1) The world had similar arguments in the 20s-30s with the battleship vs aircraft carrier.
It's similar, but there are some key differences.
The battleship pre-WW2 was going to win the decisive battle at sea. That was pretty much it...after that, we just kinda went "sea control" and handwaved away the ground fight that would follow.
CSGs bring much more utility with a big deck CVN as the centerpiece that go well beyond just defeating an enemy navy.
And honestly, I think there's a pretty well accepted idea that the SSN force is expected to be tasked to stomp any fleet silly enough to venture out to engage us in a blue water fight far off from their shores.
Where it gets muddy is when you have to put a CSG up against everything a near peer could bring, combining land based air, sensors, and missiles supporting their Fleet at sea. And if you're trying to fight all that, I don't see any way to give yourself favorable odds except by simply having more and better everything, platforms, sensors, weapons, all of it.
But as far as I can tell, the author doesn't really have any suggestions other than to spend some carrier and R&D money to rebalance Fleet numbers to bring up the ship count in order to complicate the enemy's A2AD targeting problem.
That's just pumping up defense at the expense of limiting your offense. Which may be what we need...but hardly "rethinking Navy power projection strategy."
And dumping R&D for future technologies isn't particularly a great idea either, since technological advantage is a fragile thing.
Trying to play hide and seek with SAGs of CRUDES popping off long range TLAM shots (targeted with...what exactly?) isn't going to do any better than a big deck CVN CSG at power projection in either a high or low threat environment.
*I also love how he rolls up cost per bomb dropped as Hornet lifecycle cost+personnel costs/bombs dropped against straight up procurement cost of a Tomahawk. Guess TLAM+VLS+DDG O&M costs don't matter.