I was referring to Captain Honors specifically, but the case of Capt. McWherter also comes to mind. My point is that the Navy is quite capable of retroactive accountability when desired.
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Rand study on USAF pilot retention
- Thread starter UInavy
- Start date
I was referring to Captain Honors specifically, but the case of Capt. McWherter also comes to mind. My point is that the Navy is quite capable of retroactive accountability when desired.
This is the part that is falling out of our current skills based training model. When we reduce the skill (and RQ-21 is a great example of the keyboard/mouse click control interface) required to fly the airplane, we shorten the training timeline. However, what is learned in 2 years of flight school wrt knowledge and attitude, can't be replicated in 6 months. Learned behaviors and mental models take time to develop. In the case of our enlisted population, boot camp is longer (13 weeks) than our aviation MOS producing school house (two 6 week classes = 12 weeks) in which they are given wings and designated as aircrew upon completion.
The Officer side is better, they do get 40ish hours in the DA-20 and then go learn to fly instruments in a cheaper version of the T-6 sim, and then it's off to RPA fundamentals and then their T/M/S. So they turn out at about the Primary/early intermediate level of knowledge (albeit on a much simpler airplane) by the time they get to our 6 week RQ-21A CAT I course- which consists of 15 sims and 1 flight.
I don't think it's nearly enough. But it's cheap and relatively quick, and if you want to follow the model that we've been doing and saying, "Hey, it's just a UAV" I guess it answers the mail.
Also- the Marines going to fly the MQ-9 will first have to do a 24-30 month tour with the Air Force upon completion of the MQ-9 FRS/FTU before they can come back to the Marine Corps. We'll see if they stick, or if they run back to the Air Force as soon as their commitment is up.
I don't know if the Air Force is producing better initial accession RPA pilots. I do know that their FRS is 6 months instead of 6 weeks. So in the time it takes an Air Force dude to be finished with their initial school, a Marine can be well into, if not complete with, the 3000 level syllabus.
Let's examine the differences - I think they matter.
We can disagree about whether CAPT Honors' videos constituted misconduct, but the ISIC did make that determination at the time and took action to relieve him.
Now compare that to a series of admittedly questionable policy decisions at PERS (in hindsight) by many people over a long period of time, where as far as we know, nothing that rose to the level of misconduct took place.
I'm sympathetic to the desire to increase accountability for senior leaders, but I'm having a really tough time seeing these two cases as good examples where equivalency can be drawn. I agree that the Navy is capable of retroactively holding individuals accountable when misconduct has occurred. I think those waters get very murky when you apply that concept broadly to a large organization like PERS, whose leadership at all levels has changed hands several times, when no clear act of misconduct is evident.
I agree with you here - you can't point to a single example of misconduct, and that makes it difficult to hold people accountable. But my question is this - would a reasonable man look at PERS over the last ten years and say they have handled the "crisis" situation appropriately? If the answer is yes, then carry on smartly - I'm not senior or experienced enough to make that call.
If the answer is no, then the situation was mishandled by someone or some group of people, and they need to be identified. In reality there is no "Big Navy" - it all comes down to individuals. For those (like me) who have never worked at PERS the place is a gigantic black box; I have no idea how the organization works and they have no interest in giving me that information. My entire opinion is speculation - I own that, along with whatever misjudgments or logical flaws that result.
But over the last few years I've heard comments like "we didn't do a good job telling the board how to value X" or "the SWOs don't understand this" or my personal favorite - when they intentionally screw up basic math by inflating the numerator of selected DHs with the above zone guys and don't touch the denominator. Who is the we? Who is doing those things? Those are the people who should have to answer to this. With a UCMJ charge? No, that's ridiculous, they didn't break the law. But if you were in charge of the command that is responsible for the appropriate promotion and retention of Naval Officers, and it is determined that the command didn't do its job, you should have to show cause for continuing to lead larger and more important commands. This is worse than the Peter Principle - its people being promoted past their abilities not just once but multiple times.
Part of this is due to the rotational nature of military tours. Oftentimes, decisions made today will not have an effect (positive or negative) for years - well after the individual responsible has moved on. I'm not sure there's a good way to account for that in a fair way - especially when we're talking about judgement calls based on available information at the time. Sometimes things don't go according to plan. It sounds like you want to retroactively demote or DFC someone from a currently held position based on something that happened three years ago. I just don't see a good way of doing that in a way that's fair or practical.
