Who runs V-2 Division operations daily?

[Max the Mad Russian]

Gents,

A short question just to compare to Russian practice. Imagine an arresting wire breaks - say, 2nd - and the parts are weaving with the 3rd, fouling the deck and leaving only 1st and 4th wire in usage. Who is in charge to decide either to close the deck for fast repair or to divert the planes aloft to land strips? This case is exactly what happened to Kuznetsov 13th Nov, when a sole MiG-29KR was left aloft while the deck was closed for both launch and landing (STOBAR's most sucking feature) due to the wire breaks and having neither sweet buddy-tanker in the air nor a field to land in visinity, this poor pilot awaiting high bingoed fuel first and then ejected - there was nothing wrong with the MiG itself. Don't know the details but suppose there was a clash between opinions of arresting divo ("I'll restore it soon") and air boss's one ("launch a tanker Su-33 ASAP, so open the deck"), and as our air boss have no authority over V-departments, a vital time was lost. How this situation can be treated in USN carrier? It's good to have an opinion from the past, say about 1990s, due to sensitivity of the matter and the fact that Kuznetsov as a carrier technologically has 20+ years lag from the present USN situation.

Thanks in advance

 

[picklesuit]

Air Boss

 

[wlawr005]

^ Air boss. One dude. Most of the power.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

I.e. Air Boss asking V-2 DivO "How long would it take to fix the wires?" hears a reply "Soon", he has an authority to open the deck? Obviously yes. But will he open it? Obviously not, it's so silly. He rather shoot another tanker off the cat or apply to CATCC to divert the poor boys in the air to the shore, right? So we need to improve this damn STOBAR and allow the Air Boss to open the launches even if the landing deck is closed, right? The problem is that tanker Su-33 can be launched with enough fuel for buddy-tanking only from the 3rd position, a sole launching spot with 195 meters of free run on the burner - and this spot's JBD is located just forward of the arresting wires (marked red star on enclosed layout), which of course will prevent V-2 people from making a fast repair there. Fucking STOBAR...

 

[kejo]

V-2 DIVO on our carriers has no real say on the up or down status of the arresting gear and/or catapults. They are more of an administrative (heads and beds) role. That would be the job of the ALRE Bos'n, usually an LDO, who basically runs V-2 maintenance. Air Boss usually won't make a call on the status of gear without hearing from the ALRE Bos'n first.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Air Boss usually won't make a call on the status of gear without hearing from the ALRE Bos'n first.

If LDO means that s/he is former chief who knows everything about the gears and how quickly they could be fixed in reality, it sounds great. Unfortunately here the equivalent of V-2 DivO reports directly to Air DH, and they both are aviation engineers, not the aviators/NFOs and not SWOs, while Air Boss, an aviator, and LSO, an aviator too, are not reporting to Air DH. They all reports to Deputy CO for aviation, who is not running the operations of the carrier, making rather admin duty. Aside of it, an opinion of a man who really knows what it takes to make a repair, usually CPO maritime engineering mech mate (not even EAWS), means nothing untill V-2 DivO makes his own decision. An outcome of this mess is evident - brand new shipborne MiG went to rest on the sea bottom in a good shape...

 

[Brett327]

The real question is why the ship had aircraft airborne that were below divert fuel and had no recovery tanker available. If you operate like that, you're going to put aircraft in the drink.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

If you operate like that, you're going to put aircraft in the drink.

They - I mean, our NavAir top brass - have been warned several times that sooner or later it will happen. One and only thing they undertook - certification of Su-33 as buddy-tanker, as far as I know, two aircraft were modified to carry the buddy-store device akin to your D704. Have no idea whether MiG-29KRs/KUBRs (1/2 seat like your A/B and C/D for Hornet models) have been equipped along this line or haven't but, as an internal storage of 29's is like "whiskey's jar" and main fuel is carrying in the drop tanks just like on legacy Hornet or Skyhawk, I'm afraid not - there simply isn't the free hardpoint to hang a tanking device on. Another problem is aeging fleet of Su-33s, most junior of them made in 1993, and given the small amount of these aircraft, they all are very well worn out to the date. But the main trouble I think is STOBAR in itself (or just small flying deck like on French Charles de Gaulle, where the bow cats' tracks are crossing the landing zone) - when the "deck is fouled and closed" it means that not only recovery's impossible, but the launch too.

 

[Hair Warrior]

Imagine an arresting wire breaks - say, 2nd - and the parts are weaving with the 3rd, fouling the deck and leaving only 1st and 4th wire in usage. Who is in charge to decide either to close the deck for fast repair or to divert the planes aloft to land strips? This case is exactly what happened to Kuznetsov 13th Nov, when a sole MiG-29KR was left aloft while the deck was closed for both launch and landing (STOBAR's most sucking feature) due to the wire breaks and having neither sweet buddy-tanker in the air nor a field to land in visinity, this poor pilot awaiting high bingoed fuel first and then ejected - there was nothing wrong with the MiG itself. Don't know the details but suppose there was a clash between opinions of arresting divo ("I'll restore it soon") and air boss's one ("launch a tanker Su-33 ASAP, so open the deck"), and as our air boss have no authority over V-departments, a vital time was lost.

Interesting perspective, Max! Thanks for sharing with us. I am curious - where did you hear these details?

I don't recall seeing any description of events this detailed in the English language news/ websites (but I am guessing there were more accurate accounts in the Russian news?).

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Well, this is from RuNet first, then a pair of Skype calls to classmates who are still on active duty. None of them are aviators but given longtime mutual mistrust between huge surface community and essentially alien to the Russian Navy its aviation community, each time when surface navy is able to point on the weakness of our small carrier aviation community, it is impossible for latter to hide the facts. Sad but true, all in all. Generally, the position of surface navy in carrier affairs in relation to government is that "if you want us to be the carrier navy, pay a lot more and build/buy some, but if you want to be just called carrier navy having just one old ugly half-cruiser with angled deck, you have to accept the fact that this "carrier" is akin to stepchild in our view". A long story, for short. Needless to say that there isn't any officer in Russian Navy who is happy with STOBAR, but this is a poor boy's toy - one and sole. It is good that our submariners are indifferent to carriers except for viewing them as a targets, and generally don't care about surface-aviation contradictions...

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Fuck, another one, this time Flanker D. A wire again. Old carrier is poor carrier...

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Rumors are that the pilot of that drowned Flanker Delta have either exceeded the limit of landing speed (240 km\h for Su-33) or the max error in declining from the angle deck axis (the latter is more probable: he touched the deck in 4.7 meters from the axis vs 4.2 allowed). How soon such a mistake - misalingment (un-coaxiality) or exceeding of the max distance from the axis of landing zone - have been occuring on USN carriers with F-14 pilots (rough Flanker equivalent)?

 

[wlawr005]

Probably very little considering if you're fast (flat) or off-centerline Paddles is going to get rid of you before you kill yourself.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Paddles here is more concerned with the way to be competent in the eyes of pilots he lands than by evaluation of leadership. Imagine you have 20+ carrier-qualified pilots (hardly more indeed) and just few of them who can really run LSO platform. Suppose it is much harder to divide our carrier landing on who's right and who's wrong when it comes to a pair pilot-LSO...

 

[wlawr005]

Rule #7...Paddles is always right.