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VFA-201 to be decommissioned?

Goober

Professional Javelin Catcher
None
Hey, cut me some slack :D 1991 was a looong time ago, and I only remember a handful of you guys 'cause I'd see you over at the training bldg from time to time. Real shame - there were a lot of guys hoping to see you make the leap from a SAU to an independent squadron. Then again that was back in the day of CVWR-20 and CVWR-30. :( Capt Eddie was a "unique" personality to say the least... :)
 

A4sForever

BTDT OLD GUY
pilot
Contributor
Catmando said:
It answers the oft-asked question: "Where do we get such men?"

Answer: It was from the Reserves!.....

Ohhhhhh .... be still my beating heart. We probably showed "The Bridges at Toko-Ri" 400-500 times on cruise and re-ran the last scene ... "where DO we get such men??" ... 4000-5000 times, just to keep in the game.





"...... Where do we get such men? They leave this ship and they do their job. Then they must find this speck lost somewhere on the sea. When they find it, they have to land on its pitching deck. Where do we get such men?"
 

Brett327

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
Here's a question for ya, A4s. Not that I'm suggesting that you were around in the pre-TACAN days, but I'm curious to know what a standard Case III recovery would have been like then. What kinds of NAVAIDS did mother have and what kind of Marshalling scheme would have been in effect w/o TACAN?

Brett
 

mules83

getting salty...
pilot
A4sForever said:
"...... Where do we get such men? They leave this ship and they do their job. Then they must find this speck lost somewhere on the sea. When they find it, they have to land on its pitching deck. Where do we get such men?"

LAUNCH JETS! (you forgot that part)....;)

Good movie

That scene is in the beginning of Fighter Fling 2000 if anyone is bored and wants to see it.
 

Catmando

Keep your knots up.
pilot
Super Moderator
Contributor
Brett327 said:
Here's a question for ya, A4s. Not that I'm suggesting that you were around in the pre-TACAN days, but I'm curious to know what a standard Case III recovery would have been like then. What kinds of NAVAIDS did mother have and what kind of Marshalling scheme would have been in effect w/o TACAN?

Brett

As the reigning "ancient", A4s will be able to give a much more accurate answer than I. Until then, here is what I remember.

Without TACAN, I believe we used ADF. The holding pattern was directly overhead mother (and her ADF) at prescribed altitudes. The approach was an ADF Tear-drop pattern, and then an ADF approach to the CCA. I remember practicing it a few times during workups, but I don't think we (I) ever did it for real.

Which reminds me…………I have a number of old, "180 degrees out" sea stories.

One was when the night recovery Base Recovery Course (BRC) was 180 out!

Instead of marshalling aft of the carrier, we marshaled 30 miles off the USS Midway's bow! (That no one noticed this error is still beyond me; but hey, I was a nugget, and nuggets never ask questions, nor do they ever get any 'real' answers'.

Even though were cleared for the CCA, the ship (appropriate that night, call-sign Schoolboy) couldn't paint us on their radar. The F-4 ahead of me inside the 10-mile "Gate" could see the ship, but nothing "looked right". We were all confused, airwing and ship, airborne and controllers on the scope.

Eventually, everyone realized the egregious mistake. We were approaching the pointy end, and not the blunt end of the boat! That explained a lot! Then 30 airwing aircraft arced around, 180 degrees to intercept the correct BRC, astern the ship.

Fortunately, although it was a dark and moonless night, there was no weather or sea state. But I'll bet some heads rolled!

Meanwhile, I've got other 180 degrees out stories – one, an almost accidental bombing mission and international incident on then, Communist Red China . . . but I'll save that for another time.
 

A4sForever

BTDT OLD GUY
pilot
Contributor
Brett327 said:
Here's a question for ya, A4s. ....
Catmando got it all right with the basic pattern/recovery description ... but AirWing 11 actually DID :eek: ADF, no-TACAN recoveries to the ship on three different occasions --- all at night. Seems like we had different holding "bearings" assigned so we would not be coming down through some else's holding pattern on the "push" if we screwed it up ... ?

Around 15-20 aircraft in each recovery as memory serves. I flew two and waved one. The TACAN was "tits-up" one night; the other two --- it was for "practice". :skull_125 A-7 CAG --- a very "different" kind of individual. The "practice" was kind of like ... practicing bleeding .... ??? But then ... our AirWing did "practice" touch 'n go's at night as well during his tenure. Tell me about practicing bleeding .... we should have thrown him over the side. He lives @ 15 miles from one of my current areas of operation --- so I see him occasionally --- he grounded me once --- still think's I'm an "outlaw" :icon_rast --- he's still "different".

I remember another occasion when we did a similar recovery --- but with the TACAN --- no DME --- as it was "tits".

Strange ... "tits" doesn't filter out on AW .... perhaps I should have said ... "breasts"??? ;)
 

Brett327

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
Thanks for the info. What I was getting at though was not so much TACAN out procedures, but more of a historical look at what Aviators did before TACAN was invented. I wonder how the boys in WWII marshaled, or if they could even do IMC ops to any great extent. I imagine that ADF would have had to be how things were done. At what point did CCA become an option - stuff like that.

