VFA-201 to be decommissioned?

[Blutonski816]

WOW....

now, even as a stupid College student the only reaction I have to such news is

and those reservists are Sh!t Hot sticks.... sad to see that the penny has been pinched to this degree....

 

[USMCBebop]

Part of the reason is because the Navy, more than any other branch of service, views its reserve components as lesser partners to its active duty force.

That's a retarded reason if that's why they want to retire VFA-201.

 

[FA-18 Mousse]

Gotta jump into the fray because I've been a "Hunter" for the past eight years!

First of all, there is not a better strike fighter squadron anywhere in the WORLD. Period. Dot. I have never seen a more competent, combat ready, experienced, or 'hand picked' unit anywhere in my 20 years of service. In fact, during our OIF cruise in 2003, the only squadron who had a better target acq to target kill ratio was VFA-115 utilizing ATFLIR. No one was better than the Hunters at killing Iraqis using legacy sensors....no one! Did I also mention that we did it all at night!! Didn't see the sun for three freeking weeks of combat ops.

Secondly, and as someone as already mentioned, we operate at a fraction of the cost of a regular squadron. In a time where "cost wise readiness" is being jammed down our throats, there isn't a group of individuals more prepared to stay "ready" for less dollars, flying less time, than the reserves.

Lastly, the only folks who are really to blame for the demise of the Navy Reserves are the Reserves themselves. We simply have not done a good enough job over the past 50 years (following Korea) marketing ourselves to the Big Navy as a viable, and deployable, strike asset.

Just my two cents.....

 

[Flash]

OK, OK, I give.

And, I did do a "Lobo" Flag back in 1994 with the reserves out of Mugu.

My point should have been that with the decrease in OPTAR and the declining need for a reserve airwing to go to war and the new USN-USMC Tacair integration plan where we get a Marine squadron in every airwing and the return of dedicated adversaries, the reserve F/A-18 squadrons are not seen by the NAvy leadership as needed.

I applaude VFA-201 for deploying in 2001, but what have they done in the last 5 years? Now compare that to how VAQ-209 has been used (some would say abused) in that time frame.

I have to jump in here in defense of Meat. I did an Air Wing Fallon with CVWR-20 back in May/June 2004. It started out with some of the reserves helping bring VFA-102 up to speed bedore she moved to Atsugi but turned into a CVWR-20 det that we somehow joined in on. I was impressed with the quality of the personnel in the squadrons (aircrew and ground) and the overall quality of their work.

However, it was not the smoothest Air Wing Fallon I had taken part in. First off, the reserve squadrons had a significant portion of their personnel not there for a variety of reasons. I understand they are reservists and they do a lot of other reserve time, this was the first Air Wing they had done in a long time. Arguably, an Air Wing Fallon is some of the most valuable land-based training that Navy Tacair guys can do. I know that Adversary work is great but the whole integrated strike thing falls by the wayside when that is all you do. My squadron thought that was evident in the strike planning and execution with CVWR-20. One of the things that struck me was how much guys came and went during the time we were there, many of the 'lessons learned' had to be continually relearned because of the high turnover. Not that they were a bunch of Keystone Cops but things were much rougher than in my previous and subsequent experiences.

Again, this was not because of the individual experience and ability of the squadrons and their personnel which was usually very good, they just did not have the recent experience of doing an Air Wing excercise (at least not in the adversary role).

Now most here would argue that they would just need the refresher like VFA-201 got before the did the outstanding job they did on cruise. But VFA-201 had to get up to speed along with the rest of the Air Wing for a few months before their six-month cruise. How much total time was spent on active duty for the squadron. If it was a year or more, doesn't it make sense just to use an active duty squadron? And I would be suprised if VFA-201 deployed without being supplemented by personnel from VFA-203 and 204. If a reserve squadron cannot be deployed without supplmental personnel, how many times would they be ale to do that? Not indefinitely, and not with the other squadrons deploying.

The reserve guys have been used for years as adversary squadrons but have consistently argued that they are still combat squadrons. With only one carrier deployment under their belt in the past 20 (50?) years, how can they still argue that they are anything but beefed up adversary squadrons? Other than the sweet locations for the reserve squadrons, why don't we do away with the squadrons and use reservists to supplement the Strike-Fighter Wings on each coast? It would give us a ready pool of experienced manpower to supplement the active duty squadrons in time of war and reduce the overhead (logistics, manpower, spares, training, administration, etc, etc.....) associated with individual reserve sqaudrons and their unique aircraft (F/A-18+). Expand the two reserve adversary squadrons to make up for the loss of the other reserve squadrons. I would say that the lower cost of the reserve squadrons as they are set up right now gives you a lower return.

