Hard Power and Soft Power

[Randy Daytona]

The part that caught my eye, and had me nodding in approval, was the 'prevent war with China.' Maintain a Navy large enough to deter conflict and make sure that there's freedom of navigation, but be okay with the fact that China is going to have a major sphere of influence in Asia. Take economic steps to rebalance trade.

And throw out the 'rules based order' finger pointing in order to defuse the situation.

It's actually a *gasp* whole of government approach.

Interesting news from the Army. Wonder what other force structures changes are next?

Army stands up Western Hemisphere Command in major force restructure

The new command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will combine U.S. Army North, U.S. Army South and Army Forces Command.

www.armytimes.com

Also, the NYT just started a series on whether or not the US military is overmatched. Will be an interesting read.

Opinion | Overmatched: Why the U.S. Military Must Reinvent Itself

Investing in the old ways of war leaves America at risk.

www.nytimes.com

Traditional weapons — such as artillery shells, ships and aircraft — will still be crucial to future wars, but the U.S. defense industry has lost the ability to produce them at scale and speed. In the event of a war with China, the United States would rapidly run out of essential munitions, as Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser in the Biden administration, has warned.

 

[Flash]

If we’re only going to focus on the western hemisphere, with zero strategic threats, I think that’s a good argument to half the size of our Navy

And with only Mexico and Canada in the top ten of trading partners. I think our relatively benign attitude towards our neighbors to the south since the end of the Cold War has been a decently good one by previous administrations, the juice really ain't worth the squeeze when it comes to trying to involve ourselves too deeply there.

 

[Spekkio]

Also, the NYT just started a series on whether or not the US military is overmatched. Will be an interesting read.

Opinion | Overmatched: Why the U.S. Military Must Reinvent Itself

Investing in the old ways of war leaves America at risk.

www.nytimes.com

Traditional weapons — such as artillery shells, ships and aircraft — will still be crucial to future wars, but the U.S. defense industry has lost the ability to produce them at scale and speed. In the event of a war with China, the United States would rapidly run out of essential munitions, as Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser in the Biden administration, has warned.

I mean, the NYT article misses the point of the new NSS - there are no winners in a war with China.

That's the seismic shift in priorities. I'm willing to bet that the people who were working on the 'China 2027' problem last week are still working it now despite the President's decree that it is not something we should plan for.

The public perception that we can just turn a war economy on like a light switch ala WWII is not a new or particularly enlightening analysis. It's a widely acknowledged problem inside the beltway.

 

[BigRed389]

I mean, the NYT article misses the point of the new NSS - there are no winners in a war with China.

That's the seismic shift in priorities. I'm willing to bet that the people who were working on the 'China 2027' problem last week are still working it now despite the President's decree that it is not something we should plan for.

The public perception that we can just turn a war economy on like a light switch ala WWII is not a new or particularly enlightening analysis. It's a widely acknowledged problem inside the beltway.

The NYT article isn’t a NSS problem. It’s an industrial base focused article, framed with the context of our top peer competitor.

I wouldn’t read that explicitly turning off the “China 2027” problem. It continues to leave a lot of strategic ambiguity on what we might or might not do wrt Taiwan or other PRC action, though to softens our stance overall on the PRC.

What is more relevant is how it reframes the great power spheres of influence and commitment to “rules based order”. Emphasizing burden sharing and joint defensive capabilities is absolutely the right thing to do. But in the Pacific specifically, expecting Japan and S Korea to single handedly deter the PRC, which would be a unilateral hyperpower in a world where we don’t counterbalance them, is not reasonable. And both have, unlike Europe, already invested considerably in their defensive capabilities.

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment. If we really want our allies to be more independent, we should also take the shackles off. Nukes for all my friends. Thats the only game breaker for a shitty third rate weaker power to deter more conventionally powerful nations. Just look at Russia…

 

[Lawman]

The NYT article isn’t a NSS problem. It’s an industrial base focused article, framed with the context of our top peer competitor.

I wouldn’t read that explicitly turning off the “China 2027” problem. It continues to leave a lot of strategic ambiguity on what we might or might not do wrt Taiwan or other PRC action, though to softens our stance overall on the PRC.