Brett
 

A4sForever

BTDT OLD GUY
pilot
Contributor
Brett327 said:
.....I wonder how the boys in WWII marshaled, or if they could even do IMC ops to any great extent. I imagine that ADF would have had to be how things were done. At what point did CCA become an option - stuff like that.

Brett

O.K. ... got it. I know who I can ask --- from the horse's mouth, etc. Former VF-2 NAP guy on the Lexington --- I'll ask him and get back. I'm curious, too.
 

HeyJoe

Fly Navy! ...or USMC
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
FlyinSpy said:
Yes, but...

For what it's worth, I was an NSAWC N2 instructor during the CVWR-20 Fallon det in 03. And for truth in advertising, prior to that I was a CVWR-20 "player to be named later" on several dets with several of the squadrons, and I am now in a CVWR-20 unit - so my perspectives, well, they are what they are.

Flash hits the nail on the head when he references the lack of continuity of personnel as a reason for some minor (and a couple of non-minor) "others". A normal airwing is very much in a crawl-walk-run mode during a Fallon det; the 3-week MLT-ITP-ATP sequence is designed to start slow and end big. For CVWR-20 units, a week on active duty for dets of these type (RED FLAGs, JTFXs, HARM shoots, etc.) is pretty typical. Longer is obviously highly desirable, but the powers-that-be know that it is asking a lot for anything longer. So you end up with rotating aircrew who can't, as Flash mentioned, build on their previous experience. You always have new players in the mix, making things like range fam (or re-fam, as the case may be) non-trivial, and not the things that are the usual "gotchas" during later-phase events. On the good side, you were usually talking about aircrew who averaged 2K+ hours in type, and had multiple Fallon dets under their belts. But there was always rust to be knocked off.

Also, CVWR-20 almost never functioned as a full-up air wing. So a lot of the intregated strike planning processes that even considerably more junior Fleet guys may have been up to speed on hadn't been worked by the CVWR-20 guys for a long time. More rust to be knocked off. And given that mission planning is what Fallon is all about, any oversights or lapses get highlighted quickly and painfully during range time.

The net result was that there was not the usual steadily improving learning curve seen with typical Fleet air wings - but instead one that went in fits and starts. Nothing egregiously wrong or bad, just not the usual level of performance seen in ITP and ATP events. Now, had this been a mobilization situation, and had CVWR-20 been looking at a USS Boat cruise in the immediate future, I assert it would have been a different situation - you would have had that continuity over the duration of the air wing, and you would have seen the normal learning curve. In fact, once the "rust was knocked off", you would have seen significantly above baseline performance - the impact of having really experienced folks in the cockpit and on the line.

Anyway, enough history. I think the heart of the question really is "Does it make sense to have a reserve Air Wing, as either an administrative or an operational model? Or are we better off with the equivalent of what the Army calls TDA units - units that have no actual warfighting function or mission, but instead focus on training or administrative issues?" There's obviously multiple issues wrapped up in this seemingly simple question, and I don't think there are simple answers. Not for me to answer from my current perch, since I currently stir up enough trouble as it is. I'll simply reflect that the existence of CVWR-20 is a manifestation of the Total Force policy, and of the deliberate decisions made in the 70s to incorporate Reserve forces as part of the true "go to war" forces. If we formally dismantle CVWR-20, or effectively accomplish the same thing by eliminating consitutent units, then we are making fundamental changes to that Total Force policy. And I don't think that's a good idea.


You miss one really important aspect of having a Reserve Airwing; it serves as an attrition pool of aircraft and personnel. We have been indeed fortunate to have not suffered attrition due to combat or operational losses on OEF or OIF that threaten a unit's cohesion or PAA. In the sixties, it was not unusual to have to replace a large portion of a unit's aircraft while on deployment. that is one reason the reserves strive to be roughly equivalent to what the fleet is flying (horror story was in 50s-60s when reserves were called up and found to be incompatible with ships). Lehman pushed to get Hornets in the reserves during transition from A-7, not after for that reason. The reserve model has changed...reserve units have been used to porvide adversary presentations (Hornet squadrons fill needs that the 2 VFC Adversary units cannot). In late 2002, a reserve Hornet squadron was tapped to fill in on a deployment so the thrid reason is to actually deploy. The Navy does not task its reserves to the extent that the USAF does in that regard. Many USAF reserve and ANG outfits are in regular rotation as part of standing AEF commitments.
 

VFA-203 Forever

So You Like To Put fishsticks in your mouth?
SteveG75 said:
I will pour a little bit of cold water on the old guys here with a question.

When was the last time a reserve fighter or attack squadron deployed??
.

Ever think about doing some research?

As a couple others mentioned, VFA-201 Deployed in 2003.

Also VMFA-142 deployed to Al Asad,Iraq in March of '05 for a 6 month deployment.

Adam
"VFA-203 Forever"
-GO GATORS! VMFA-142-
 
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