Webguru, this is pretty much standard for carrier-based aircrew.
You guys are still allowed to shoot them?
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P3 Mishap article
- Thread starter S.O.B.
- Start date
Those 60-90 hour months were pre-FLM. People haven't seen that in years. My highest month was just over 40 hours underway. I think 700hrs in model will be well above average for DHs in the future. The average will probably be closer to 500 in model. That could be scary from an ORM point of view.
For you HSC guys, don't think you're special... with the notable exception of Bahrain, I've never gone above 18 hours a month, including a full VERTREP deployment.
The days of leaving your first flying tour with >1000 hours are over for the vast majority of helo bubbas. Believe it.
I left my S-3 squadron with 1260 hours in type, 350 traps total (42 month tour) and left my 1st COD tour with 990 hours in type, 450 trpas total (38 month tour). COD guys get most of their hours on deployment too, but if a CVN is at sea, we are flying quite a bit no matter where it is.
I am fairly certain the 3710 rule is if 18 hour crew day is exceeded, then it's a shall have 15 hours off. I'll look it up tomorrow.
I am fairly certain the 3710 rule is if 18 hour crew day is exceeded, then it's a shall have 15 hours off. I'll look it up tomorrow.
Greeting from Sasebo Japan. I met up with my airwing last week in Hong Kong and am now here...
Back to the protracted preflight. I guess I'm confused on terminology but either the airplane is up or its not when you walk out of the ready room right? It sounds like you're walking on down aircraft with the expectation that it will get fixed once you get to the line? Do I understand this incorrectly?
Back to the protracted preflight. I guess I'm confused on terminology but either the airplane is up or its not when you walk out of the ready room right? It sounds like you're walking on down aircraft with the expectation that it will get fixed once you get to the line? Do I understand this incorrectly?
60 hour months while deployed to 5th fleet were not uncommon in the hornet world. Depending on the schedule most JO's would leave with over 1000 hours and 300 traps.
Aircraft is UP when the crew reads the ADB and walks to the plane. Then, either aircraft systems or mission systems may either force preflighting another aircraft, or waiting for maintenance to address the gripes. Depending on the flight, some systems may be required, or you can of course fly with a PMC aircraft.
Some items can be caught right away (O2 underserviced/leak for example) or others might not be encountered until we start engines (hot/cold starts, bleed air malfunctions) or until we complete radar systems checks. I am grossly over simplifying here. There are a wide variety of problems a crew can encounter, whether there are other aircraft we can shift to, and what we can fly without.
As I think with any squadron, you definitely have aircraft that are the well groomed and workhorse machines, others that seem to always have issues.
For me, extraordinarily long preflights were the exception, not the rule.
I left HS-14 with 900 in model. And I was on the low end because I did 8 months on a "Proof of concept" det that involved very little flying. The norm prior to that was 40 hours a month whether on deployment or not. Some guys left with 1200 in model. (Though usually they are ops guys padding their hours at the expense of everyone else.)
EP-3's always seemed to get a lot of hours, 1500-1800 hours (actual stick time) was the norm for pilots. Not sure what the average is now but it shouldn't be too much lower, they still fly a heckuva lot in theater.
In Prowlers 700-1000 seemed to be the norm for first tour, averaging on the lower side. Brett could give you more recent numbers.
I'm pretty sure I've walked on plenty of downed aircraft in theater. I really didn't know that's something other communities/squadrons didn't do. If it works out right, you get a call (before you walk and start your crew day) telling you to stay put and near a phone. But I'm fairly sure I've walked on lots of planes that were being worked on and "almost" ready.
Long preflights were nothing new in my two squadrons. You had to be pretty well-versed on what messages had to go out at what points if you were late, because you'd definitely be late (if not canx'd) for several of your missions on any given deployment. You'd also know, at the first sign of trouble, to figure out your drop dead point, and you'd sit there in the plane waiting for Mx to work their magic for hours up until that point. I don't see any way around that. It makes for a hell of a work day and increases your risk factors, but that's why you standardize your crew duty days. No one can criticize you for working within those numbers, even if it's right up to the limit.
Long preflights were nothing new in my two squadrons. You had to be pretty well-versed on what messages had to go out at what points if you were late, because you'd definitely be late (if not canx'd) for several of your missions on any given deployment. You'd also know, at the first sign of trouble, to figure out your drop dead point, and you'd sit there in the plane waiting for Mx to work their magic for hours up until that point. I don't see any way around that. It makes for a hell of a work day and increases your risk factors, but that's why you standardize your crew duty days. No one can criticize you for working within those numbers, even if it's right up to the limit.
IMHO...the problem is a mismatch between the ability to generate the training sorties to realize the desired flight hours to acheive the required proficiency and T&R points...balanced against the very real need for combat-effective forward-deployed crews and aircraft.