What is more relevant is how it reframes the great power spheres of influence and commitment to “rules based order”. Emphasizing burden sharing and joint defensive capabilities is absolutely the right thing to do. But in the Pacific specifically, expecting Japan and S Korea to single handedly deter the PRC, which would be a unilateral hyperpower in a world where we don’t counterbalance them, is not reasonable. And both have, unlike Europe, already invested considerably in their defensive capabilities.

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment. If we really want our allies to be more independent, we should also take the shackles off. Nukes for all my friends. Thats the only game breaker for a shitty third rate weaker power to deter more conventionally powerful nations. Just look at Russia…

The burden sharing realism though is something of a tough love that people need to acknowledge.

When we consciously became a single theatre military model during the “pacific pivot” and other such policy that should have been the wake up call to Europe to get their S in a sock. A major conflict in either region is going to consume us, and Europe particularly needs to understand that all those critical enabling capabilities we provide are going to be tied up in the other side of the planet.

There’s plenty of dumb penned in ideological and political drivel to focus people’s attention in the new NSS, but the recognition that we can’t simply be available for war in every corner is an important self acknowledgment of the facts. We currently have the smallest military we’ve had since WWII, it took Knudsen and other industrialists all of 2 years to set conditions to allow for the arsenal of democracy, and if you look at what we went through to win the last major conflict we are not prepared for what a 1942 like learning curve is going to look like.

Wherever the next major war of great powers happens… that first 45 days is gonna be something.

 

[BigRed389]

The burden sharing realism though is something of a tough love that people need to acknowledge.

When we consciously became a single theatre military model during the “pacific pivot” and other such policy that should have been the wake up call to Europe to get their S in a sock. A major conflict in either region is going to consume us, and Europe particularly needs to understand that all those critical enabling capabilities we provide are going to be tied up in the other side of the planet.

There’s plenty of dumb penned in ideological and political drivel to focus people’s attention in the new NSS, but the recognition that we can’t simply be available for war in every corner is an important self acknowledgment of the facts. We currently have the smallest military we’ve had since WWII, it took Knudsen and other industrialists all of 2 years to set conditions to allow for the arsenal of democracy, and if you look at what we went through to win the last major conflict we are not prepared for what a 1942 like learning curve is going to look like.

Wherever the next major war of great powers happens… that first 45 days is gonna be something.

I don’t know anybody truly relevant to decision making who didn’t acknowledge the burden sharing reality, especially as it pertains to Europe who has a combined GDP about 10 times that of Russia and a population as mismatched as Russia’s is to Ukraine’s. Thats been clear even during Obama’s time, and Trump 1.0 turned it up to 11.

As for the industrial surge for WW2, it also shouldn’t be forgotten that they did that when the US led the world in manufacturing. Obviously no longer the case.

The nice thing is, while we are no longer number 1, we’re still #2. Down side, we’re not competitive in key sectors like shipbuilding or lower level supply chain fundamental to build…anything. That said, a lot of our allies are stacked right behind us. So that looks like a good setup for a Coalition, but I’m not sure this group can actually bring everybody along, nor am I even convinced the domestic politics of our allies would even be favorable to it. Though I certainly hope my worries are unfounded.

 

[Lawman]

I don’t know anybody truly relevant to decision making who didn’t acknowledge the burden sharing reality, especially as it pertains to Europe who has a combined GDP about 10 times that of Russia and a population as mismatched as Russia’s is to Ukraine’s. Thats been clear even during Obama’s time, and Trump 1.0 turned it up to 11.

As for the industrial surge for WW2, it also shouldn’t be forgotten that they did that when the US led the world in manufacturing. Obviously no longer the case.

The nice thing is, while we are no longer number 1, we’re still #2. Down side, we’re not competitive in key sectors like shipbuilding or lower level supply chain fundamental to build…anything. That said, a lot of our allies are stacked right behind us. So that looks like a good setup for a Coalition, but I’m not sure this group can actually bring everybody along, nor am I even convinced the domestic politics of our allies would even be favorable to it. Though I certainly hope my worries are unfounded.

It’s been clear, but it took an actual invasion (technically not the first one) of the one neighbor it could happen to and not invoke reticle V to get them to meet it.