I work alongside reservists every day in my current job and admire them for their dedication, work ethic and experience. I have nothing but praise for 99% of them. But is the current setup of Reserve Naval Aviation the most optimum to utilize these fine men and women? I would argue not.

 

[A4sForever]

I have to jump in here........I work alongside reservists every day....But is the current setup of Reserve Naval Aviation the most optimum ....? I would argue not.

While you make some valid points from a "practical", "operational" perspective --- overall --- this continual looking askance at NAVAIRRES is just crazy. It makes me more than a little irritated, as I know a couple of "Reserves" who did a lot of time in the Hanoi .... *sigh* ... never mind. You can't beat a horse that's already dead.

Many people have a condescending attitude toward/opinion of Reservists --- it's always been that way . That's right, I said condescending --- call it whatever you will. Many (most?) active duty types do, but in my experience they just don't admit it -- of course not, how could they?? And that's in spite of nice words, those throwaway words , obligatory "fine people" words in a post ....

Reservists don't make the rules. Politicians, beancounters, and drones in the Pentagon do. Naval Air Reserves, since their inception, have always been the birth child of local politics, money, and jobs. Why do you think politicians become apoplectic when a Reserve Base is BRAC-ed to death?? May I submit: local politics, money, and jobs ???

A not so "new" news "Flash" (no pun): Reservists ... have ... other ... lives.

Civilian lives. Civilian jobs -- full time jobs. They're not military full timers. In most cases, any military "obligation" is long past. Reserves do the military IN ADDITION TO their "real" lives. Not like Flash --- he's active duty --- Flash has one job --- it's full time. One job. That's what makes the Reserves' time and away-from-home sacrifices even MORE notable. Guys come and go during dets because .... they're part time!! They still have to punch a time clock back in civie street while being on det. Try it sometime -- two jobs, across the country or halfway around the world. If you make Reservists full-time --- then they wouldn't be ... Reservists, would they??

With the exception of VFA-xxx's recent experience (pick a squadron number --- it could apply to any and all "Reserve" squadron wholesale deployments) --- the Naval Air Reserves have always been about "replacements" on an as-needed basis ... not wholesale unit deployments. Unit mobilizations --- that's something "new" --- maybe it was always the ideal --- but a wholesale squadron deployment has seldom been realized. Broken record plays again: Reserves don't make the rules ---politicians, beancounters, drones do. "We" were going to "do it" during the CONTRA war --- "it" didn't materialize for many reasons. Personnel readiness --- individual or unit--- wasn't one of them ...

Specific to something I know a little about: The Adversary "squadron" concept is still relatively "new", especially when speaking of Naval Air Reserves. It's only been a couple of decades -- not even a career. Reserve Adversary units were not originally intended to deploy as a squadron. And I'm talking about the "real" Adversary units, i.e., the Saints, NAS DALLAS, and the Omars. Staffed primarily by "Weekend Warriors". Distant, geographically separate, but concurrent DACM requirements made detachments the reality in NAVAIRRES Adversary-world. But to provide for some semblance of administrative and logistical infrastructure, the "squadron" model was the preferred vehicle. We did it "differently" in Dallas -- i.e., DETS-ARE-US .... before they closed NAS and made the Adversary mission something else. The fighter squadrons based @ NAS DALLAS were just that -- fighter squadrons, not Adversary assets.

As with everything else, the Reserve mission ... it changes. But does it ever really .... ?

*edit* for Flash: You didn't, so I gotta delete one of your posts (above) --- dupe --- I'll go with the first one, post time-wise ???

 

[FlyinSpy]

However, it was not the smoothest Air Wing Fallon I had taken part in. First off, the reserve squadrons had a significant portion of their personnel not there for a variety of reasons. I understand they are reservists and they do a lot of other reserve time, this was the first Air Wing they had done in a long time. Arguably, an Air Wing Fallon is some of the most valuable land-based training that Navy Tacair guys can do. I know that Adversary work is great but the whole integrated strike thing falls by the wayside when that is all you do. My squadron thought that was evident in the strike planning and execution with CVWR-20. One of the things that struck me was how much guys came and went during the time we were there, many of the 'lessons learned' had to be continually relearned because of the high turnover. Not that they were a bunch of Keystone Cops but things were much rougher than in my previous and subsequent experiences.

