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Navy VS Air Force Helicopter Pilot

Jim123 said:
:D



You have to suspend reality when the Kirov CCGN runs out of SSMs and attack with your FFG, dodging his shells while going to work with your 76mm. #tactics
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That is the knife in the teeth SWO answer. Once the Soviets are winchester and you've splashed all the vampires then you rush in and zap him guns and SSMs.

I always drew a corollary between torpedoes in WWII and ASCMs in the modern world. The IJN loved torpedoes and the USN preferred radar directed gunfire. The Soviets loved ASCMs and our SWOs loved ???. I'm guessing the answer to ??? was that CRUDES was there to protect the CVBG and the CVBG was the hammer because more recent CRUDES doesn't have the broadside weight of WWII CRUDES like the "machine gun cruiser" CLs.
 
Jim123 said:
I don't know why the decision was made to carry it so far outboard, far away from the aircraft's center of gravity.
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I think it was, in part, because it dropped first, then fired. Or more accurately, one of the locks would unlock and everyone hoped the other lock might also unlock before it fired*.

*Bonus points if it fired, but only after both locks unlocked. Sometimes it's failures were beneficial.

Pags said:
The Soviets loved ASCMs and our SWOs loved ???.
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For SAGs, the ??? was probably LAMPS. While my last perusal of the TACMAN was a while ago, there was still some stuff still in there that applies to Romeo, so I'll refrain from going into any more detail but if the SAG had a shooter, it was a thing.
 
Pags said:
That is the knife in the teeth SWO answer.
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Hey, I learned all kinds of tactics while playing Strike Fleet on the Commodore 64:

  • Harpoon and TASM swarms are pretty great
  • Overlapping fields of fire and intercept geometry for friendly SAMs and enemy SSMs
  • Helicopter AEW and remote targeting
  • The CIWS doesn't always get a kill on the first shot, not in eighties computer games anyway
  • Alfas a pretty fast so you'd better drop your torpedo pretty much right on him

Most important thing I learned was I really didn't want to spend days, months, or years of real life standing bridge watch and staring through binoculars...
 
Jim123 said:
If I remember correctly, we had angle of bank restrictions when carrying a Penguin missile in an H-60. Maneuvering restrictions when carrying slung ordnance are common on all aircraft, but carrying just one Penguin was a real physical burden for the -60, much worse than carrying torpedos.
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The fins on the Penguin, even folded, are too big to fit on the inboard pylon like a torp. Then the load offset from the CG starts to touch lateral control margins, e.g. stick at the lateral stop is insufficient to get back to wings level.

Our ASCM allergy arises, I think, because we've been doctrinally trying to relive Midway and the "carrier duels" for the past 75 years. Well, with a ~15 year break recently where we briefly redefined combat as sea-based bomb trucking into uncontested airspace. Ref 'The Rules of the Game' by Gordon. Also kinda hard to crack SAG v SAG when we can't figure out SAG v shipping lanes.
 
I always preferred “Red Storm Rising” for PC to learn ASuW attack geometry.
 
phrogdriver said:
I always preferred “Red Storm Rising” for PC to learn ASuW attack geometry.
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Either that one or the Red October home game computed your attack solution in real time on the display... something like a big circle on the tac display and when it got small then it was a good time to shoot the torpedo.

Really though, ASW and ASuW is mostly oceanography and geometry.
 
Jim123 said:
There was really no need to figure out how to do it with a helicopter.
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Initally yes, when both sides considered ocean battles where there's no place for ASuW helicopter work. But when the littoral wars came to reality, why not?

Pags said:
Soviets had ASCMs to kill convoys and CVBGs. We had SSNs and ASW to kill Soviet SSGNs and VF+VAW+AEGIS to kill Bears and vampires so VA and VFA could execute strikes
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Yes but even in this scenario it is better to have Perry-class with two 60' able to hit surfaced (for salvo) Echo-II SSGN with Harpoons rather than to wait until CVW's Vikings found and hit this sub, especially given the fact that may not be the CV escorting the Transatlantic convoy but FFGs were in escort inevitably.
 
Pags said:
I always drew a corollary between torpedoes in WWII and ASCMs in the modern world. The IJN loved torpedoes and the USN preferred radar directed gunfire. The Soviets loved ASCMs and our SWOs loved ???. I'm guessing the answer to ??? was that CRUDES was there to protect the CVBG and the CVBG was the hammer because more recent CRUDES doesn't have the broadside weight of WWII CRUDES like the "machine gun cruiser" CLs.
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According to VADN Henry C. Mustin, a Shoe, while being Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic c. 1988, there was initially no SWO intention to answer those flying "long lances" with something offensively tactical. It was the USN Bubbleheads who tried to answer the challenge. Let me cite his "Oral History" a bit:
I remember Walt Locke was the Tomahawk guy—the original Tomahawk project, before it became a joint program. He was a rear admiral. The only people who were looking at the Tomahawk were the submariners. They were looking at it as an anti-ship weapon. We knew that there was no way in hell you were ever going to be able to target a ship 600 miles away, because we couldn’t target the Harpoon. You fire this thing out there and no matter what you do with the seeker, at some point you’re going to turn it on, and whatever it sees it’s going to attack first. So they had a whole scheme of targeting systems they called “outlaw shark.” We were saying the anti-ship version of the Tomahawk should be a third priority. The first priority should be the TLAM—C, conventional version of Tomahawk. Submariners didn’t really like that, because the warhead of the TLAM—C was a 1000-pound bomb. And in order to really contribute to anything you had to carry a lot of them. They didn’t have the real estate in the submarines to carry enough TLAM—Cs to make any difference in a conventional scenario. Which is one of the reasons why they’re pushing to get these Tridents reconfigured. So, as I said before, there was no support from any of the other unions for the Tomahawk, but we persevered.

