Should I stay or should I go? Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying And Love HSC.

[Max the Mad Russian]

Mini-subs don't count

Concur in general. But just remember please: all three doubtlessly successful midget attacks of WWII (Alexandria 1941, Kaa-Fjord 1944 and Johor strait 1945) were performed against large surface ships and at least might resulted with numbers of MIAs. Though modern equivalent of it is 2000 USS Cole case in Aden port, where there wasn't a reason to ask for HSC SAR efforts, but in ROKS Cheonan case that midget was used rather as regular attack SSK with relatively long torpedo run, the ship was torn apart and a part of a crew went swimming almost instantly, which is the reason for a call to Sierras ASAP.

Anyway, there are disasters. In this 1991 case nine SA330s of SAAF got 225 souls overnight from the sinking vessel, and this is absolutely unhabited part of Africa shoreline...

 

[Gatordev]

I do find the counter-argument that CSAR is a niche job not worth the time and money (in peacetime) to be kind of silly when one could easily ask why the navy bothers with a “niche job” like ASW...a ship hasn’t been sunk by a sub since 1982!

I know your comment is actually arguing FOR these capabilities, but I'm using it as an example.... A common misconception about ASW is that it's about sinking subs, when often a successful prosecution can mean much more than a physical kill. And just like saying we haven't utilized Navy CSAR since Vietnam (which isn't true), it's also incorrect to say that there haven't been numerous successful ASW prosecutions since OEF started.

Again, Griz, I know you're not saying those things...just something that's important for everyone to remember. Of course, there's only so many pennies in the piggy bank.

 

[Griz882]

I know your comment is actually arguing FOR these capabilities, but I'm using it as an example.... A common misconception about ASW is that it's about sinking subs, when often a successful prosecution can mean much more than a physical kill. And just like saying we haven't utilized Navy CSAR since Vietnam (which isn't true), it's also incorrect to say that there haven't been numerous successful ASW prosecutions since OEF started.

Again, Griz, I know you're not saying those things...just something that's important for everyone to remember. Of course, there's only so many pennies in the piggy bank.

Well said, and I concur. In the end you are right, there are only so many pennies in the piggy bank.

 

[azguy]

I've said it here before. The PR mission set is a relic. We have been spoiled by decades of wars in which we had unchallenged air superiority. It's been a great capability in OIF/OEF/OIR/et al, but not one relevant to future wars. #1 threat to current PR capability is distance; #2 threat is foreign air power in the peer-threat states.

The other piece is the Navy capability vs others. I've integrated with a few Air Force RS's. Really great capability. But above points still stand for a TACAIR guy that ejects over China. That said, the equivalent Navy capability can't touch the USAF so I don't know what everyone is talking about in here. The Sierra's LOG mission is critical to the modern CSG; the MH-60S community should own that and master it.

 

[RedFive]

For several reasons, this is almost assuredly the Navy's next CSAR/PR asset:

 

[wlawr005]

I don't really think this next "great war" will be fought overland at all.

 

[Griz882]

For several reasons, this is almost assuredly the Navy's next CSAR/PR asset:

Agree, even for the extensive over-water rescues that might be required.

 

[RedFive]

Agree, even for the extensive over-water rescues that might be required.

She has the legs to penetrate the FEBA, she can hover, and she can tank with anyone. All she needs is a hoist (if there isn't already one installed).

 

[Griz882]

Also an option!

 

[SynixMan]

Please point me toward the AAR you read, or provide examples as to what you are talking about.

Second part - You're right on the focus, but writing out overland CSAR as a capability and is a lesson we in Naval RW have learned many times before and the people making these decisions are inept due to their ignorance. What if Jack is 3 miles inland on an Island? "Sorry guys, I am not trained to overland". What if he is on the beach... "hell guys I have never done a brown out so can you have him swim out a few miles". Where do we draw the line? Well, what will happen is we will still go, but now with ill trained helicopter crews at a much higher risk.