That’s the F’d up thing with the whole more important to be seen resisting than to pragmatically approach the problem. Look at the whole “we refuse to buy F35” nonsense amongst allies because they have their adopt n opposition stance. Canada is a great example of cutting of their nose to spite their face with that given how long they avoided the right choice to avoid being seen as giving Trump a win.

And as much as money matters, I’m far more interested in seeing actual movements on personnel. The fact the largest economy in Europe can’t field a full tank battalion when they build the world’s most prolific western MBT is just an example of how pitifully hollow they are. There is nothing about the kind of attrition and wounding effects we are seeing in Ukraine that Europe (or us honestly) is ready for. Fan of the new leadership in Japan and Germany though, and huge fan of the Poles so there is hope for change. There is just a lot of systemic inertia in those societies to talk big but not make the shifts that will require some major reworking to how the status quo is.

 

[taxi1]

Canada is a great example of cutting of their nose to spite their face with that given how long they avoided the right choice to avoid being seen as giving Trump a win.

Is it in our interest to have Canada buy the F 35?

Why are we being such a dick to them anyway right now? What is the point of the whole 51st state thing?

Looks like stupid, cruel bullying to me.

 

[Spekkio]

The NYT article isn’t a NSS problem. It’s an industrial base focused article, framed with the context of our top peer competitor.

I wouldn’t read that explicitly turning off the “China 2027” problem. It continues to leave a lot of strategic ambiguity on what we might or might not do wrt Taiwan or other PRC action, though to softens our stance overall on the PRC.

What is more relevant is how it reframes the great power spheres of influence and commitment to “rules based order”. Emphasizing burden sharing and joint defensive capabilities is absolutely the right thing to do. But in the Pacific specifically, expecting Japan and S Korea to single handedly deter the PRC, which would be a unilateral hyperpower in a world where we don’t counterbalance them, is not reasonable. And both have, unlike Europe, already invested considerably in their defensive capabilities.

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment. If we really want our allies to be more independent, we should also take the shackles off. Nukes for all my friends. Thats the only game breaker for a shitty third rate weaker power to deter more conventionally powerful nations. Just look at Russia…

I think the current NSS is significantly more clearer than the previous ones I've read, going back to Bush 43, in terms of defining execution.

Wrt China, if the header in the NSS says 'prevent war with China,' then that's a huge shift to turning off the 'conflict 2027 is inevitable' from the previous administration. It then goes on to outline a whole of government, DIME approach to doing that - in the M world, it's building and maintaining a military that is still strong enough to defeat China if the need arises. The seismic shift is in the "D" realm where we acknowledge for the first time that China is going to be the hegemon in Asia with its own sphere of influence. We have stripped the phrase 'great power competition' from the NSS. That is something that the Biden administration (or Harris, if elected) was not willing to accept. The 'E' is a smaller shift, but for the first time fully acknowledges out loud America's intention to reduce / eliminate our economic reliability on China, and is stark in calling our economic investment in them a failure. This was occurring during the Biden administration, but not fully articulated.

We were putting ourselves on the path of Thucydides Trap, and I think this NSS gets us off that path. It seems like more of a philosophy of 'okay China, you don't want to play nice? Fine. Have your small piece of the pie and you'll be just like Russia - a nation that will forever struggle economically in your corner of the world. But if you fuck with international trade or Taiwan, then you're fucking with us.'

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment

That really just gets into neoliberal vs neocon approaches to foreign policy. If you are a neocon and believe that international alliances don't work and drag you into needless affairs / conflicts, and you are better off displaying strength abroad and making bilateral agreements, then you don't really care if your treaty allies feel abandoned.

I don't think Biden (or Harris if elected) would have gotten nearly the same traction in getting Europe to increase its military spending because Biden cannot credibly threaten not to honor Article V. He certainly wouldn't have called out organizations like the EU as leading to economic stagnation and decline among our closest allies.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Is it in our interest to have Canada by the F 35?

Why are we being such a dick to them anyway right now? What is the point of the whole 51st state thing?

Looks like stupid, cruel bullying to me.

Cruelty is a defining character trait of DJT. He is a man that has never once in his life experienced love. It's core to his personality and (sic) psychosis.