Well there will be two America class LHA's without well decks, so they could act as what you describe but with Marine F-35B's. The others too, but not as well with less gas and hangar space.
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Road to 350: What Does the US Navy Do Anyway?
- Thread starter Randy Daytona
- Start date
RCD: Basic argument seems to be that the administration has already given up on a 355-ship fleet (the Too Hard and Low Money warning lights already lit up), but it's a mistake. The "presence" vs "capability" argument is heard a lot around OPNAV.
"The ships carrying out this presence mission must, of course, be capable of combat operations. This is the essence of conventional deterrence, in which would be disturbers of the peace are confronted with tough choices backed up by present, capable, combat power....Like its sister services, the Navy also has warfighting requirements generated by Combatant Commander generated numbered war plans. However, in the Navy’s case, these wartime requirements are separate and distinct from the considerable strategic, global, peacetime requirements it must fulfill. And while the sensors, systems, weapons, and networks that enable a fleet to harness its full power are critical when the shooting starts, far more important to the protection and sustainment of American security and prosperity in peacetime is being where the action is likely to be. This is now, and has always been, a function of numbers."
When It Comes to the Navy, Size Matters
"The ships carrying out this presence mission must, of course, be capable of combat operations. This is the essence of conventional deterrence, in which would be disturbers of the peace are confronted with tough choices backed up by present, capable, combat power....Like its sister services, the Navy also has warfighting requirements generated by Combatant Commander generated numbered war plans. However, in the Navy’s case, these wartime requirements are separate and distinct from the considerable strategic, global, peacetime requirements it must fulfill. And while the sensors, systems, weapons, and networks that enable a fleet to harness its full power are critical when the shooting starts, far more important to the protection and sustainment of American security and prosperity in peacetime is being where the action is likely to be. This is now, and has always been, a function of numbers."
When It Comes to the Navy, Size Matters
I'll go ahead and dredge up this dead thread- Hendrix is back at it: https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/03/29/a-balanced-defense/
Though I can follow the "capacity" versus "capability" thread (McNamara was doing this type of analysis 40 years ago), I'm not sure I follow the logic on how he ends up at his numbers. However, this is the least juvenile of his analyses I've read so far. "Unlimited capacity for improvement."
Though I can follow the "capacity" versus "capability" thread (McNamara was doing this type of analysis 40 years ago), I'm not sure I follow the logic on how he ends up at his numbers. However, this is the least juvenile of his analyses I've read so far. "Unlimited capacity for improvement."
Navy extending the life of all the Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
https://news.usni.org/2018/04/12/na...e-life-no-destroyer-left-behind-officials-say
https://news.usni.org/2018/04/12/na...e-life-no-destroyer-left-behind-officials-say
With some of the earlier DDG's, it's like beating the shit out of your car for 30 years, then suddenly deciding you want to keep it around for another 15 years.
exNavyOffRec
Well-Known Member
you mean like with some of the OHP class? or Knox class?
Yeah, except the training, proficiency opportunities and material readiness chain were a bit different. I wonder how many technological changes, spiral development issues the KNOX and OHP class had to deal with versus the AB class? I hear there are several different bridge configuration, technology differences in the AB class - true?
I served on Knox class FFs. They simply weren’t built for that kind of extended service. I can’t even get my head around the requirements to update one considering what @robav8r calls spiral development in technology. Know’s were closer to her WWII DE forefathers than anything we would consider “modern.” I’m surprised they lasted 25 years in the fleet.
Thought this was interesting. For those still manning the line, any thoughts?
Is Secretary of Defense Mattis planning radical changes to how the Navy deploys?
Experts contend that what Mattis is describing, a concept he’s labeled as “Dynamic Force Employment,” would necessarily create tension with the Navy’s current deployment model known as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, an iteration of similar plans that have been in place since the Cold War.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2...ning-radical-changes-to-how-the-navy-deploys/
The aircraft carriers Ronald Reagan, Theodore Roosevelt and Nimitz and their strike groups underway in the western Pacific in 2017. Defense Secretary James Mattis wants to see this kind of thing more often, but to do it could fundamentally change the Navy. (James Griffin/Navy)
Is Secretary of Defense Mattis planning radical changes to how the Navy deploys?
Experts contend that what Mattis is describing, a concept he’s labeled as “Dynamic Force Employment,” would necessarily create tension with the Navy’s current deployment model known as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, an iteration of similar plans that have been in place since the Cold War.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2...ning-radical-changes-to-how-the-navy-deploys/
The aircraft carriers Ronald Reagan, Theodore Roosevelt and Nimitz and their strike groups underway in the western Pacific in 2017. Defense Secretary James Mattis wants to see this kind of thing more often, but to do it could fundamentally change the Navy. (James Griffin/Navy)
If you look really really close, can you see Nimitz ship's company fucking away yet another man overboard drill?
Maybe it's because I'm not a GO/FO, but while I understand the merits, I don't get how an 'unpredictable' deployment cycle is sustainable. As the linked article points out:
And I really don't follow this logic:
I just don't get how you 'bank' readiness. You can't work up a CVW or a CSG and then put it on the shelf until it's needed. You need long underway periods to get everyone fully ready to deploy. Underway periods need to be scheduled. That schedule determines all the other schedules (schools, yard periods, etc etc).
If we'll all recall, this is exactly how the original FRP - the one that quickly became a train wreck and got everyone into routine back-to-back and 10-month cruises - got started in the first place. We won't work up, deploy, come home, stand down...we'll work up and then only deploy if we need to. Which is fine if the world's quiet, but not when you have two land wars in Asia and China and Russia getting frisky. If the assets are available, COCOMs will ask for them. I know GEN Mattis, being a former, wartime CENTCOM, knows that, and I also know he's a very smart guy. Yet this model only seems sustainable if things settle down back to a 1990's style of things being generally quiet, punctuated by short crises or an ALLIED FORCE-style bombing campaign erupting now and then. So what is it that I'm not getting?
It reminded me somewhat of a decade old article from Proceedings entitled Buy Fords, Not Ferraris. I searched back and sure enough, that article was discussed previously here. https://www.airwarriors.com/community/index.php?threads/proceedings-buy-ford-not-ferrari.30478/
Interesting that at the same time, this came out.
US Navy re-establishes Second Fleet amid Russia tensions
https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/worl...-second-fleet-amid-russia-tensions/ar-AAwLz9g
Here’s a model: 12x CVNs. Each CSG does 120 days at sea followed by 245 days in port for repair, refit, workup. Of those 120 days at sea, up to 30 are in transit. Each month you put a different CSG to sea, and bring another one back to homeport. So in total, you have minimum 3x CSGs in theater at any given time, with a couple others in transit. Once a month, SECDEF would potentially have the flexibility to have 5x CSGs at sea as they are crossing paths (1 outbound, 1 inbound, and 3 on station) which gives SECDEF options for how and where to send them. Sailors have a 120:245 ratio of sea to homeport annually, giving time for training, family, etc.
Thoughts?
Thoughts?
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