There are two (actually three) ways of looking at the problem...you either have too few training aircraft...or too many pilots...or too many operational commitments (good luck reducing those).
It's an interesting/fascinating/sucky problem facing the MPR community as it tries to make do until the P-8A comes along to (hopefully) cure what ails it.
We have reduced our definition of what constitutes the minimum number of flight hours to qualify 2P and PPC/EWAC over the years...not because it made sense or that we suddenly became more efficient...but because aircraft availability realities starting slapping safety and common sense right in the chops.
So...we can fix more aircraft (time and money)...chop pilot accessions (eases the training burden but crushes the squadrons on deployment)...or start saying/be forced to say "No" to the COCOMs.
I'd like to see CPRG and the safety center take a hard look at the multi-decade statistics they have on P-3 flight safety...to see if there is an uptick in pilot-error related safety of flight incidents or not. We cannot argue using anecdotes (ie the VP-1 incident happened recently and is fresh in our minds...therefore it is a harbinger of doom)...what is really happening at the fleet level? If this already underway...I look forward to the results.
If there is a valid increase in incidents that can be related to the flight hour reduction...then all options already mentioned should be on the table...along with looking at reducing the number of squadrons.
This sucks on many levels (including command opportunity)...but with a large number of P-3's either having been stricken or moldering in depot waiting for an SSI fix, can we afford to still have 16 active duty squadrons (and the reserves) competing for a dwindling number of training assets with a constant number of FNG pilots needing a sane/safe number of flight hours?
Fewer squadrons should mean a larger tooth-to-tail ratio...less overhead etc... It might not solve the problem, but we can't dismiss it out of hand, either.
Maybe the VP-1 incident was the result of a systemic breakdown...or maybe it was an isolated incident in which the individual pilot, squadron OPSO, and Patrol Wing all got unlucky.
I have my opinions...but like most...not the facts.
There are two (actually three) ways of looking at the problem...you either have too few training aircraft...or too many pilots...or too many operational commitments (good luck reducing those).
It's an interesting/fascinating/sucky problem facing the MPR community as it tries to make do until the P-8A comes along to (hopefully) cure what ails it.
We have reduced our definition of what constitutes the minimum number of flight hours to qualify 2P and PPC/EWAC over the years...not because it made sense or that we suddenly became more efficient...but because aircraft availability realities starting slapping safety and common sense right in the chops.
So...we can fix more aircraft (time and money)...chop pilot accessions (eases the training burden but crushes the squadrons on deployment)...or start saying/be forced to say "No" to the COCOMs.
I'd like to see CPRG and the safety center take a hard look at the multi-decade statistics they have on P-3 flight safety...to see if there is an uptick in pilot-error related safety of flight incidents or not. We cannot argue using anecdotes (ie the VP-1 incident happened recently and is fresh in our minds...therefore it is a harbinger of doom)...what is really happening at the fleet level? If this already underway...I look forward to the results.
If there is a valid increase in incidents that can be related to the flight hour reduction...then all options already mentioned should be on the table...along with looking at reducing the number of squadrons.
This sucks on many levels (including command opportunity)...but with a large number of P-3's either having been stricken or moldering in depot waiting for an SSI fix, can we afford to still have 16 active duty squadrons (and the reserves) competing for a dwindling number of training assets with a constant number of FNG pilots needing a sane/safe number of flight hours?
Fewer squadrons should mean a larger tooth-to-tail ratio...less overhead etc... It might not solve the problem, but we can't dismiss it out of hand, either.
Maybe the VP-1 incident was the result of a systemic breakdown...or maybe it was an isolated incident in which the individual pilot, squadron OPSO, and Patrol Wing all got unlucky.
I have my opinions...but like most...not the facts.
Back when we were using brand new P-3B's our preflights averaged around 2 hours. On deployment with parts issues sometimes a little longer. The 4-5 hour preflight was very rare and raised eyebrows up the line.
With the advent of the P-3C and more sophisticated computer/avionics systems troubleshooting became more complicated and required more time, (gotta boot the system, set all the switches, run thru BITs, etc...) and results weren't always black and white.
We were averaging 90+ hours a month per crew on deployment and pushing the crew rest limits on a regular basis. From what I'm hearing (reading) now those op-tempos are a thing of the past within the VP's.
With the advent of the P-3C and more sophisticated computer/avionics systems troubleshooting became more complicated and required more time, (gotta boot the system, set all the switches, run thru BITs, etc...) and results weren't always black and white.
We were averaging 90+ hours a month per crew on deployment and pushing the crew rest limits on a regular basis. From what I'm hearing (reading) now those op-tempos are a thing of the past within the VP's.
Malo83
Keep the Faith
Hard luck Squadron or just bad Karma, VP-1 has had more that it's share. :icon_smil
http://www.vpnavy.org/vp1_mishap_1980.html
http://www.vpnavy.org/vp1_mishap_1980.html