Although further Mustin adopted the surface fleet Tomahawk tactic:

So we went out in Bill Peerenboom’s ship (a CGN), and took five ships to go down for this. We went down in electronic silence and along the coast. The carrier couldn’t find us. In the meantime we had sent a couple of submarines down, and they located the carrier. So they were keeping us informed of the carrier’s position and we were still in silence. The carrier air wing was searching all over the Atlantic Ocean and couldn’t find us, because we had very carefully gone in one of these merchant routes. When we reached Tomahawk range we fired not only on the submarine-reported position, but on electronic signals that we received from the carrier at long-range. We fired what we called six Tomahawks; then we rolled the dice and said: Okay, two of them hit. Then we found out what the carrier had been doing at that time, and it turned out that they’d had a bunch of airplanes on deck, and things like that.
When we got down there I went over and saw the admiral on the carrier, and I said, “Hey, here’s the way the exercise worked out, as I see it. We fired these simulated missiles, and rolled the dice. Here’s what we had for your position.”
He checked it, and said, “Hey, you had us.”


The first was the submariners and it makes them similar in ASuW to Russians to a degree. All these tricks with SSGNs carrying ASCMs could (and I think should) be boiled down to just one key issue: a targeting. Even if one has a huge satellite group or air recco assets, the SSGMs are to be inevitably hanging on a periscope antennaes just to get a targeting info for a hours, and thus they are prey for ASW aviation. That is why we "rolled our eyes" when the USN killed VSs as ASW assets and stripped VPs off primary ASW role. Placing the CSG ASW on 60R' shoulders only seems to be a huge challenge to cope with.
 
thump said:
Our ASCM allergy arises, I think, because we've been doctrinally trying to relive Midway and the "carrier duels" for the past 75 years.
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It was the shortage of money which restricted the Soviets appetite to follow these lines. Could the Soviet economy and industry have been more effective, the USSR may present the big carrier fleet much earlier, instead of putting the money into submarines of all thinkable kinds.
 
Griz882 said:
"Halsey acted foolishly."

View attachment 23853
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No Soviet submarine crewmember, even a CO, had been allowed to wear beard, as there is a strict claim for safe mask's (so-called PDA) adhering. This claim exists till today. But... Imagine shaved Sean Connery and you got Mr. Bond at once, and thus imagine Bond (James Bond) as Soviet SSBN's CO - a hugest success of MI6! KGB sucks:D
 
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Pags said:
Soviets obviously loved ASCMs, the bigger the better!
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Technical gap. Our industry couldn't create missile engine small enough to be used on a missiles able to be fired through standard subs' 21" torpedo tubes until 1984 I think (up to SS-N-21 «Sampson»). Previously all those enormous ASCMs were essentially an expendable drones designed as airframes, especially those for air launch. And given the rarity of live launches by regularly commissioned ships and subs, I'm sure very little amount of officers with the fleets were aware how technically and electronically unreliable the systems of those missiles were. Those officers who knew that were mostly the Weapon Engineers from so-called Missile Technical Bases and they were protected from sea tour rotation - one my fellow spent all 15 years from commissioning to retirement with pension (O-1 to O-5) within the same base supervising the ballistic missiles' maintenance, which was quite usual career path for noted people. Average Gun/Missiles Weapon DH of a Soviet DDG had participated in live ASCM launch 0.3-0.5 times for his entire tenure. Submarine Weapon DH made it for about once during his service time including all his DivO and DH tours (8-12 years for total). So when Soviet/Russian navy officer is solidly sure for those ASCM combat worthness, it's better for you to be sure he came from somewhere far from the naval weaponry subcommunity.
 
Jim123 said:
Maneuvering restrictions when carrying slung ordnance are common on all aircraft, but carrying just one Penguin was a real physical burden for the -60, much worse than carrying torpedos.
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BTW when Penguin appeared to be the main ASuW weapon of Royal Norwegian AF's F-16s there had been a concern in Soviet Navy as to small combattants became vulnerable since they had no ECM means to protect themselves against this missile. But sooner than noted ECMs got IOC, the Penguins went off?
 
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