Yes, but...

For what it's worth, I was an NSAWC N2 instructor during the CVWR-20 Fallon det in 03. And for truth in advertising, prior to that I was a CVWR-20 "player to be named later" on several dets with several of the squadrons, and I am now in a CVWR-20 unit - so my perspectives, well, they are what they are.

Flash hits the nail on the head when he references the lack of continuity of personnel as a reason for some minor (and a couple of non-minor) "others". A normal airwing is very much in a crawl-walk-run mode during a Fallon det; the 3-week MLT-ITP-ATP sequence is designed to start slow and end big. For CVWR-20 units, a week on active duty for dets of these type (RED FLAGs, JTFXs, HARM shoots, etc.) is pretty typical. Longer is obviously highly desirable, but the powers-that-be know that it is asking a lot for anything longer. So you end up with rotating aircrew who can't, as Flash mentioned, build on their previous experience. You always have new players in the mix, making things like range fam (or re-fam, as the case may be) non-trivial, and not the things that are the usual "gotchas" during later-phase events. On the good side, you were usually talking about aircrew who averaged 2K+ hours in type, and had multiple Fallon dets under their belts. But there was always rust to be knocked off.

Also, CVWR-20 almost never functioned as a full-up air wing. So a lot of the intregated strike planning processes that even considerably more junior Fleet guys may have been up to speed on hadn't been worked by the CVWR-20 guys for a long time. More rust to be knocked off. And given that mission planning is what Fallon is all about, any oversights or lapses get highlighted quickly and painfully during range time.

The net result was that there was not the usual steadily improving learning curve seen with typical Fleet air wings - but instead one that went in fits and starts. Nothing egregiously wrong or bad, just not the usual level of performance seen in ITP and ATP events. Now, had this been a mobilization situation, and had CVWR-20 been looking at a USS Boat cruise in the immediate future, I assert it would have been a different situation - you would have had that continuity over the duration of the air wing, and you would have seen the normal learning curve. In fact, once the "rust was knocked off", you would have seen significantly above baseline performance - the impact of having really experienced folks in the cockpit and on the line.

Anyway, enough history. I think the heart of the question really is "Does it make sense to have a reserve Air Wing, as either an administrative or an operational model? Or are we better off with the equivalent of what the Army calls TDA units - units that have no actual warfighting function or mission, but instead focus on training or administrative issues?" There's obviously multiple issues wrapped up in this seemingly simple question, and I don't think there are simple answers. Not for me to answer from my current perch, since I currently stir up enough trouble as it is. I'll simply reflect that the existence of CVWR-20 is a manifestation of the Total Force policy, and of the deliberate decisions made in the 70s to incorporate Reserve forces as part of the true "go to war" forces. If we formally dismantle CVWR-20, or effectively accomplish the same thing by eliminating consitutent units, then we are making fundamental changes to that Total Force policy. And I don't think that's a good idea.

 

[A4sForever]

Flash & FlyinSpy:
both of you ... good information and good perspective. I read both your posts carefully and understood, hopefully. Please do not mistake my disagreement(s) with the how's and why's of NAVAIRRES Aviators (from a former operator's viewpoint -- mine) with your "desired AirWing" outcome (?) from a "user's/trainer's" viewpoint (you guys, I'm thinking ??). Hope I'm making sense here ... sorry if I sounded "overly" critical, Flash.

One "...can't build on previous experience..." with Weekend Warriors ??? Because they cycle in and out on exercises and dets??? I disagree. I don't know who you were working with ... but it was never a problem in my Reserve experience -- no rust problems in the 70's and 80's. In the A4 Adversary role ---we made the "Regulars" cry and wet the bed --- whether they were Air Force, ANG, USN, USMC, Germans, Australian's, Pakistani's, or Canadians. In fact, the USMC and Canadians maintained they "got the best fights from the Dallas Rangers" (A4s) .... the Navy and Air Force guys were too proud to admit it . The Dallas Reserve F-4 drivers (USN and USMC) were the BEST FIGHTER PILOTS I ever encountered -- tactically or pound for pound . Continuity and lessons' learned were usually required reading on the part of the "regulars" that we worked against.

Lest you wonder: this is not some kind of an A4's retro-"head-trip" ... i.e., "who's good and who's not ..." or ... "weren't we great back then"?? Because the answer would be: " why, yes -- we were". But that's not the point.

