Rand study on USAF pilot retention

[Flash]

I think it's an important step to begin to take for the Navy UAS communities- developing a separate, professional career field that can train and sustain itself.....At least you guys are keeping the Triton in VP and the Firescout in H(SC?)....The community will always play second fiddle to whomever owns it, and will never be as good as it could if it were allowed to stand on it's own two feet as a professional warfighting discipline.

I think the Navy, at least VP, has a more coherent plan than any other service getting into the broader UAV mission. The Triton should remain part of the larger VP/MPRA community instead of trying to strike out on its own or being subsumed into the larger ISR world where it will get lost in the FMV/ISR vacuum that consumes pretty much every other US MALE and HALE UAV out there. I also think there is great value in having UAV 'crews' with a strong aviator background to help manage the aircraft and the mission, especially given how much more closely they would complement existing VP mission.

 

[Pags]

Well, I'm not worried about me, I'm worried about what the computer will do if [insert failure here] happens at the perch with the LSE 20 feet away or while one of my maintainers is walking through the arc. I know the risk is minimal because of how/where we fly it, but just like the automatic approach in the 60 or a Tesla "autopilot," they should be used as a tool. Computers are amazing tools, but they can never replace human decision making -- even Data would acknowledge that!
View attachment 21636

The risk there is really nothing different than if has an engine failure on takeoff over the deck or if SAS kicks off or if a rogue wave comes up and crushes your helo. UAVs and robots won't remove risk, they'll just change how we think about it.

Well, then I think we just agreed on the same thing from different viewpoints. I'm not suggesting we walk away from UAVs, but as a prior aerospace engineer who designed UAVs, a pilot, and a (conscripted ?) UAV operator, I think we need more awareness of their limitations and less hype about their ability to replace humans. A self-driving Tesla is super cool and I can't wait to have something to lessen the burden of a boring highway drive, but it's not going to navigate downtown Ensenada or safely traverse a snow/sand-blown road anytime soon. Sensors fail. Computers glitch. Life is too important to blindly trust a machine with no self-awareness.

Agreed. And at no point did I advocate for a fully autonomous kill bot. I was reading a paper on autonomy (ok, the abstract, but I had the best intentions of reading the whole thing...SQUIRREL!) the other day and the premise was that we're nowhere near fully autonomous killbots. But our technology is in the position to assist the man in the loop in making a quick decision. Just like how google maps can say "hey, there's a sushi joint you might like" for a town you've never been in and help you decide on where to have dinner when away from home, a tactical AI decision aid could help operators narrow down the possibilities and make quicker decisions. However, I should note that some of our current systems do tend towards killbot when in auto, things like AEGIS and ASE, where human decisions just happen to slow in areas where quick responses are required. Of course, none of these systems will be perfect, but right now the tactical decision making system is basically the man in the arena thinking quickly and is largely imperfect. A decision aid wouldn't be perfect but it might help in stressful situations. And you can always ignore it.

Well, they were surprised by the issues I brought up as though it had never occurred to anyone. Perhaps I'll give it a shot in a couple months when I get time, but I'm really not sure my efforts would make much difference.

I don't know the specifics that you're talking about so I can't say whether that's to be expected or disappointing Hence why I said you should write something and bring it to HSCWP/L and PMA attention.
[/QUOTE]

 

[Pags]

I'm sure there will be advancements in autonomous drones and more survivable datelines but from what I've seen right now that is a very long way away. As an EW guy who worked both the EA and ES sides, the issue with datalinks might not be insurmountable but it will be a very hard one to mitigate and will likely never be 'solved'. There is only so far innovation can get you before you run into simple physics, and unless you have a black hole handy that is a hard problem to get around. Having observed the bigger picture of UAV operations for many years has made me very aware of their wonderful capabilities as well as their serious limitations, a career in EW has made me wary to rely on them in anything more than the most permissive of environments.

Autonomous operations is a whole other ball of wax and one that can often be easily defeated by the simplest of measures. Unlike an autonomous car that knows what 'Stop' and 'Yield' signs look like good luck trying to make sure that a UAV 'knows' what an enemy tank, locally modified, looks like compared to a friendly one through a hazy undercast at dusk. That would be hard enough for a person to do, just look at how may 'Scud launchers' we blew up in the Gulf War...oops, tanker trucks...and that just scratches the surface of 'autonomous' operations.

