A good article on the OV-10 in this month's Air & Space magazine:
Bronco's Tale
http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/82258917.html
Bronco's Tale
http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/82258917.html
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Return of Turboprops to CAS role?
- Thread starter aircav06
- Start date
OV-10X is commented on by Boeing officials during the 2010 Singapore Air Show:
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw100205_1_n.shtml
If we (USMC) axed just two individual F-35's we could have two-plus squadrons of these ugly bastards. Why is this such a hard concept for the O-7+ crowd to grasp?
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw100205_1_n.shtml
If we (USMC) axed just two individual F-35's we could have two-plus squadrons of these ugly bastards. Why is this such a hard concept for the O-7+ crowd to grasp?
It would be a better argument if you were talking about the EMB-314/A-29 Super Tucano or even the T-6 Texan II, one has already been killing terrorists and the other has reliably been flying for years as a trainer. Even then though the USMC may me reluctant to make a large investment in a non-VTOL aircraft that would not do well in a high threat environment. They already expanded their AH-1Z buy, why add another aircraft to their budget that may only have limited utility to their core missions, especially when others are already talking about buying them?
Agreed and would love to see any of those out there (see Skyraider). I think that the Bronco brings more versatility to the fight, being that it can haul ass or trash and can operate from crappy strips in the middle of nowhere. I think if a T-6B tried that, it's gear might snap, cant speak for the Tucano. The LiMA descriptor outlined here seems right up the old Bronco's alley - albeit Air Force's proposal. But then again, a C-12 and SkyVan fit that description pretty well too.
Im just sayin we can do way more for way less money utilizing any one of the myriad of options out there, but Im gonna stop whining. I'm over it.
Wunna dees days Alice, Wunna dees days...:icon_rage
Even if switching the money over were that easy, adding a platform to the inventory is more than just buying the aircraft, if you intend to keep the capability. There are facilities, logistics, training of pilots and maintainers, all of which take time and money to stand up or switch from other airframes. That's a lot of investment for an aircraft that might never be needed after the Marines leave Afghanistan.
So what fills the role for the time they are in Afghanistan? That's not really rhetorical as I disagree with the argument that we don't spend money now because we may not need the capability after we're done.
The Air Wing does.
How long would it take to build, train, and deploy (and then integrate into existing airops) a COIN squadron? We're starting a drawdown in a year or two. You can accelerate it with an increase in cost, but the very argument for a COIN platform isn't that it delivers something new, but that it delivers it cheaper. This isn't an MRAP situation where we're lacking a critical capability. It's a cool concept, but the O-7's are looking at the big picture and not just a cool airframe.
How long would it take to build, train, and deploy (and then integrate into existing airops) a COIN squadron? We're starting a drawdown in a year or two. You can accelerate it with an increase in cost, but the very argument for a COIN platform isn't that it delivers something new, but that it delivers it cheaper. This isn't an MRAP situation where we're lacking a critical capability. It's a cool concept, but the O-7's are looking at the big picture and not just a cool airframe.
What about the old VMO squadrons? You cant tell me they just threw out the baby with the bath water. I mean I realize facilities, and logistics but training cant be that much of a hassle as this is a platform that we have had before. I got your point though.
That was nearly 20 years ago now. Virtually no one with any real experience with it is still around.
Is the juice worth the squeeze on this? Is the gap between helicopters and jets so great that existing assets, like UAVs can't fill the gap? I don't know. Is this one for the Marine Corps to handle if it is an issue? The other services already have air assets specifically devoted to unconventional warfare. Maybe they should spend some of their money on it.
I would argue that if we didn't have the excruciatingly long acquisition cycle that we have, it would actually take a relatively short amount of time. The flying skills are already there. Find any pilot in the airwing and I'd argue they can do the stick and rudder skills. Teach them the appropriate controlling techniques (JTAC, FAC, etc), and it's done.
Also, monetarily, can you honestly say that training the pilots and acquiring the aircraft would even remotely come close to the cost of the new 60's, much less the JSF or a few new 18's?
Pardon my ignorance if this question has already been asked, but is there something a Turboprop-Attack A/C squadron can do that an AF A-10 squadron or likewise couldn't handle? Is it simply a matter of linger/loiter time or are the Turboprops really that much better for the CAS role?
OccamsRazor
Final Select BDCP Intel
I hate poking my nose in among those far more qualified to discuss these subjects, but I decided to do a little internet research, and here goes:
Back during the Second World War, the acquisitions cycle was much faster for a variety of reasons - less complicated platforms, less bureaucracy, more money to spend to speed up the process. Still, the times from prototype to initial acquisition to combat readiness were quite remarkable. The F4U Corsair first flew on May 29, 1940, went into full production in mid-1941, and was in combat with the Marines by February 1943. The F6F Hellcat went from first prototype in June-July 1942 to production in October that year to first engagement in September 1943. The P-47 went from first flight May 6, 1941 to first combat mission March 10, 1943. Stories for most other famous light aircraft of the war are similar - somewhere from eighteen months to two years. The initial deployment of the OV-10 was around three years, from prototype in July 1965 to first combat missions in July 1968; the A-10 took five years, May 1972-October 1977. By comparison the F-22 first flew in September 1997, and the first squadrons deployed in December 2005. So, over time, the cycle has definitely slowed down; I don't know enough about these things to know whether adding the Tucano or OV-10 would be closer to the WW2 end or the Vietnam-modern end, but I have to suspect the former.