I guess my question might be: do we really want and/or "need" a deployable Reserve Air Wing?? Since it doesn't seem to work too well in practice ??? Personally, I don't think it is feasible to expect to have a "deployable" Reserve Air Wing --- without calling them up, working them up, and thus making them ... other than "Reservists". Like I said, some beancounters and drones thought it would be a "good idea" to do it during the CONTRA War aboard the Coral Maru --- it was overreaching by a factor of 1000% in terms of practicality and did not happen. Thankfully....

I spent almost 100 days/year flying "part time" during much of my Reserve time; all the while holding down a full-time job that took me away from home @ 1/2 of each month. Works great on the family life and marriage. Fortunately, I never had to contend with additional "ground responsibilities" in the Reserves ... like regulars do. Flying was our business --- our ONLY business --- and business was good.

For a few years I was current in and flying four (4) different aircraft in any given month. Two airline and two Navy. No continuity lost. No "rust" that needed to be chipped away ... just an accident waiting to happen.

Limes were the answer ... :icon_rast

 

[wink]

I personally appreciate the stirring defense of the Reserve Airwing. Considering all the debate about who deployed when and for how long keep in mind that the Reserve's masters are ulitmately active duty guys. I know of at least one RESFORON C.O. that volunteered his squadron, with affirmative endorsements from his USNR chain of command, to be activated about the time of OEF. The active Navy did not take him up on his offer. The distrust and distain some of the active Navy have for the Reserves, as mentioned by A4s and Catmando is true enough.

Something that hasn't come up here are the SAUs. Most all the SAUs were actually the first NAVAIRES units to get the ax in the mid 90's. That is unfortunate because they can be nearly as useful as the RESFORONS for even less money. My experience in the PACFLT VS SAU in the build up to Desert Storm was a model of how to take advantage of the experienece and flexibility of a SAU. The squadron I was to augment on mobilization was working up during Desert Shield. Knowing that the probablility for a combat cruise was likely the squadron C.O. brought his reservists up to Fallon with him. He took us aside and told us we were going to be leading the missions and on the strike planning teams. He expected us to give the nuggets lots of rope and keep them from killing themselves. He got lots of experience to lead his very junior squadron and we were ready for a call up.

 

[FlyinSpy]

One "...can't build on previous experience..." with Weekend Warriors ??? Because they cycle in and out on exercises and dets??? I disagree.

Whoops - minor nomenclature/context issue here. The "can't build on previous experience" comment was referring to the "experience of the prior week or so at Fallon", not on the experience base of their careers. There is a "flow" and "rhythym" that goes with any LFE (large force exercise), and NSAWC is no different - they like things done *their* way. And that's as it should be - they are the stan for the entire Navy. If you're not regularly flying LFEs, or working in the Fallon range environment, it takes a certain number of hops or events to get up to speed on both the admin and tactical aspects of what's going on.

In a normal airwing, everyone makes the stupid mistakes the first few days, and then progresses into the "advanced mistakes" as the events get progressively harder. If you're swapping out aircrew, not only are the new guys dropping into significantly more challenging events, since they missed the "stupid mistakes phase" they don't have that experience base to build on. Less a factor in the Prowler, since you'd usually have at least one guy in a crew who'd been around the previous week(s); could be much more of an issue on the Hornet side. Now, as I mentioned earlier, it doesn't hurt as much as it might a Fleet airwing that is packed full of JOs, since pretty much everyone in the CVWR-20 units is a veteran of multiple Fallon dets. But it does take time to re-acquaint yourself - the equivalent of "knocking the rust off".

 

[wink]

In a normal airwing, everyone makes the stupid mistakes the first few days, and then progresses into the "advanced mistakes" as the events get progressively harder.

I had the habit of making "advanced mistakes" even in the early phases . Although you breezed by the point it is important to highlight that Reservists, like any 10 + year aviator with tons of operational experience isn't going to be making very many of the stupid small mistakes. That comes from experience, no? Something that a typical Reserve squadron has in greater amounts on average than an active squadron. While half the typical active squadron is making stupid mistakes trying to find their a$$ over the first few days, the Reserves are simply "knocking the rust off".

 

[Flash]

Flash & FlyinSpy:
both of you ... good information and good perspective. I read both your posts carefully and understood, hopefully. Please do not mistake my disagreement(s) with the how's and why's of NAVAIRRES Aviators (from a former operator's viewpoint -- mine) with your "desired AirWing" outcome (?) from a "user's/trainer's" viewpoint (you guys, I'm thinking ??). Hope I'm making sense here ... sorry if I sounded "overly" critical, Flash.