Something not mentioned yet though doesn't have anything to do with technology though, instead 'politics'. The idea of having 'automatic drones' roaming the airspace is a huge political football. It is hard to overstate the specter of drones that exists in other countries and not just the Middle East, the mere suggestion of deploying ISR-only UAV's often runs into political obstacles the moment it is brought up. Even domestically it can be controversial with some companies running into employee objections on the use of AI. So the idea of 'autonomous military drones' would have to overcome quite a big hurdle politically and publicly before being fielded.

Don't disagree with the current state of what's out there now. But like I said, finding smart people to solve hard problems quickly is something that we culturally tend to be good at in war time. Hopefully it holds true for the next time we need someone to pull a rabbit out of a hat.

Politics are also something may seem hard to overcome in peacetime, but wars have a tendency to change societies risk perspective. Everyone said gas was awful and should never be used in pre-WWI politics. And then germany did it. And then so did everyone else. These things all change.

We can go round and round on this with you saying "but now" and "but in real life" and I can make up all sorts of cool futuristic ways to counter your arguments. That's the fun of talking about the future. It's easy to be unconstrained when there's no cost or technical hurdles and all you have to do is say neat words. It's also the danger because if we fall too in love with ideas that have low TRLs and low funding then they'll never come to be. But then again, the idea of an atomic bomb in 1940 was far fetched...and then we had a reason to find billions of dollars to move that technology from a bunch of nerds' blackboards to an actual weapon system.

 

[Angry]

How does that even work? Do you pull a guy out of retirement just to publically abuse him for what is essentially your enjoyment?

It's not like people made these decisions on purpose. They were people trying to make the least bad decisions they could. Not sure how you hold someone accountable for doing that .

Shit, even if they did it on purpose then that's called downsizing or layoffs and that just business.

I was asking more with respect to people still on active duty. if its occurred mostly over the last 5 years I'm betting many are still around.

 

[Pags]

I was asking more with respect to people still on active duty. if its occurred mostly over the last 5 years I'm betting many are still around.

Ok, so how does that work? What does "hold someone accountable" mean in this case? Public apology? Tar and feather? Dunk tank? Removal of rank?

Like I said, most of these guys did the best they could. If you held a kangaroo court their story would still be "here's why we did what we did" and "here's why we didn't do that other thing."

Should your former command be able to hold you accountable for a failed AMI if you were a former QAO? Even if it was something you thought you were doing right?

These aren't criminal offenses that demand justice.

 

[SlickAg]

Is there a reason why the brass who were denying it can't be held accountable? I'm genuinely asking this question, in line with my "no one is around to take responsibility" comments from earlier.

They were either a) ignorant that a problem truly existed and thus bad at their jobs or b) knew that a problem existed and lied about it - clearly an ethical failure, especially since the primary motive for lying would be to obscure one's own shortcomings. I'm not interested in seeing someone hang from a yardarm because they didn't correctly mitigate a manning shortfall, but I feel like it would send a good message to future leaders to see someone held accountable for their inaction in SOME fashion.

sarcasm//SUSTAINED SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE//end sarcasm

 

[Flash]

Don't disagree with the current state of what's out there now. But like I said, finding smart people to solve hard problems quickly is something that we culturally tend to be good at in war time. Hopefully it holds true for the next time we need someone to pull a rabbit out of a hat....We can go round and round on this with you saying "but now" and "but in real life" and I can make up all sorts of cool futuristic ways to counter your arguments. That's the fun of talking about the future.

We are literally pouring billions into this problem and ones like it, the future is already here and it ain't pretty. I know that there might be some revolutionary tech just over the hill but from what I've seen it is a pretty tall, sandy dune in the Namib desert. I work with folks far smarter than me who actually talk about this stuff for fun in between doing their real work and they have problems coming up with solutions. I may not understand it all but having seen UAV ops in the military and catching the easier to understand stuff, it ain't a problem that will be surmounted anytime soon.

But then again, the idea of an atomic bomb in 1940 was far fetched...and then we had a reason to find billions of dollars to move that technology from a bunch of nerds' blackboards to an actual weapon system.

