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CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt makes quite the statement.
- Thread starter CAMike
- Start date
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
Not at all.
Some people can be hard nosed leaders and revered by their subordinates like General Mattis. These people have a gift of charisma that when they correct someone or come down on them, the person walks away thinking positively of that person. They're the top 1%.
Most are not like that. Most are like a CO I had as a JO that came into a ship that had let its skills and cleanliness decay in a 6 month upkeep. Like, couldn't fight a fire if our lives depended on it. Almost everyone with deployment experience, including officers, transferred.
We worked long days, Saturdays, you name it. Evening trainers, extra field days, etc. We hated him because he was a poor communicator. He was as inspirational as Ben Stein. We thought he was a slave driver and we hated how risk adverse he was compared to his predecessor. In retrospect, we needed the sets and reps, but we didn't know it as first tour sailors and JOs.
We deployed successfully, and just barely lost out on the Battle E.
Should that type of leader get fired? Should he have focused on being more likeable at the expense of raising the ship's performance? Should he have settled for 'good enough' instead of being the best we could possibly be?
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Thanks for considering that.
Is anyone really shocked or surprised by the outcome?
I do not know of anytime where the Navy reversed it's firing decision.
I know a CVN XO fired for loss of confidence, then was cleared during the BOI, and was DONE...never to re-enter the CVN CO pipeline. He still retired as a CAPT, so he's got that going for him.
I'll bite...what did CAG do or not do?
CAG? It was implied in the story.
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Just read it again...still not picking up on why "The carrier air wing commander and the ship's chief of medical operations will be referred for administrative action..."
Only thing I think maybe could be implied is that since they definitively said it wasn't Crozier that leaked it, that the administrative action is for those two leaking it? I didn't see any such implication of that, but can't think of anything else that was maybe "implied".
Go on.
some excerpts...
309. Junior Medical Department personnel drafted a letter and presented it to the TR SMO, who was the last to sign it.387310. In the letter, the signatories outlined their concerns over the situation on TR, detailed the possibility of 50 fatalities onboard the TR based on their assessment of published COVID-19 mortality rated at the time, and threatened to release their letter to the media.38
316. The TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to the Surgeon General copying CPF and C7F Surgeons and a few other senior leaders within Navy medicine.394317. Approximately three minutes later, the TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to over 160 recipients, none of whom were in TR’s operational or administrative chain of command.395
309. Junior Medical Department personnel drafted a letter and presented it to the TR SMO, who was the last to sign it.387310. In the letter, the signatories outlined their concerns over the situation on TR, detailed the possibility of 50 fatalities onboard the TR based on their assessment of published COVID-19 mortality rated at the time, and threatened to release their letter to the media.38
316. The TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to the Surgeon General copying CPF and C7F Surgeons and a few other senior leaders within Navy medicine.394317. Approximately three minutes later, the TR SMO sent the Medical Department letter via email to over 160 recipients, none of whom were in TR’s operational or administrative chain of command.395
From the TR CI Report, Summary of Opinions
3. The TR SMO’s recommendation and the resulting release by the former TR CO of crewmembers in quarantine from the aft portion of the ship on March 29, 2020 likely resulted in infection to a larger portion of the crew.
4. The embarked CSG-9 Warfare Commanders (WCs) (TR CO, CVW-11 CAG, DESRON Commodore) and the TR SMO displayed an abundance of concern for the safety of the crew as their primary focus, yet they were unable to develop COAs prior to or even by four days after arrival in Guam that provided for the short-term safety of the crew. Instead, they focused efforts on the most constrained and least executable COA (at the time), while taking insufficient parallel steps that would have resulted in more immediate segregation, quarantine and isolation of the crew. As a result, efforts to move the crew off the ship were uncoordinated, unsupervised and slow. The extended time Sailors remained on the ship, while no longer segregated, likely increased the number of infections.
**
9. The TR SMO developed a flawed, worst-case crew casualty narrative that the CVW-11 CAG reinforced and frequently amplified at Warfare Commander Boards, and that had an impact on the mindset of the former TR CO and TR XO. The TR SMO fostered distrust of HHQ actions, and put his leadership in an untenable situation.
10. The TR CO sent his email and letter as a genuine plea for help from CPF and CNAP. Each leader received and acted upon it as such, responding via phone and email, respectively, within minutes of receipt, with CNAP also ensuring C7F and CJRM were made aware of the request. Further, CPF considered the matter of sending the letter closed after his conversation with both CCSG-9 and TR CO.
11. When asked to sign a letter that contained a flawed, worst-case crew casualty narrative as well as an ultimatum concerning an intent to submit the letter to the public, the TR SMO missed a leadership opportunity to correct subordinates. Instead, he signed the letter, and transmitted it outside the chain of command, essentially endorsing the effort to undermine Navy leadership.
12. The former TR CO intended for his email to be a “red flare” to accelerate needed support and ensure attention to what he believed to be insufficient courses of action. The former TR CO wrote his email to break down communication barriers on plans, resources and support, and did not intend for it to be released to the public. However, he did not personally inform his Immediate Superior in Command, CCSG-9, of the letter and instead transmitted information of a very sensitive nature about a capital warship on an unclassified network.
3. The TR SMO’s recommendation and the resulting release by the former TR CO of crewmembers in quarantine from the aft portion of the ship on March 29, 2020 likely resulted in infection to a larger portion of the crew.
4. The embarked CSG-9 Warfare Commanders (WCs) (TR CO, CVW-11 CAG, DESRON Commodore) and the TR SMO displayed an abundance of concern for the safety of the crew as their primary focus, yet they were unable to develop COAs prior to or even by four days after arrival in Guam that provided for the short-term safety of the crew. Instead, they focused efforts on the most constrained and least executable COA (at the time), while taking insufficient parallel steps that would have resulted in more immediate segregation, quarantine and isolation of the crew. As a result, efforts to move the crew off the ship were uncoordinated, unsupervised and slow. The extended time Sailors remained on the ship, while no longer segregated, likely increased the number of infections.
**
9. The TR SMO developed a flawed, worst-case crew casualty narrative that the CVW-11 CAG reinforced and frequently amplified at Warfare Commander Boards, and that had an impact on the mindset of the former TR CO and TR XO. The TR SMO fostered distrust of HHQ actions, and put his leadership in an untenable situation.
10. The TR CO sent his email and letter as a genuine plea for help from CPF and CNAP. Each leader received and acted upon it as such, responding via phone and email, respectively, within minutes of receipt, with CNAP also ensuring C7F and CJRM were made aware of the request. Further, CPF considered the matter of sending the letter closed after his conversation with both CCSG-9 and TR CO.
11. When asked to sign a letter that contained a flawed, worst-case crew casualty narrative as well as an ultimatum concerning an intent to submit the letter to the public, the TR SMO missed a leadership opportunity to correct subordinates. Instead, he signed the letter, and transmitted it outside the chain of command, essentially endorsing the effort to undermine Navy leadership.
12. The former TR CO intended for his email to be a “red flare” to accelerate needed support and ensure attention to what he believed to be insufficient courses of action. The former TR CO wrote his email to break down communication barriers on plans, resources and support, and did not intend for it to be released to the public. However, he did not personally inform his Immediate Superior in Command, CCSG-9, of the letter and instead transmitted information of a very sensitive nature about a capital warship on an unclassified network.
