Eddie,
Yes, the de-baathification did alot to alienate the standing powerbase in the Sunni sectors. Particularly in Al Anbar. Though I dont think it was the most significant factor.
It may have been a bad idea. But at the time there were some serious fears of bigger problems if they were left in place. They had significant combat power and we had inadequate forces in place to hold it together if one year later they put something together. Remember, we had "won" with a small force and pressure was on to reduce the footprint in theatre before the Abrams had even shut down their engines.
Its a hotly contested decision but pinning the insurgency on it alone or it "mostly" is short sighted. I'de bet that without hindsight most others in Amb Bremmer's position would have done something at least similar.
The insurgency in the south was an altogether different animal and remains such.
Thanks for this.
I clearly have some more reading to do... and yet part of me thinks the (my) "need" to dissect and understand the whole situation now now now is part of the problem. Evaluate the scenario, make my intellectual thought-point, and wash my hands of it, having "solved it" in my own mind without actually doing a damn thing to contribute to the actual solution.
I catch myself doing it too often, I catch too many others doing it far too often. I'm going to go run now, in the hopes that I may yet earn the privelage to make my own contribution to the solution.