One of the folks I work with actually studied nuclear physics and has a love, bordering on weird, of nuke weapons. She has told me many times that making nuke weapons is actually pretty basic physics, all you need is the raw materials and enough nerds and/or computers to crunch the numbers and voila! Jeez, even 'lil Kim and his dad were able to make a few.

 

[Swanee]

I also think there is great value in having UAV 'crews' with a strong aviator background to help manage the aircraft and the mission, especially given how much more closely they would complement existing VP mission.

I agree. But that's a training issue. We tend to overlook the attitudes part of the learning equation when we train UAV guys from day one. We are able to cut some knowledge, and a lot of skill training, but we have found that the shorter time to train means less touches with an instructor on what it means to have the attitude of a professional aviator.

I have some ideas on how to fix that though. Contract the UAV guys from the start, just like pilot and NFO. Send everyone to API and primary. I think they should go to pilot primary, because they need to be taught what it means to sign for an aircraft and to be responsible and accountable for an airplane.

Then branch off to UAV intermediate/advanced. This allows peer groups to develop, and has the capability to build trust and confidence in the UAV community from every other aviation community. When you walk into a planning conference and see a good dude who did well with you in flight school, you're a little more likely to accept them and their knowledge. It also gives the touch time to develop the true aviation background. It's not as cheap as the DoD wants, but I think it's the right way to do it.

How does/did the P-3, EP-3, S-3, team work together? Was it similar enough to have an EP-3 guy bounce back and forth? How does the Triton mission relationship differ? I understand that this probably could go high side quickly, but I think it would help understand why Triton should continue to be a B-Billet of VP. Is it because VP runs it already? If so, isn't that how we got a really capable strike UAV from the boat turned into an ISR tanker?

 

[Flash]

How does/did the P-3, EP-3, S-3, team work together? Was it similar enough to have an EP-3 guy bounce back and forth? How does the Triton mission relationship differ? I understand that this probably could go high side quickly, but I think it would help understand why Triton should continue to be a B-Billet of VP. Is it because VP runs it already? If so, isn't that how we got a really capable strike UAV from the boat turned into an ISR tanker?

The mission for the EP-3 was completely different and there was very little crossing of the streams for very good reason, there were integration issues when VQ was absorbed by the larger 'MPRA' community (i.e. most VP leadership had little care or desire to learn the VQ mission) and I think that is part of what helped with the demise of VQ as a separate community. We did have a small handful of VP folks transition to VQ, they had to actually transition communities back then, but they usually had a very steep learning curve.

The one part of Triton I believe will get the short stick will be the VQ mission, I think the EW expertise that resides in VQ now will quickly wither away and the bigger decision makers who pay the bills (not just the Navy)won't care enough to see it thrive. It is a cynical view but from what I've seen, as an outsider now, doesn't give me much hope. It is a bit ironic since the Navy officer who laid much of the ground work for a missionized 737 was a VQ guy.

Contract the UAV guys from the start, just like pilot and NFO. Send everyone to API and primary. I think they should go to pilot primary, because they need to be taught what it means to sign for an aircraft and to be responsible and accountable for an airplane...Then branch off to UAV intermediate/advanced.

A good idea but one big hurdle, money. If the USAF is talking about cutting pilot training for actual pilots by using virtual reality or whatever they call it actual pilot training for UAV folks will likely be a non-starter.

 

[Brett327]

Is there a reason why the brass who were denying it can't be held accountable? I'm genuinely asking this question, in line with my "no one is around to take responsibility" comments from earlier.

They were either a) ignorant that a problem truly existed and thus bad at their jobs or b) knew that a problem existed and lied about it - clearly an ethical failure, especially since the primary motive for lying would be to obscure one's own shortcomings. I'm not interested in seeing someone hang from a yardarm because they didn't correctly mitigate a manning shortfall, but I feel like it would send a good message to future leaders to see someone held accountable for their inaction in SOME fashion.

OK, so how do you actually do that? Exactly who do you hold accountable? By what administrative process you you implement that? Every decision maker from that time has moved on or retired. Do you write them a bad FITREP in their current job? Does their current RS legally have the power to weigh in retroactively? Do you have an IG investigate and provide recommendations to CNO? If they just missed the mark on a issue where opinions varied, does that constitute the basis for DFC? People do make mistakes, and we claim to be against zero-defect mindsets. If they lied, can you prove it? Do you know all the facts? Perhaps they did know but a decision was made to minimize the issue in public while working quietly in the background.

