FloridaDad
Well-Known Member
Just a question man, no need to get aggressive about it. I think it's entirely normal to ask questions about what to expect.
Thanks for the response!
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Aerial Vehicle Operator (AVO) a.k.a. Drone Operators Requirements
- Thread starter navyofficer
- Start date
The main USAF UAV guy on the Joint Staff at one point ~15 years ago was a former Navy HC H-46 pilot who was a T-37 instructor for his second tour then joined the USAFR to continue flying them while flying for his airline in his off time. A lack of airline job after 9/11 found him on active duty where he ended up in RQ-4's for a while then on to staff. Very sharp guy, well on his way to Colonel, but it always took him a minute to explain his background to folks.
That's an odd one, only reason I knew about those was the DC Guard had a pair for exec transport.
That’s where we got ours! We had a GS-14 who had a side hustle flying with the Guard, and eventually the AF Generals said, “Why the eff are all the other four stars rolling in G550’s while we’re slumming it in these ratty G100’s?!” So, the AF bought G550’s and said they could fly the C-38’s (G100’s to civilians/Astrajets if you’re Evropean) to the boneyard. As it turns out, that costs more money than just letting two Navy guys come up on the weekend and take them off your hands.
So, we got two Certified Pre-Owned C-38’s (that were 2 years overdue on phase mx…) to use for safety/photo chase and logistics support in Pax.
Spoiler alert: they are great log birds, but absolutely awful for photo chase (tiny windows) and terrible for safety chase (too fast for all the big wings, not maneuverable enough for the fast movers).
Somewhat related, when the DoD started buying G-V/550's to replace the G-III's and IV's, aka C-20's, they designated them C-37's so it didn't look like they were buying the same planes to replace the previous ones. At least that is what was related to me by a few C-20 types and knowing the government it makes perfect sense, and admittedly it is a little awkward.
That pretty much all figures, still wonder how the DC ANG ended up buying them in the first place.
RhodesReese
Well-Known Member
Don’t know if this has been posted but the Assit. LDO OCM put out some of the new updates for the AVO PA that is coming down the pipeline
“ biggest change, you will need to take the SUPer ASTB, all testing sites have the new test. ASVAB no longer required. Max years of service is 12 years. Associates degrees is not waiverable”
“ biggest change, you will need to take the SUPer ASTB, all testing sites have the new test. ASVAB no longer required. Max years of service is 12 years. Associates degrees is not waiverable”
Do current ASTB scores count? Sorry I dont know what the super astb is.
RhodesReese
Well-Known Member
I’d reach out to the OCM and ask. I’m not too sure. Just wanted to pass some info he put out.
RhodesReese
Well-Known Member
Updated PA
FlyingGator
Member
Drone systems engineer here, prior Midshipman applying for AVO. Looks like a dope program
FlyingGator
Member
Are you applying? From what my understanding is, the SUPer is a modified ASTB. I think it’s a safe bet for that if you do really good on the traditional ASTB-E your scores would be similar. Since my major is Drone Systems Engineering I take classes like mechanical physics and comprehensive calculations (calc 4). If you hear anything about study guides please send them my way because right now I’m banking on calc and physics.
I will apply if sna doesn't work out for me. I think you'll be a shoe in with those credentials
I am late to this party, and admittedly, the thread has gotten off-track from its original topic. I am one of the authors of the “Winged Luddites” article that hit last January. When my co-authors and I write articles, we always invite discourse and encourage counterviews; however, it disappoints me that retired and serving senior naval officers on this forum, some of whom served with me at NAWDC, would disparage so readily the motivations and research performed by their fellow aviators and officers through ad hominem attacks.
We do not do it for “clicks” or “resume building.” In fact, we hesitated to publish for fear of professional consequences, but in the end, we all decided to push forward anyway. Generally speaking, writers on military subjects, whether War on the Rocks, Modern Warfare Institute, or Proceedings, feel apprehension because their peers will read it and fear of blowback keeps some from picking up the pen. That is a shame because honest and open discourse is where innovation can flourish. My interest in writing actually stemmed from my writing during JPME, not personal glory, and it was a war college professor that encouraged me to get into writing beyond the classroom. We are all on the same team; ultimately, it's about improving the joint force and our ability to win.
