Right there with you brother. My last jacket review (which I only did as a favor the NSC CO) was basically a laundry list of things I have zero interest in doing, or else I would have stayed on active duty.
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Solving the Navy's problems one RC squadron at a time
- Thread starter red_stang65
- Start date
We had a dude here who paid his own way to go to in res command and staff. We're the Guard, we're always coming back to our state, and most likely our wing- no one is going to take an 11 month PCS and all that entails- especially with a family.
So the dude ended up spending money on an apartment and spent a year geobaching it in order to stay on a golden path. The worst part was that senior and state leadership applauded the move "He's dedicated guy!" instead of seeing it for what it really was- another officer having to sacrifice a year away from family for the service in chase of a promotion.
We all joined the Guard so we didn't have to do this crap.
Like the anecdote above, even the ANG isn't immune. At least I'm an AGR on a set of orders that will take me to sanctuary as an O-4- and I've recently learned that no one cares what rank your retired ID card says. I've learned that there are two types of O-5s around the Guard/Reserves- the guys who care about the mission and doing the job as painlessly as possible- the functional leaders- and then the designated leaders who are chasing eagles and stars.
A buddy just sent me this quote from Mustin’s speech to the Reserve Organization of America last year:
“Through the diligent efforts of the entire force, the Navy Reserve is more focused on warfighting readiness than at any other time in our 107- year history, and even more lethal.”
So…the least amount of people, the least amount of hardware, and the least amount of funding in 107 years, and the Navy Reserve is more ready and more lethal than ever? Apparently the Navy Reserve will help win the next war by GMT, urinalysis, and PRT completion rates.
I'm less than convinced that things like 209 are worth anything other than a bunch of airshow geeks creaming themselves over Darth Vader. I've seen their deployment cycle as opposed to the active component, and you can't tell me a 2-month Misawa deployment is somehow a good use of 4-5 jets that otherwise could get used for a 6+ month active-duty deployment wherever a COCOM needs Growlers.
Yes, I get that there's more experience and knowledge in 209's ready room because it's more senior and selective, but it seems to me that it's an open question as to whether Big Navy is getting their return on investment out of those jets or whether it's just a bro-deal frat for finding and grooming future SELRES golden children. If the balloon goes up, is that seniority going to manifest itself in some uber-elite Growler squadron that's head and shoulders over the rest of the fleet? Or can that headcount serve OPLANs in other ways by giving the jets to COMVAQWINGPAC, standing up another AC Growler squadron, and putting the SELRES/FTS aviators in other roles?
I somehow doubt the PACOM or EUCOM CAOC's Chief of Combat Ops is going to come down in some crisis and say "I have a special mission! Send me the Star Warriors," as opposed to "I've got these SEAD lines and 15 Growlers in theater. NALE, make it happen."
Edit: The bigger point is that we have a group of people who are tasked with being tactically proficient and ready to go when the balloon goes up . . . and that's the active component. It's silly to think that the most effective use of reservists is aping the AC. Far better to look at where the AC has gaps and use the RC to complement or augment things. Do we really need reserve hardware squadrons slotted into deployments supporting COCOM OPLANS? Or is the right use of those folks things like adversary support, VR, and all the non-glamorous non-flying things like NALEs and filling staff billets? I'd argue the latter. You can't expect people with civilian jobs to keep their fighting skills as sharp as the AC O-3s through O-5s that already fill our AC squadrons. So why try?
Considering how over the past thirty years the “strategic reserve” was replaced with the demand for and direction to build an “operational reserve” as part of the “Total Force” that could seamlessly integrate with the active component in conflict, there is definitely a requirement for reserve units that deploy.
If there’s any question about the value of the reserves in wartime scenarios, consider how much of the Navy in WWI, WWII, and Korea were mobilized reservists: 54% of the Navy by the end of WWI, 84% of all Sailors in WWII, and 100,000 Sailors mobilized in Korea (source). Also, consider how many times VP-62/69, HSC-84/85 and HSM-60 have been deployed in the last 20 years supporting the AC and Joint Force with air ambulance, CSAR dets, ASW dets, and SOF support at fractions of the cost of AC units. Their experience buys down risk at lower operating costs to boot.
Yes, the active component is tasked to be tactically proficient for conflict. But you also can’t afford an active component OPLAN force at proficient levels all day every day, so you need to factor in cost savings. SECDEFs have been telling us to do that for several years now—Navy just hasn’t been. Reserves help keep that experience warm, and are a rheostat that can be dialed up/down as required. They’re also a pressure relief valve for pop-up tasking that the AC isn’t in a position on the MAP to support at the moment, or can help with all the other non-MAP work on the cheap.
We’ve done it right before, we just aren’t doing it now. And just because we’re doing it wrong now doesn’t mean that’s how we should keep doing it.
If there’s any question about the value of the reserves in wartime scenarios, consider how much of the Navy in WWI, WWII, and Korea were mobilized reservists: 54% of the Navy by the end of WWI, 84% of all Sailors in WWII, and 100,000 Sailors mobilized in Korea (source). Also, consider how many times VP-62/69, HSC-84/85 and HSM-60 have been deployed in the last 20 years supporting the AC and Joint Force with air ambulance, CSAR dets, ASW dets, and SOF support at fractions of the cost of AC units. Their experience buys down risk at lower operating costs to boot.
