Pilot shortage?

[FrankTheTank]

The Army uses civilians in the Training Command - wonder how long it will be before the Navy revisits that idea? I would imagine you could tempt quite a few pilots away from the show for a comfortable job flying acrobatic airplanes and being home every night.

I don’t know if people know this but the airlines have out and back pairings. That’s mostly what I do combined with some reserve these days. I know people that haven’t slept in a hotel in years, hell decades. Only thing required is seniority! Or some Jedi trip trade skills. Luckily, I have a little of both.

 

[Birdbrain]

So of these myriad of problems what's likely to change for better or worse in the decade of the 2020s? I default to optimism, because pessimism is a quitter's attitude, but a healthy dose of realism is welcome.

 

[Brett327]

I was only saying Millington added contracts on top of Title 10, not implying they retroactively changed contracts. That’s beyond the pale even for them.

10 U.S. Code § 653 - Minimum service requirement for certain flight crew positions

www.law.cornell.edu

The Army is doing the same move, taking everyone to 8. But hey, if we’re artibitrally changing contracts, why not make it 12, 15, 20 years? Big eyed pre-commissioning kids will still sign, right?

The larger point is these people aren’t dumb. They know the rules because they largely wrote them. Is it a nefarious plot to screw people over? No, but it’s ethically gray and a shitty way to treat people who’ve otherwise served honorably.

What was shittier was purposely writing shortened shore orders to leave people 12 months of service commitment. PERS finally got their hand slapped about a year ago for that (contra to the DoDI’s guidance on tour lengths). If my 33 month shore orders had been written for 36 back in 2016, I wouldn’t have had to take a disassociated tour.

Grand scheme, they’ll set the contract length to balance the needs of the institution with what they think people will agree to. I don’t see that as ethically gray. People are asked to serve according to what they signed up for. Not understanding what’s shitty about that.

 

[sevenhelmet]

So of these myriad of problems what's likely to change for better or worse in the decade of the 2020s? I default to optimism, because pessimism is a quitter's attitude, but a healthy dose of realism is welcome.

Well, for starters, the budget issues aren’t going to get easier with mounting national debt and the military representing the largest share of “discretionary” expenses. The political environment is only getting more difficult, unfortunately.

But I’m hopeful for the Navy in terms of organizational change toward more flexible career paths to maximize talent. Programs like PFI and CIP could be indicators of a bigger movement in that direction. The ROI argument practically screams for attention when it costs an estimated $12M and 12-14 years to get a new SNA trained and experienced from zero to VFA strike lead (just one example, every community has their own). Allowing people to serve by doing what they’ve been training to do is what makes the whole force better. Detailing them to dead-end disassociated assignments when they didn’t pan out for the golden path simply raises the stakes to the point where guys on the fence (or with bad timing) will walk away.

Strategically, I think the single biggest thing that could be done is a comprehensive overhaul of our “strategy” in the Middle East, so high-end assets aren’t being used as heavily in a low-end/asymmetric warfare area. Years of contingency ops have made a temporary contingency the norm. Drawing down the high dollar OCO ops in CENTCOM could free up a LOT of capital, both financial and material, to help soften the blow of budget constraints in the future. We need to preserve whatever capital we can for that “high end fight”, should it ever become a reality. Ideally, we need to stop pitting regional COCOMs against the services. The process is broken, and it needs to be addressed.

I admit these are half formed thoughts, and things are rarely as simple in the real world. But a concentrated effort to match talent and resume with billets could go a long way by itself. People like feeling valued for their abilities, not just as “butts in seats”.

 

[Birdbrain]

Well, for starters, the budget issues aren’t going to get easier with mounting national debt and the military representing the largest share of “discretionary” expenses. The political environment is only getting more difficult, unfortunately.

But I’m hopeful for the Navy in terms of organizational change toward more flexible career paths to maximize talent. Programs like PFI and CIP could be indicators of a bigger movement in that direction. The ROI argument practically screams for attention when it costs an estimated $12M and 12-14 years to get a new SNA trained and experienced from zero to VFA strike lead (just one example, every community has their own). Allowing people to serve by doing what they’ve been training to do is what makes the whole force better. Detailing them to dead-end disassociated assignments when they didn’t pan out for the golden path simply raises the stakes to the point where guys on the fence (or with bad timing) will walk away.

