Yes, but...
For what it's worth, I was an NSAWC N2 instructor during the CVWR-20 Fallon det in 03. And for truth in advertising, prior to that I was a CVWR-20 "player to be named later" on several dets with several of the squadrons, and I am now in a CVWR-20 unit - so my perspectives, well, they are what they are.
Flash hits the nail on the head when he references the lack of continuity of personnel as a reason for some minor (and a couple of non-minor) "others". A normal airwing is very much in a crawl-walk-run mode during a Fallon det; the 3-week MLT-ITP-ATP sequence is designed to start slow and end big. For CVWR-20 units, a week on active duty for dets of these type (RED FLAGs, JTFXs, HARM shoots, etc.) is pretty typical. Longer is obviously highly desirable, but the powers-that-be know that it is asking a lot for anything longer. So you end up with rotating aircrew who can't, as Flash mentioned, build on their previous experience. You always have new players in the mix, making things like range fam (or re-fam, as the case may be) non-trivial, and not the things that are the usual "gotchas" during later-phase events. On the good side, you were usually talking about aircrew who averaged 2K+ hours in type, and had multiple Fallon dets under their belts. But there was always rust to be knocked off.
Also, CVWR-20 almost never functioned as a full-up air wing. So a lot of the intregated strike planning processes that even considerably more junior Fleet guys may have been up to speed on hadn't been worked by the CVWR-20 guys for a long time. More rust to be knocked off. And given that mission planning is what Fallon is all about, any oversights or lapses get highlighted quickly and painfully during range time.
The net result was that there was not the usual steadily improving learning curve seen with typical Fleet air wings - but instead one that went in fits and starts. Nothing egregiously wrong or bad, just not the usual level of performance seen in ITP and ATP events. Now, had this been a mobilization situation, and had CVWR-20 been looking at a USS Boat cruise in the immediate future, I assert it would have been a different situation - you would have had that continuity over the duration of the air wing, and you would have seen the normal learning curve. In fact, once the "rust was knocked off", you would have seen significantly above baseline performance - the impact of having really experienced folks in the cockpit and on the line.
Anyway, enough history. I think the heart of the question really is "Does it make sense to have a reserve Air Wing, as either an administrative or an operational model? Or are we better off with the equivalent of what the Army calls TDA units - units that have no actual warfighting function or mission, but instead focus on training or administrative issues?" There's obviously multiple issues wrapped up in this seemingly simple question, and I don't think there are simple answers. Not for me to answer from my current perch, since I currently stir up enough trouble as it is. I'll simply reflect that the existence of CVWR-20 is a manifestation of the Total Force policy, and of the deliberate decisions made in the 70s to incorporate Reserve forces as part of the true "go to war" forces. If we formally dismantle CVWR-20, or effectively accomplish the same thing by eliminating consitutent units, then we are making fundamental changes to that Total Force policy. And I don't think that's a good idea.