Yes, the active component is tasked to be tactically proficient for conflict. But you also can’t afford an active component OPLAN force at proficient levels all day every day, so you need to factor in cost savings. SECDEFs have been telling us to do that for several years now—Navy just hasn’t been. Reserves help keep that experience warm, and are a rheostat that can be dialed up/down as required. They’re also a pressure relief valve for pop-up tasking that the AC isn’t in a position on the MAP to support at the moment, or can help with all the other non-MAP work on the cheap.
We’ve done it right before, we just aren’t doing it now. And just because we’re doing it wrong now doesn’t mean that’s how we should keep doing it.
Can’t speak to VAQ, but I think Reserve VP/HSC/HSM communities have demonstrated that you could.
The "operational reserve" is rightly being chucked. That was a desperate play for relevance by Big Navy in an era when the big show was an Army/Air Force/Marine Corps show. Yes, there were joint billets here and there which Navy folks had the best skills to fill (EW comes to mind). But we don't pay for a Navy Reserve to be handing out basketballs in Djibouti. Let the AC handle the fact that they've fucked up their own headcount, and let the Army handle when they've fucked up their own headcount without demanding the Navy gap-fill. There's a reason the instruction says ADOS is not a replacement for going to PERS and saying "we need people."
Frankly, I don't agree with the idea that SELRES deployable units are a good ROI. Dwell limits prevent them from MOBing to the same tune as an AC unit using the same assets. Use them for a 6-month deployment and now you've lost them for 3 years. I say again . . . focus the reserves on places the AC needs plus-ups or complementary capabilities. Don't try to duplicate things that the AC does well like producing full-up deployable units. Units like the VFC and VR communities are straight up the RC's alley. The NALE and staff augmentation is straight up the RC's alley. CNATRA and FRS augments are straight up the RC's alley.
Frankly, I don't agree with the idea that SELRES deployable units are a good ROI. Dwell limits prevent them from MOBing to the same tune as an AC unit using the same assets. Use them for a 6-month deployment and now you've lost them for 3 years. I say again . . . focus the reserves on places the AC needs plus-ups or complementary capabilities. Don't try to duplicate things that the AC does well like producing full-up deployable units. Units like the VFC and VR communities are straight up the RC's alley. The NALE and staff augmentation is straight up the RC's alley. CNATRA and FRS augments are straight up the RC's alley.
Still a requirement from SECDEF, and CNO is still directing CNR to build it out. The major cuts that we’ve seen are the result of 20 years of AC control over reserve funding, and attempts to sell reserve units to buy active things. No other service has been doing this to the same extent, by the way, so “operational reserve” is still a thing, whether Navy is adhering to it or not.
Totally concur. Hence the recent cutting of a lot of irrelevant reserve billets (e.g.: Naval History & Heritage Command).
Plenty of data over several decades shows they are. Active Navy just has a rough track record of understanding or incorporating these forces into the big picture. True, the more you use them, the higher the cost goes. But they don’t need to do every deployment if they get rolled into the mix and can build opportunity for the AC to take a knee, get time for mods, SLEP, airframe transitions, etc. Also, Reserve VP, HSC, and HSM deploy(ed) way more frequently than once every 3 years and are still cheaper.
Latest Reserve Forces Policy Board memo goes over a good amount of history and data to show the value—operationally and financially (here). Looking at how USA/USAF/USMC use their reserve forces, one can see there’s a sizeable disconnect in how the Navy is currently using its resources.
Concur. Not an either/or choice, but about doing this/and—we can and have done both these and operational units since the 70s. USA/USAF/USMC also seem to have found a way to maintain and deploy their operational Guard/Reserve aviation units, too.
The challenge is how to get the mindset of leadership to recognize how far afield the process has gone, and dare I say, “get real, get better.” Twenty years of this inertia is probably going to take a while to stop and reverse, though.
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My (non flying) reserve unit is supposed to augment the active side during wartime. Unfortunately, MPRA manning is so FUBAR and the active side is short, so they now want us to "volunteer" to MOB and fill watch standing shifts during peacetime ops. The great idea is Reservist O-4s working 6 days on/1 off, 8 hour watches working for a CWO3 OIC, for six months. ?
I need to find one of those FUBIJAR "I quit once and I'll quit again" patches...
Agree with everything else you said except the bit about NR NHHC. I didn't really get the point of having reservists there either until I did an ADOS to OPNAV and had to go to them for info.
Most of what NHHC does "in the field" is collect data from Fleet units so that it can be crunched and used later if/when needed. If, for example, years down the road you needed to analyze CVN/CVW days at sea, sorties, etc, during OIF I. Otherwise that data has to be dug out of a dozen different sources that aren't easily accessible, or it's not collected anywhere at all. I talked to one bloke who worked on a project to compare underway days preceding past collisions-at-sea, as part of the McCain/Fitz analysis.
When the optempo goes way up, like during a shooting war, the small number of full-timers at NHHC are going to get quickly overwhelmed, so one could argue you have more of a need for Reservists at a place like that. Given all that, kind of sounds like an "I don't understand it, so it's not important" thing by Big Navy, which is much of a muchness to the rest of this discussion.
Now, other things like the Constitution Reserve unit (there apparently was such a thing), yes, I agree with the irrelevance. Neat way to spend your drill weekends, maybe not much use if the Chinese are lobbing cruise missiles into Honolulu.
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Nobody from NHHC ever became an admiral, so clearly it’s not important to the Navy’s mission.
I need that on a patch.
Wow…Greaseman!
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