I list all these questions not to obfuscate, but to demonstrate what a complex undertaking that kind of thing would be. So, my question to you if this: What would be enough of a rebuke to satisfy your desire for example-making? Then, what is the administrative (or legal) process that gets you there? The guy who was ultimately in charge of PERS at the time, ADM Bill Moran, is about to be the next CNO.

Go.

 

[SlickAg]

OK, so how do you actually do that? Exactly who do you hold accountable? By what administrative process you you implement that? Every decision maker from that time has moved on or retired or been promoted to positions of higher rank and responsibility. Do you write them a bad FITREP in their current job? Does their current RS legally have the power to weigh in retroactively? Do you have an IG investigate and provide recommendations to CNO? If they just missed the mark on a issue where opinions varied, does that constitute the basis for DFC? People do make mistakes, and we claim to be against zero-defect mindsets. If they lied, can you prove it? Do you know all the facts? Perhaps they did know but a decision was made to minimize the issue in public while working quietly in the background.

I list all these questions not to obfuscate, but to demonstrate what a complex undertaking that kind of thing would be. So, my question to you if this: What would be enough of a rebuke to satisfy your desire for example-making? Then, what is the administrative (or legal) process that gets you there? The guy who was ultimately in charge of PERS at the time, ADM Bill Moran, is about to be the next CNO.

Go.

FIFY.

I think an IG investigation would be a fantastic idea. Look at the systems in place that worked or not and recommend changes and implementations for the future. Capture the lessons learned. Mainly so the Navy doesn't repeat this colossal failure.

Then after the report is made public, the responsible parties and/or leadership could publish an open letter in Proceedings or some other professional journal in the interest of education for all hands, much like true confessions in the Ready Room. They could have a chance to tell their side of things and explain the difficulties involved. No need for any of that official mumbo jumbo. It would just require the willingness on their part to be a little publicly embarrassed.

You're focusing on all the legal and administrative difficulties. I think most people would just be interested in seeing them do the "right" thing.

 

[squorch2]

Screw it, just fire them.

 

[Hotdogs]

I think it's an important step to begin to take for the Navy UAS communities- developing a separate, professional career field that can train and sustain itself.

The Marine Corps has made the huge mistake of making it the B-Billet world for traditionally winged guys since it's inception in 1984. That means that there is no community buy in from the officer ranks, as everyone was just there for a couple years and then is going back to "real" aviation. There is no real direction or sense of community, and standardization is incredibly tough when each squadron may be commanded by a pilot or NFO from completely different type.

At least you guys are keeping the Triton in VP and the Firescout in H(SC?). But soon enough you're going to want ENS Timmy to be a UAS guy from the get go, so that when he's a DH he's been in the community for 10 years, and as a CO he's been there close to, if not, 20. And it's a horrible idea for UAS to be the Nami Whammy platoon. You don't want any community to have the land of broken toys stigma- especially if they are in the business of killing.

Otherwise, as is Navy fashion, the UAV tour will be off the golden path, and you won't get the quality or buy in, as you're not sending your top guys there. The community will always play second fiddle to whomever owns it, and will never be as good as it could if it were allowed to stand on it's own two feet as a professional warfighting discipline.

I agree. But that's a training issue. We tend to overlook the attitudes part of the learning equation when we train UAV guys from day one. We are able to cut some knowledge, and a lot of skill training, but we have found that the shorter time to train means less touches with an instructor on what it means to have the attitude of a professional aviator.

I have some ideas on how to fix that though. Contract the UAV guys from the start, just like pilot and NFO. Send everyone to API and primary. I think they should go to pilot primary, because they need to be taught what it means to sign for an aircraft and to be responsible and accountable for an airplane.

Then branch off to UAV intermediate/advanced. This allows peer groups to develop, and has the capability to build trust and confidence in the UAV community from every other aviation community. When you walk into a planning conference and see a good dude who did well with you in flight school, you're a little more likely to accept them and their knowledge. It also gives the touch time to develop the true aviation background. It's not as cheap as the DoD wants, but I think it's the right way to do it.