Limes were the answer ... :icon_rast

Don't worry, I did not think were not 'overly' critical of my post. I read your post and agree that higher (and distant) powers determined the direction, purpose and utilization of the Reserves that were not always the most beneficial to the regular Navy and the Reserves (I think that was the gist of what you said, am I right?). Like I said before, I have always thought that the individuals who make up the Reserves are professionals that I am honored to work alongside. I just think the current makeup of Reserve Naval Aviation is not optimum.

I agree with Wink that it was a mistake to do away with the SAU's. The ones that I dealt with, at VAQ-129 and TW-6, were well run units that did an excellent job of supplementing the active units they were assigned to. I think that this is a much better use of Reserve personnel than the Reserve squadrons that make up CVWR-20.

And while the Total Force concept is a noble one and works for many parts of the military, I think that the CVWR 'Total Force' concept is not working. I think SAU's attached the the respective VFA/VAQ/VP wings is a much more practical arrangement, and it still fufills the 'Total Force' concept. BTW Spy, what you said about the Air Wing Fallon was what I was trying to say about building on experience and how CVWR-20 was not able to do that in '03.

BTW, I appreciate all the time you 'part timers' have put in. I see the hoops some of the Reservists jump through to serve at my current work and it is not easy.

Now, I am going to go start drinking again......if I start agreeing with A4s I know that it was a mistake to stop..........Limes!......

 

[Catmando]

The icon of the quintessential Naval Reservist was captured in James A. Michener's classic novel - later made into a Hollywood movie - "The Bridges at Toko-Ri."

"Not every pilot can guide his aircraft from a wave-tossed deck, seek out targets over unfamiliar Korean terrain, then return to what looks like a speck in the sea. Naval Reservist Harry Brubaker (William Holden) can."​

It answers the oft-asked question: "Where do we get such men?"


Answer:

It was from the Reserves!​

homevideo.paramount.com/Catalog?cmd=display_product_page&release_id=1429
The movie.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0449206513/qid=1136928625/sr=8-2/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i2_xgl14/103-1459955-0525438?n=507846&s=books&v=glance
The book.

 

[FA-18 Mousse]

Flash wrote: "Now most here would argue that they would just need the refresher like VFA-201 got before the did the outstanding job they did on cruise. But VFA-201 had to get up to speed along with the rest of the Air Wing for a few months before their six-month cruise. How much total time was spent on active duty for the squadron. If it was a year or more, doesn't it make sense just to use an active duty squadron? And I would be suprised if VFA-201 deployed without being supplemented by personnel from VFA-203 and 204. If a reserve squadron cannot be deployed without supplmental personnel, how many times would they be ale to do that? Not indefinitely, and not with the other squadrons deploying."

Flash-

Just to clarify some of your assumptions. I was mobilized to active duty on 7 Oct 02, did a one week SFARP starting on 14 Oct 02, started a three week Air Wing Det on 21 Oct 02, spent 2 weeks at sea on Teddy Roosevelt starting 3 Dec 02, and then 3 weeks at sea on Teddy doing a modified Fleetex before being deployed for OIF. All told, VFA-201 spent less than 3 months working up with CVW-8 before being deemed "combat ready".

Demobilized on 14 July 03, totaling approximately 9 months on active duty.

Oh, we also didn't require any augmentation from any other units in the air wing. We did it all with indiginous "Hunters".

Cheers-

 

[Goober]

Something that hasn't come up here are the SAUs. Most all the SAUs were actually the first NAVAIRES units to get the ax in the mid 90's. That is unfortunate because they can be nearly as useful as the RESFORONS for even less money. My experience in the PACFLT VS SAU in the build up to Desert Storm was a model of how to take advantage of the experenece and flexibility of a SAU.

You were a Moonlighter? Small world...I was a fledgling, newly-winged SENSO at -41 that went to Fallon w/ you guys right after DS. No sh!t, you guys really did have the best pilots and FOs I've ever flown with. I remember Captain Eddie and Nipper to this day...

 

[wink]

You were a Moonlighter? Small world...I was a fledgling, newly-winged SENSO at -41 that went to Fallon w/ you guys right after DS. No sh!t, you guys really did have the best pilots and FOs I've ever flown with. I remember Captain Eddie and Nipper to this day...

But you don't remember me!!! Either I didn't make as big a spectacle of myself as Capt Eddie and Nipper, or I just wasn't as Sierra Hotel as the rest . We did have a great bunch of guys.