Very man in the arena-esque.

That doesn't even begin to touch the forever wars of which you spoke, maintenance issues, lack of flight hours, et cetera. Combine that with the above Human Resources type debacle and maybe Gregory L. Vistica would want to start writing a book.