Hard Power and Soft Power

[Randy Daytona]

The part that caught my eye, and had me nodding in approval, was the 'prevent war with China.' Maintain a Navy large enough to deter conflict and make sure that there's freedom of navigation, but be okay with the fact that China is going to have a major sphere of influence in Asia. Take economic steps to rebalance trade.

And throw out the 'rules based order' finger pointing in order to defuse the situation.

It's actually a *gasp* whole of government approach.

Interesting news from the Army. Wonder what other force structures changes are next?

Army stands up Western Hemisphere Command in major force restructure

The new command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will combine U.S. Army North, U.S. Army South and Army Forces Command.

www.armytimes.com

Also, the NYT just started a series on whether or not the US military is overmatched. Will be an interesting read.

Opinion | Overmatched: Why the U.S. Military Must Reinvent Itself

Investing in the old ways of war leaves America at risk.

www.nytimes.com

Traditional weapons — such as artillery shells, ships and aircraft — will still be crucial to future wars, but the U.S. defense industry has lost the ability to produce them at scale and speed. In the event of a war with China, the United States would rapidly run out of essential munitions, as Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser in the Biden administration, has warned.

 

[Flash]

If we’re only going to focus on the western hemisphere, with zero strategic threats, I think that’s a good argument to half the size of our Navy

And with only Mexico and Canada in the top ten of trading partners. I think our relatively benign attitude towards our neighbors to the south since the end of the Cold War has been a decently good one by previous administrations, the juice really ain't worth the squeeze when it comes to trying to involve ourselves too deeply there.

 

[Spekkio]

Also, the NYT just started a series on whether or not the US military is overmatched. Will be an interesting read.

Opinion | Overmatched: Why the U.S. Military Must Reinvent Itself

Investing in the old ways of war leaves America at risk.

www.nytimes.com

Traditional weapons — such as artillery shells, ships and aircraft — will still be crucial to future wars, but the U.S. defense industry has lost the ability to produce them at scale and speed. In the event of a war with China, the United States would rapidly run out of essential munitions, as Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser in the Biden administration, has warned.

I mean, the NYT article misses the point of the new NSS - there are no winners in a war with China.

That's the seismic shift in priorities. I'm willing to bet that the people who were working on the 'China 2027' problem last week are still working it now despite the President's decree that it is not something we should plan for.

The public perception that we can just turn a war economy on like a light switch ala WWII is not a new or particularly enlightening analysis. It's a widely acknowledged problem inside the beltway.

 

[BigRed389]

I mean, the NYT article misses the point of the new NSS - there are no winners in a war with China.

That's the seismic shift in priorities. I'm willing to bet that the people who were working on the 'China 2027' problem last week are still working it now despite the President's decree that it is not something we should plan for.

The public perception that we can just turn a war economy on like a light switch ala WWII is not a new or particularly enlightening analysis. It's a widely acknowledged problem inside the beltway.

The NYT article isn’t a NSS problem. It’s an industrial base focused article, framed with the context of our top peer competitor.

I wouldn’t read that explicitly turning off the “China 2027” problem. It continues to leave a lot of strategic ambiguity on what we might or might not do wrt Taiwan or other PRC action, though to softens our stance overall on the PRC.

What is more relevant is how it reframes the great power spheres of influence and commitment to “rules based order”. Emphasizing burden sharing and joint defensive capabilities is absolutely the right thing to do. But in the Pacific specifically, expecting Japan and S Korea to single handedly deter the PRC, which would be a unilateral hyperpower in a world where we don’t counterbalance them, is not reasonable. And both have, unlike Europe, already invested considerably in their defensive capabilities.

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment. If we really want our allies to be more independent, we should also take the shackles off. Nukes for all my friends. Thats the only game breaker for a shitty third rate weaker power to deter more conventionally powerful nations. Just look at Russia…

 

[Lawman]

The NYT article isn’t a NSS problem. It’s an industrial base focused article, framed with the context of our top peer competitor.

I wouldn’t read that explicitly turning off the “China 2027” problem. It continues to leave a lot of strategic ambiguity on what we might or might not do wrt Taiwan or other PRC action, though to softens our stance overall on the PRC.

What is more relevant is how it reframes the great power spheres of influence and commitment to “rules based order”. Emphasizing burden sharing and joint defensive capabilities is absolutely the right thing to do. But in the Pacific specifically, expecting Japan and S Korea to single handedly deter the PRC, which would be a unilateral hyperpower in a world where we don’t counterbalance them, is not reasonable. And both have, unlike Europe, already invested considerably in their defensive capabilities.

So there is still much to be defined in what the new strategy means in execution. And some among our allies could definitely see this as abandonment. If we really want our allies to be more independent, we should also take the shackles off. Nukes for all my friends. Thats the only game breaker for a shitty third rate weaker power to deter more conventionally powerful nations. Just look at Russia…

The burden sharing realism though is something of a tough love that people need to acknowledge.

When we consciously became a single theatre military model during the “pacific pivot” and other such policy that should have been the wake up call to Europe to get their S in a sock. A major conflict in either region is going to consume us, and Europe particularly needs to understand that all those critical enabling capabilities we provide are going to be tied up in the other side of the planet.

There’s plenty of dumb penned in ideological and political drivel to focus people’s attention in the new NSS, but the recognition that we can’t simply be available for war in every corner is an important self acknowledgment of the facts. We currently have the smallest military we’ve had since WWII, it took Knudsen and other industrialists all of 2 years to set conditions to allow for the arsenal of democracy, and if you look at what we went through to win the last major conflict we are not prepared for what a 1942 like learning curve is going to look like.

Wherever the next major war of great powers happens… that first 45 days is gonna be something.