The history of Navy RW CSAR is riddled with leaders and strategists making stupid assumptions about the future, giving up a capability, only to need that capability again after learning through the loss of good people. After the Korean War there was no investment into it and eventually Naval RW found themselves in Vietnam learning on the fly. Post Vietnam again we let the capability largely go away and we had Grenada, Lebanon, Libya. Many of those actions were covered with ill-trained crews and aircraft. Yes HS was around but in many cases not in position to cover those actions. And USAF ARS/RQS units were not always in place quick enough (or available) From there Desert Storm, Bosnia, OEF/OIF/OIR, etc.

It needs to be a clear that, HSC had no doctrinal place in OEF/OIF/OIR (with some limited exceptions). As much as we all wanted to be in the fight, it wasn't a Navy RW fight. Lots of GWOT baby's joined the wrong branch if that's what they wanted. To put in perspective:

Afghanistan coast: 0 mi
Iraqi coast: 36 mi

Iranian coast: 1750 mi
Russian coast: 23,400 mi
Chinese coast: 9,000 mi

Yes A2AD and the tyranny of distance will have massive affects on if we (or anybody) can make it overland in the opening days of peer MCO fight, but what about 30 days in, 60 days, 1 year. And before we start playing the game of "it will be over by then so we don't need to plan for it" I refer back to history with WW I, WW II, Vietnam, etc. Many of those same assumptions were made.

To all the fixed wing nerds, have fun knowing the Navy isn't coming to get you if you bail out over land. And before you say "but the Air Force" let me stop right there and let you know they aren't everywhere the Navy is and they will have their hands full. I would be irate if I was a Fighter Attack Guy.

I know you're a smart dude on this (and I think we've crossed paths in real life). I still contend the Fixed Wing myopia of the Flags running OPNAV screwed the pooch on the HS/HCS replacement vehicles by over-using the MBA they got on their shore tours to think parts synergy between R and S would be the great savior of Naval Helicopter Aviation. In reality, it made a lot of poor tradeoffs we'll continue to pay for. From there, the dilution of skillsets across the community combined with participating in conflicts that don't play to our strength has only accelerated the spiral.

Navy helo pilots are still some of the best in the world at what they do and we have a shitload of them. The world is 70% water and, as you pointed out, there's a ton of coastline out there. The Navy's strength of presence always played well into the Low Threat Immediate game and I think it will continue to do so. A lot of us have been in the room when a problem occurs and sometimes the decision makers need "What can you give me right now?". Statistically, that's a JO HAC standing an Alert or already flying and getting retasked.

As much as this divestment sucks, I think we'll continue to be surprised at how people step up.

 

[loadtoad]

She has the legs to penetrate the FEBA, she can hover, and she can tank with anyone. All she needs is a hoist (if there isn't already one installed).

In a limited capacity but she has some major limitations compared to traditional RW depending on the AOR. The V-22 in the hands of AFSOC or the NAVY is not a one stop shop, just an additional layered capability that provides options.

 

[RedFive]

she has some major limitations compared to traditional RW depending on the AOR.

Can you go over some of these? Seems to me the Marines had great success using her in Libya. What's not to love??

 

[taxi1]

CSAR asset? I'm thinking a hammock between the skids.

Semi-seriously on the JTAC of Opportunity comment too. Send the drone to within proximity, have the downed dude execute line of sight close control, hop on or in it, and hit the "Go home" button.

 

[Griz882]

CSAR asset? I'm thinking a hammock between the skids.

Semi-seriously on the JTAC of Opportunity comment too. Send the drone to within proximity, have the downed dude execute line of sight close control, hop on or in it, and hit the "Go home" button.

Interesting...at the height of CSARs hay day in Vietnam HC-7 “wrote the book” and one of the first items noted was; “...should not be committed into hostile environment until survivor is located, identified and information, RESCAP available throughout the entire mission.”

 

[Pags]

CSAR asset? I'm thinking a hammock between the skids.

Semi-seriously on the JTAC of Opportunity comment too. Send the drone to within proximity, have the downed dude execute line of sight close control, hop on or in it, and hit the "Go home" button.

There's no "in it" for the MQ-8C. Inside is all full of skynet and gas.