Thought experiment:
You're an instructor at the FRS. One of your students is struggling in the syllabus. You do an HFB, PRB, etc and based on the available information, decide to not recommend a FNAEB to the CO. This student goes on to complete the course and goes to the fleet.
Five years later, this former student of yours, through what is determined to be gross pilot error, crashes his jet and kills his crew. You are now a DH. What is your degree of culpability given your decision to allow him to continue in the FRS? Should you be demoted, reprimanded or fired from your DH tour? Should you make a public apology to the families of the crew he killed?
Not a perfect analogy, but I hope it illustrates just how complicated an undertaking you're proposing. Accountability should always be the goal, but we work in an immensely complicated bureaucratic organization and sometimes that just isn't possible, practical or fair.
It's a decent thought experiment and one that a few of us have had over beers, only from a slightly different angle: How about a CO who gives his long #1 EP to a guy who (at the time) appears to be solid, respected/admired by CPOs, JOPA, and Sailors, but comes unhinged once in the front office and drives a squadron into the ground. Should the CO who made this guy a CO be held accountable? Yes. No. Maybe. It's tough question. It's as imperfect of a question as Brett's, but it does get you thinking about where the line is drawn, or if it is ever drawn.
In my estimation, there were/are several senior leaders with rose colored glasses permanently affixed to their heads. They failed to listen closely enough, or ask the really tough questions based on the information they had/have. At the same time, they were/are admittedly limited in the number of levers they have to pull, knowing an action today has significantly more reactions and consequences 2,4,10 years down the line.
So what's a guy to do? And these are general musings, not directed to, or in response to any particular post here: Tip O'Neil once said, "all politics is local." I'd offer that all leadership is local. Focus on what you can control within your sphere of influence. Go all in trying to get your Sailors the classes, tools, and training they need. When shitty deals come down from Pers or local manning dudes, push back and ask why? Push your JO's hard to focus on their tactical development while screening as much BS as you can for them. Try to do what you can to make "work" fun, and pick your battles wisely. Get creative in looking for and creating training opportunities where they don't seem to exist now. Don't sugar coat things for your guys, Sailors or JO's, they're all way too smart to buy BS lines from their own squadron leaders, and you'll instantly lose credibility with them. A recognition on your part that things aren't awesome, but that you're willing to do what you can from your current station in life to affect positive outcomes will go a long way.
Sure, but.... be careful in who you anoint as a "young turk." Not every LT who's read the John Boyd cliff notes is the revolutionary #innovator they fancy themselves to be. There's one you and I have recently PM'd about that comes to mind.
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Not talking retroactive demotion or DFC - more along the lines of considering the failure when screening the individual for future positions of authority/responsibility.
I actually like your analogy even though it isn't perfect, because it highlights something I think happens all too often - pushing people who shouldn't be fleet aviators/flight officers out of the FRS and into the fleet to fill seats. Obviously the gross pilot error and death isn't a frequent occurrence (thankfully). But with respect to your analogy - I'm a FO so let's change it up a little.
If one of my students was responsible for shooting a training missile into a fishing boat (TC problems) after I recommended him for qualification, I would absolutely expect to be held responsible in some way. Firing me? Maybe. Recovation of my Instructor qualification? Probably, for good reason. Having it reflected in my fitrep that one of my students schwacked XXX number of innocent mariners? Yea. Absolutely. If the evidence was there that this person couldn't handle the procedures or the anxiety or whatever it was that led to HFB, PRB, TRB, but I went against that to make a personal recommendation to the Skipper for retention, that's on me. You've got a paper trail of me saying "he/she has had problems but I think the skills are there and he can do the job." I understand the non-zero-defect mentality, but we carry live weapons. Sometimes defects are unacceptable.
I don't expect the Skipper to know the intimate details of every upgrader in a squadron, that's why he/she has qualified instructors. We already erode an instructor's authority (at least in VP land) by not taking failures/marginals seriously and allowing endless reflies or "he had a bad day" or "the instructor was too demanding" excuses. I'm not looking to threadjack (ok, maybe), but if I want my opinion to be taken seriously when I fail someone who deserves it, I damn well better be able to accept responsibility when I pass someone who doesn't.
Now, recaging this for the PERS/manning crisis - we aren't talking about life and death. But if someone is in a position of administrative authority, and it comes out down the line that they couldn't handle it, should they not be disqualified for greater administrative authority? In line with the analogy - would you as a Skipper ever trust my judgment about a struggling student again? At the very least, should the question not be raised? From what I gather you don't disagree with this sentiment (correct me if I'm wrong) but the argument is its too difficult/not clear how to deal with the situation. I agree, but that doesn't mean we don't try.