So if we felt we were missing a core capability to do low-level CAS, starting today, and willing to spend more cash to ensure speed, we might be able to get combat squadrons to Afghanistan within the 18-24 month timeframe. The logistical burden of supporting the OV-10 or Super Tucano is lighter than that to support a modern jet aircraft, especially if we don't particularly care about maintaining the program once we stop doing COIN (though I suspect Afghanistan won't be the last time having a dedicated CAS/FAC aircraft will look like a wise decision, and would therefore hope the program would be forward-looking). If it's not a core capability now or in the future, the money could probably be better spent elsewhere. But to me, it seems like a discussion of "now vs. later" that fails to anticipate that Afghanistan might not be the last counter-insurgency we fight, and that having a dedicated platform for providing air support in sanitized airspace - even if we don't use it all the time - might be a cost-effective decision, is not complete. We have lots of high-end capabilities for fighting major theatre wars that we don't use, but which we maintain anyways; the Navy in particular has devoted most of its resources to the high end of the spectrum of conflict, with the result that the United States has to use guided missile destroyers to chase pirates in speedboats. If we might have more operations in the near-future in which a CAS platform would be useful, and given the comparatively low cost of deploying a turboprop with a proven design and a lower bar for training and logistics, and especially if we think having them might help us win in Afghanistan, my question is: why not? We sacrifice relatively little to fill in a capability we don't have, which could help us win now and which we might need again soon.
Back during the Second World War, the acquisitions cycle was much faster for a variety of reasons - less complicated platforms, less bureaucracy, more money to spend to speed up the process. Still, the times from prototype to initial acquisition to combat readiness were quite remarkable. The F4U Corsair first flew on May 29, 1940, went into full production in mid-1941, and was in combat with the Marines by February 1943. The F6F Hellcat went from first prototype in June-July 1942 to production in October that year to first engagement in September 1943. The P-47 went from first flight May 6, 1941 to first combat mission March 10, 1943. Stories for most other famous light aircraft of the war are similar - somewhere from eighteen months to two years. The initial deployment of the OV-10 was around three years, from prototype in July 1965 to first combat missions in July 1968; the A-10 took five years, May 1972-October 1977. By comparison the F-22 first flew in September 1997, and the first squadrons deployed in December 2005. So, over time, the cycle has definitely slowed down; I don't know enough about these things to know whether adding the Tucano or OV-10 would be closer to the WW2 end or the Vietnam-modern end, but I have to suspect the former.
So if we felt we were missing a core capability to do low-level CAS, starting today, and willing to spend more cash to ensure speed, we might be able to get combat squadrons to Afghanistan within the 18-24 month timeframe. The logistical burden of supporting the OV-10 or Super Tucano is lighter than that to support a modern jet aircraft, especially if we don't particularly care about maintaining the program once we stop doing COIN (though I suspect Afghanistan won't be the last time having a dedicated CAS/FAC aircraft will look like a wise decision, and would therefore hope the program would be forward-looking). If it's not a core capability now or in the future, the money could probably be better spent elsewhere. But to me, it seems like a discussion of "now vs. later" that fails to anticipate that Afghanistan might not be the last counter-insurgency we fight, and that having a dedicated platform for providing air support in sanitized airspace - even if we don't use it all the time - might be a cost-effective decision, is not complete. We have lots of high-end capabilities for fighting major theatre wars that we don't use, but which we maintain anyways; the Navy in particular has devoted most of its resources to the high end of the spectrum of conflict, with the result that the United States has to use guided missile destroyers to chase pirates in speedboats. If we might have more operations in the near-future in which a CAS platform would be useful, and given the comparatively low cost of deploying a turboprop with a proven design and a lower bar for training and logistics, and especially if we think having them might help us win in Afghanistan, my question is: why not? We sacrifice relatively little to fill in a capability we don't have, which could help us win now and which we might need again soon.
magnetfreezer
Well-Known Member
The intent of the AT-6/etc in a COIN role is to have an airplane that you can quickly spin up foreign pilots/maintainers on, is easy to maintain and cheap. The A-10 is a great aircraft but West Blargistan probably can't afford the giant support infrastructure, depots, etc. plus the fact we may not want to give them all our latest avionics.
The AF has a squadron that does exactly that (6th SOS), but is that a role or consideration for the MAW?
As much as I envy the WWII generation for being able to put an aircraft in the field in that time frame, I think those days have passed. Too many lawyers and too many Congressmen. But I repeat myself. Look what's happened to the AF tanker deal, for goodness' sake.