Strategically, I think the single biggest thing that could be done is a comprehensive overhaul of our “strategy” in the Middle East, so high-end assets aren’t being used as heavily in a low-end/asymmetric warfare area. Years of contingency ops have made a temporary contingency the norm. Drawing down the high dollar OCO ops in CENTCOM could free up a LOT of capital, both financial and material, to help soften the blow of budget constraints in the future. We need to preserve whatever capital we can for that “high end fight”, should it ever become a reality. Ideally, we need to stop pitting regional COCOMs against the services. The process is broken, and it needs to be addressed.

I admit these are half formed thoughts, and things are rarely as simple in the real world. But a concentrated effort to match talent and resume with billets could go a long way by itself. People like feeling valued for their abilities, not just as “butts in seats”.

Is it possible that in trying to squeeze as much ROI with a more constrained military budget and an exploding national debt to consider, the federal government and DoD will try to prioritize what is of more importance because there's less dollars to spend?

In other words and of more importance to Naval Aviation would you say that instead of forcing aviators, which the Navy is already short on, to do non-flying tours instead keep them in aviation for their whole career is a possible path in the future? I understand the argument that those non-flying tours make you a more well rounded Naval Officer but like you say it doesn't seem to make much sense to take somebody who the Navy has spent millions of dollars and time to train and have them do a job they neither signed up for nor trained for.

On your second point would you say we are in for a draw down in operations in the Middle East with more focus and dollars spent on training and preparation for a conventional conflict with a very real and capable opponent? I don't mean to get into classified stuff here, of which I know nothing about, so if I'm drifting that way I'll stop but the writing seems to be on the wall in the news. Perhaps I'm connecting dots that are unconnected.

I won't pretend to know the politics (or most of the acronyms) behind all of this but I would bet that plenty of aviators would stay in if they stayed flying and flew more. That is being valued for hard earned skills and not just being a butt in a seat to me.

 

[squorch2]

Naval Aviation (and Big Navy) has some challenges going forward:

• job sucks mightily for long stretches
• No 9/11-type event driving recruiting
• Comp is quite limited (assuming we want to tell ourselves we’re the best and brightest, comp is about 50% of what the best and brightest make in the civ world)
• ultra shitty/difficult day to day processes (viz mynavyhr redesign, reserve mobilization pay delays, etc)
• Productivity Culture almost entirely out of sync with rest of DOD/civilian world (telework, digital signatures, data driven decision making, etc)
• Low friction/high diffusion communication (FB, Twitter, TikTok) making folks very aware of alternatives

What to do?

• modernize HR/staffing (DOPMA re-visioning falls in here)
• SD-driven optempo reduction & recapitalization (human & physical)
• Divest missions where possible (ACDU amphib ops, e.g.)
• Either make jobs suck less or increase comp
• probably some other stuff that the war for talent folks have mentioned

 

[robav8r]

Naval Aviation (and Big Navy) has some challenges going forward:

• job sucks mightily for long stretches
• No 9/11-type event driving recruiting
• Comp is quite limited (assuming we want to tell ourselves we’re the best and brightest, comp is about 50% of what the best and brightest make in the civ world)
• ultra shitty/difficult day to day processes (viz mynavyhr redesign, reserve mobilization pay delays, etc)
• Productivity Culture almost entirely out of sync with rest of DOD/civilian world (telework, digital signatures, data driven decision making, etc)
• Low friction/high diffusion communication (FB, Twitter, TikTok) making folks very aware of alternatives

What to do?

• modernize HR/staffing (DOPMA re-visioning falls in here)
• SD-driven optempo reduction & recapitalization (human & physical)
• Divest missions where possible (ACDU amphib ops, e.g.)
• Either make jobs suck less or increase comp
• probably some other stuff that the war for talent folks have mentioned

Top Gun II ?

 

[Jim123]

Top Gun II ?

Well, the lego trailer makes me wish I were 25 years younger. I wonder if I could find someone to be a "ladder" for me, like that guy in Gattaca. I would definitely get jets this time around...

On your second point would you say we are in for a draw down in operations in the Middle East with more focus and dollars spent on training and preparation for a conventional conflict with a very real and capable opponent?

Perhaps. That's a huge strategy question. The National Defense Strategy is due next year (formerly QDR) and we just had a major election; the timing between the two isn't a coincidence.

Our Middle East strategy has been Carter Doctrine for the last forty years, a lot of human rights issues for some of that, and the war on terror(ism?) for the last twenty. The belief that all three things have in common is stability for positive reasons- predictable energy prices and their positive effect on the world economy, peoples' support for their governments, and for everyone to politically play by the rules. That last thing is an oxymoron in the history of the human race, politics, and war- and this point is not merely academic.

