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Bonhomme Richard fire

nittany03

Recovering NFO. Herder of Programmers.
pilot
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
This entire thread is poking at a much larger bear called the material condition and readiness of DoD critical infrastructure. We have allowed some of our most important assets and facilities to degrade to a point that they are not in a state of material readiness required for their intended mission function. Bases, ships, airplanes, "systems" (with a few, small exceptions) are in need of a massive influx of capital.
Which you see around everywhere, unfortunately. People who buy the nice new house without factoring in maintenance costs, and in 10 years the paint’s peeling because they can’t afford to have it redone. Startup companies who build the latest and greatest technology, and don’t maintain it, and so 20 years later they’re a major industry player paying through the nose to “migrate” off what’s now legacy tech.

Now we’re seeing the exact same thing happen with the Fleet that was around when the Cold War ended.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
First, I never said he was a “terrible leader,” I questioned his decision making during the fire…and so did the official report. If you want to yell at me because navy policy is bad, fine, but don’t put words in my mouth.
1. Who's 'yelling'?
2. Questioning a CO's decision making in a time of crisis without all of the relevant information requires either a. a lot of hubris thinking that you could have done better with a fraction of the information or b. an assumption that the CO was incompetent. If you've ever been part of a mishap investigation, you would know that the senior member is out to figure out who to blame and the CO is an easy target.
But the reports list plenty of failings.
The decision to evacuate personnel at 0930 isn't one of them.

BT

It's disheartening that multiple commissioned officers jump to the conclusion that the Navy produces COs who are incapable of sound crisis decision making.

This report is a bit more level-headed and highlights the institutional weaknesses in fire prevention and response.
 

Attachments

  • Major Fires Review.pdf
    1.2 MB · Views: 5

Hair Warrior

Well-Known Member
Contributor
Culture is king. If a CO takes blame for “not doing enough,” look for other COs to then ride their crews harder and demand more. This is ok… until it gets out of balance, especially if the work > the workforce.
 

Hair Warrior

Well-Known Member
Contributor
I'm not sure how much harder we can really ride our surface force. Seems like a recipe for more disaster.
Sort of crossing theead topics here, but if the surface force is having trouble getting SWOs to take the DH bonus and do DH tours, what effect will that have on CO/XO level?
 

AllAmerican75

FUBIJAR
None
Contributor
Sort of crossing theead topics here, but if the surface force is having trouble getting SWOs to take the DH bonus and do DH tours, what effect will that have on CO/XO level?
Eventually, they may not have enough O5s to throw into the XO/CO fleet up pipeline. So far that hasn't been a problem but it could easily become one. Eventually we'll reach a breaking point where the DH and O4 bonuses aren't enough and the ridiculous OPTEMPO and lack of maintenance/support take their toll.
 

Hair Warrior

Well-Known Member
Contributor
Something else to consider: What type of leader are you keeping, at each force shaping inflection point?
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
Sort of crossing theead topics here, but if the surface force is having trouble getting SWOs to take the DH bonus and do DH tours, what effect will that have on CO/XO level?
The first impact is selection rates increase, which means potentially lower overall quality officers screen with less competition driving performance.

After that: longer sea tours and gapping certain shore/staff billets.

You won't have manning shortfalls until selection rates can't overcome attrition (e.g retirement / medical / disciplinary) and sea tour lengths become untenable.

The ones that stick around. Selection to O4 and O5 are in the 90s. Selection for command isn't guaranteed but you can easily retire as an O5.
Are you talking due course or overall? My understanding is that the SWO community uses admin boards as its filter, and the way statutory precepts are written means that anyone completing their due course operational tours should screen with rare exceptions.
 
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Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
Looks like the final determinations have been made. Adm. Brown (ret) took most of the heat but the BHR CO and XO each got a reprimand.

It's interesting to me that ADM Brown completely misunderstands why he's being admonished. He incorrectly thinks it's about what happened after the fire occurred.
 
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