The article took several months to write and publish, sourcing open-source studies, books, and articles, including CSBA, RAND, NPS, and the National War College. Books by Christain Brose (The Kill Chain) and Paul Scharre (Army of None) were also cited. It went through a peer review process with subject matter experts. We interviewed individuals involved in the development and engineering side of some of the now-defunct programs described in the article. Colonel Spataro is the current JADC2 J6 and combed through budgetary documents, tracing where funding went. Those budgetary traces left no doubt in his mind, combined with his peer’s thesis regarding the killing of the Marine Corps “Guardian Angel” program, that some form of Luddism was occurring – the prioritization of manned assets over an emergent need. Kramer’s and my research, coupled with interviews, also led us to conclude that the possibility of purposefully curtailing unmanned research for reasons outside of the capabilities was likely.
Generally speaking, the article has been well-received by academics and aviators, including commanding officers. For example, the article resonated with the CO of a weapons school, and he sent a personal email to us for “capturing the struggle” that RPA crews have been experiencing. A few have offered constructive criticism, and some of their points are valid. For example, the X-47 landing datalink was too vulnerable to be used in an operational setting. However, the engineer acknowledged that such a vulnerability was not tied to the airframe but a system that could be replaced. The prototype sat around for years afterward in the hopes that the Navy would do just that, try a different datalink system. Another aspect was that the article gave the impression that there is an anti-unmanned cabal of senior officers attempting to kill everything. That is true, not everyone is against unmanned, but the flow of money and the total trend pointed in a different direction. And Congress has increased oversight of the Navy because they are starting to feel the same way.
Discussions of acquisitions at the programmatic level are dubious for a couple of reasons. Rule number one is that you don’t allude to being read into a program. Two, no single weapon system in history that I am aware of, other than the early years of the atomic bomb, yielded such a great overwhelming advantage over an adversary. In the end, it’s the aggregation of superior equipment in sufficient numbers, sustained through healthy replenishment and a depth of bench consisting of highly trained personnel combined with sound strategy, that wins conflicts.
We do not do it for “clicks” or “resume building.” In fact, we hesitated to publish for fear of professional consequences, but in the end, we all decided to push forward anyway. Generally speaking, writers on military subjects, whether War on the Rocks, Modern Warfare Institute, or Proceedings, feel apprehension because their peers will read it and fear of blowback keeps some from picking up the pen. That is a shame because honest and open discourse is where innovation can flourish. My interest in writing actually stemmed from my writing during JPME, not personal glory, and it was a war college professor that encouraged me to get into writing beyond the classroom. We are all on the same team; ultimately, it's about improving the joint force and our ability to win.
The article took several months to write and publish, sourcing open-source studies, books, and articles, including CSBA, RAND, NPS, and the National War College. Books by Christain Brose (The Kill Chain) and Paul Scharre (Army of None) were also cited. It went through a peer review process with subject matter experts. We interviewed individuals involved in the development and engineering side of some of the now-defunct programs described in the article. Colonel Spataro is the current JADC2 J6 and combed through budgetary documents, tracing where funding went. Those budgetary traces left no doubt in his mind, combined with his peer’s thesis regarding the killing of the Marine Corps “Guardian Angel” program, that some form of Luddism was occurring – the prioritization of manned assets over an emergent need. Kramer’s and my research, coupled with interviews, also led us to conclude that the possibility of purposefully curtailing unmanned research for reasons outside of the capabilities was likely.
Generally speaking, the article has been well-received by academics and aviators, including commanding officers. For example, the article resonated with the CO of a weapons school, and he sent a personal email to us for “capturing the struggle” that RPA crews have been experiencing. A few have offered constructive criticism, and some of their points are valid. For example, the X-47 landing datalink was too vulnerable to be used in an operational setting. However, the engineer acknowledged that such a vulnerability was not tied to the airframe but a system that could be replaced. The prototype sat around for years afterward in the hopes that the Navy would do just that, try a different datalink system. Another aspect was that the article gave the impression that there is an anti-unmanned cabal of senior officers attempting to kill everything. That is true, not everyone is against unmanned, but the flow of money and the total trend pointed in a different direction. And Congress has increased oversight of the Navy because they are starting to feel the same way.
Discussions of acquisitions at the programmatic level are dubious for a couple of reasons. Rule number one is that you don’t allude to being read into a program. Two, no single weapon system in history that I am aware of, other than the early years of the atomic bomb, yielded such a great overwhelming advantage over an adversary. In the end, it’s the aggregation of superior equipment in sufficient numbers, sustained through healthy replenishment and a depth of bench consisting of highly trained personnel combined with sound strategy, that wins conflicts.
FormerRecruitingGuru
Making Recruiting Great Again
Sir this is a Wendy’s.