If we pull out of the Middle East in a few short years, well, nature abhors a vacuum. If we stay until...? Well, that's what we've been doing. We're not getting nothing for our efforts but it's hard to articulate what the world would look like if we had chosen very different major policy decisions ten, twenty, thirty years ago. What do we want these things to look like in the next thirty years?

The current crop of whiz kids in D.C. will decide, just like they always do.

 

[Brett327]

The National Defense Strategy

Paradoxically, not really a strategy document... at least not in the past 20 years. Maybe that's part of the problem.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I found it very telling that our senior CAG/CSG leadership had trouble clearly articulating our strategic goals for the region during my last deployment.

They eventually gave up and went more or less the route of “You signed up for this, so suck it up.”

 

[Python]

As someone who got out in spite of COVID-19 and have had friends do the same, I’m inclined to agree- a lot of the valuable feedback might come from those people.

However, the trouble it it’s been death by a thousand cuts for some of us. Timing, golden path, material and training shortfalls, burnout, detailing, family, QoL... all of those played a role in my own decision to leave AD. And through it all, I got a real sense that things were drifting ever further from what I had been led to believe were organizational norms. During my JO tour just a few short years ago, it would have been unthinkable for a fleet squadron to be on single jet flow for 8 months straight, or to not receive a single FNG pilot for nearly three years. Or for there to be >90 aircraft on the ramp at the FRS, with only 8-10 flyable (or less) on a given day. Add all of that to a rigid timing and seniority construct that wastes expensively-attained qualifications, murky strategic goals, and absurdly long deployments with fewer of the perks that there used to be (e.g. theater security cooperation dets, actual port calls in interesting places) resulting in burnout, and it was sort of a perfect storm for me.

Still the hardest decision I’ve ever made. But even in hindsight, I would do it again.

Not all of this is fixable on a reasonable timeline. Its hard to offer constructive suggestions, even with the perspective of being gone for a little while. Personally, I think the Navy’s trying in their own, adorable Navy way. But I think it might be constructive for some senior leaders to realize that the system which worked so well for them doesn’t offer the same opportunities any more.

Also, sustained ops in the Middle East is killing us- there’s no way to get “the enterprise” back on top while that is going on. We need to be honest and introspective about what the mission really is over there.

Perfect.

 

[Python]

The ROI argument practically screams for attention when it costs an estimated $12M and 12-14 years to get a new SNA trained and experienced from zero to VFA strike lead (just one example, every community has their own). Allowing people to serve by doing what they’ve been training to do is what makes the whole force better. Detailing them to dead-end disassociated assignments when they didn’t pan out for the golden path simply raises the stakes to the point where guys on the fence (or with bad timing) will walk away.

Totally don’t deny that you’re right, but I am curious what is the source of that figure?

 

[sevenhelmet]

Totally don’t deny that you’re right, but I am curious what is the source of that figure?

Good question. I admit I am parroting something I’ve heard multiple times to aid my argument. It’s origins are unknown to me, but based on cost per flight hour, I think it’s in the ballpark.

 

[SELRES_AMDO]

The Navy has a few GS pilots at VX squadrons. Seems like a cool gig. I know they're GS-13s. Not sure if they get additional hazard pay for the work. I'm not a pilot so I have no idea if it is a good job or not. They seemed to like it since all they do is fly.

The big issue from my perspective is that a lot of my peers that left active duty wanted nothing to do with the Navy after separation. They had no desire to be a GS civilian. I went to work as a GS civilian/reservist and somedays I don't blame them. The Navy is good at shooting themselves in the foot and creating terrible work environments.

 

[sevenhelmet]

The Navy has a few GS pilots at VX squadrons. Seems like a cool gig. I know they're GS-13s. Not sure if they get additional hazard pay for the work. I'm not a pilot so I have no idea if it is a good job or not. They seemed to like it since all they do is fly.

The big issue from my perspective is that a lot of my peers that left active duty wanted nothing to do with the Navy after separation. They had no desire to be a GS civilian. I went to work as a GS civilian/reservist and somedays I don't blame them. The Navy is good at shooting themselves in the foot and creating terrible work environments.

The VX GSs and contractors often do more than “just fly”, but they are good jobs. I have a couple of friends doing that, and they seem to like it. Better than AD, although a couple of them were 2xFOS for O4, so it wasn’t their first choice.

I understand the desire to get distance from the organization after separation. Nothing against the guys who take Navy/Military affiliated jobs though, there are a lot of good options out there. For my part, burnout and my desired location after the military contributed to looking for work far outside the Navy’s civilian hiring scope.