Would you though? I have a hard time believing something like that would happen. I know that VPenis is capable of great evil, but even for you guys, that would be a stretch.
As a CO, if I had a JO fire a missile into a fishing vessel, the idea of firing the Training Officer probably would not occur to me, absent some other aggravating circumstances.
Mistakes are opportunities to learn and grow - even when the stakes are high. Most people would take that lesson on board. I'm not the kind of person who holds a single bad decision against you in perpetuity. People fuck things up all the time, recover, and move on with life.
As an old Skipper once told me, "It's OK to step on your dick... just don't mark time on it."
Honestly, I would. But that is because I only ever pass a someone I'm evaluating/instructing if they have fulfilled the requirements of the event without reservation. I'm a big fan of "you didn't get it right today, but that doesn't mean you can't get it right ever - we'll train you some more and bring you back when you are ready." That approach has definitely gotten me in trouble before - when you fail an O-4 on a NATOPS check, it somehow becomes the fault of the JO instructor - but I'm my own biggest critic and couldn't look at myself in the mirror if I gave someone a pass when they didn't perform up to par.
Copy what you are saying that people need learning opportunities, I've never written someone off after one flight as worthless, and God knows I've underperformed more than once. But I also don't believe that everyone who ends up in a fleet squadron is cut out for the job - and my friends in the varying phases of production throughout the fleet tend to agree that our attrition rates don't reflect an appropriate degree of scrutiny in undergraduate flight training. Everyone loves a comeback story, but not everyone that fucks something up is going to come back from it. And maybe we'll disagree on this, but sometimes I believe the stakes are too high to take a chance on someone who has already proven they can't perform well. In our community (I know...VPenis) all our weapons shots or high risk evolutions go to O-4s or EP JOs. You don't see a lot of middle of the pack or underperformers getting to play with live warheads - so there clearly is a line drawn in the sand somewhere.
You're right - I do disagree.
Missile shoots and other training evolutions with live drops have so many controls, ORM and procedural safeguards in place that the actual risk of gooning it away is fairly low. Supervision is, of course, important, but IMO, those evolutions are some of the best ways to have junior people learn their craft. When we had AIM-120 or HARM shoots in my squadron, mid tour JOs paired with an FNG was standard fare.
Probably because the only thing that mattered for readiness was that 1 of 12 crews fired or dropped 1 live harpoon or maverick.
What you've just articulated in your last couple of posts is risk. And most of the fleet pubs are pretty clear that a good deal of the risk acceptance is done at the CO level. That's why as an IP you don't qualify someone, you provide a recommendation to the CO that a guy get qualled. At least in the 60 NATOPS and SWTP is was clearly delineated that a CO could qualify whomever he wanted. So a CO could take the risk to to qualify a guy and then mitigate that risk by never scheduling him to shoot. But even a guy who aced his training flights can goon it up. So even a perfect record and glowing recommendation will never completely remove all risk. But in the end the squadrons risk level is managed by the CO.
Also, you don't want a system where IPs are held accountable for the actions of the guys they passed. Because the IP acceptance level would be perfection and no one would get qualled because too many IPs would be covering their ass. Can you imagine what would happen if the IPs thought they could be culpable for man slaughter? I say this not as a guess but because I've lived in an organization where the technical authority doesn't work for your program and can say no until his risk level is satisfied. Then the acceptance of technical risk by the program becomes much harder. It's a huge pain in the technical world and would be suicidal in a warfighting organization.
I'd also say that what it sounds like you're really looking for is messaging from PERS on how and why things got messed up. But I'm not even sure PERS would say things are messed up if there are enough bodies to fill fleet seats. A DH Screen is an admin board that isn't a statuatory requirement. it would be up to the NAE to do away with the DH Screen and allow any O4 to fill those billets. Or to let a senior O3 fill them. I'm guessing some top level discussions might be along the lines of "this is NAE's to figure out and fix. you have enough bodies to fill your seats and it's only your own self imposed rules that are preventing you from filling them."
For all its faults, it's still less absurd than the AF. It's more like HSL with more useful flight time, better pay, and better deployment sites.
Kind of pathetic when you think about it - 12 people minimum are qualified to launch a weapon but we only test one of them.