How does/did the P-3, EP-3, S-3, team work together? Was it similar enough to have an EP-3 guy bounce back and forth? How does the Triton mission relationship differ? I understand that this probably could go high side quickly, but I think it would help understand why Triton should continue to be a B-Billet of VP. Is it because VP runs it already? If so, isn't that how we got a really capable strike UAV from the boat turned into an ISR tanker?

You guys have your PMOS. You have a pipeline and career path very similar to winged aviators. You guys are getting MQ-9s (or some variant of it). We’ve arguably ponied up some very solid guys to command VMU. One of them was a very capable and well respected AH-1W driver who should’ve been an HMLA CO. Your PMOS doesn’t have enough depth to have pure MOS COs yet. I honestly don’t know what else you guys want.

Based off of my conversations in training and elsewhere with VMU, You guys seem to be very eager to be a part of the fires and effects game, but have little actual ambition to fully understand what that means with in the limitations of your current capability. There are some structural issues with retention across the services and VMU is no exception to that, but some of this attitude is internal to your community. When I start speaking basic PGM employment envelopes, laser geometry, and CFF with VMU and get handed some eye rolls, You can understand other communities frustrations with how you guys operate... and I’m not even including the perennial flying FOD/Metal bird strike hazard in an objective area you guys could create. Sometimes you can be your own worst enemy.

 

[Swanee]

You guys have your PMOS. You have a pipeline and career path very similar to winged aviators. You guys are getting MQ-9s (or some variant of it). We’ve arguably ponied up some very solid guys to command VMU. One of them was a very capable and well respected AH-1W driver who should’ve been an HMLA CO. Your PMOS doesn’t have enough depth to have pure MOS COs yet. I honestly don’t know what else you guys want.

Based off of my conversations in training and elsewhere with VMU, You guys seem to be very eager to be a part of the fires and effects game, but have little actual ambition to fully understand what that means with in the limitations of your current capability. There are some structural issues with retention across the services and VMU is no exception to that, but some of this attitude is internal to your community. When I start speaking basic PGM employment envelopes, laser geometry, and CFF with VMU and get handed some eye rolls, You can understand other communities frustrations with how you guys operate... and I’m not even including the perennial flying FOD/Metal bird strike hazard in an objective area you guys could create. Sometimes you can be your own worst enemy.

You're preaching to the choir man.

Yes, we've had some solid CO's, and I worked for the one of which you speak. But the guy who followed him was a DASC turned UAV guy, and now a Prowler guy. That's tough for continuity, and each squadron may do things drastically differently.

Is it getting better? Sure. But we're not there, and 30 years of somewhat botched history has made it tough.

We're not ready for MQ-9. We say we are, but... We're not at that level- some of us are, but we're wearing pilot/NFO wings on our chests. I argue that our training pipelines are too short, and our T&R manual doesn't have enough codes and too many of them can be completed in the simulator. Very few of our WTIs can hold a candle to other aviation communities' WTIs.

One of those awesome COs (a short, bald, Harrier guy) told me once, "Swanee, one day we'll be able to run, but first we have to figure out how to take the clown shoes off."

I want buy in, I want money for legitimate training and a legitimate training pipeline. I want my peers to have to have the same level of aviation knowledge that we were required to have when we winged. I want my peers to be better and I want the bar to be higher. I want the "It's just a UAV" attitude to go away.

You guys should absolutely be frustrated when you work with VMU. We've spent too much time operating in a ROZ, on a preprogrammed route, circling in the overhead pointing our camera at whatever we see, without actually knowing what being really good at what you do means.

 

[Brett327]

I think an IG investigation would be a fantastic idea. Look at the systems in place that worked or not and recommend changes and implementations for the future. Capture the lessons learned. Mainly so the Navy doesn't repeat this colossal failure.

That's a nice sentiment, but the IG doesn't do process improvement. They focus on fraud/waste/abuse and misconduct for the most part. This one from the IG website might apply:

• Mismanagement/Organization Oversight (Significant Cases)

But, as with so many things, the devil is in the details. Before we even get to your complaint, have you attempted to resolve the situation through the formal grievance process, or through your chain of command? In most cases the IG will not accept a complaint unless these steps are taken and documented.

Next, you're going to have to provide some specific details: Name the person responsible. Provide the exact date and time of the wrongdoing. Exactly what action did this individual take or fail to take? What was the impact?

Piece of cake.

So, the real question is, why haven't you clicked this link and taken the action you're recommending?
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/ig