Why are you Leaving?

[squorch2]

Maybe because s/he's the Strike Warfare Commander?

Right on, with the additional implication that planning for strikes is about more than aircraft - not to mention future options like long range naval artillery and unmanned platforms. As pointed out above, there's no need for CAG to go downtown when there are options with better/more currency (DHs, COs, etc.)

You're thinking operational level C2, not tactical.

Absolutely! Because at that level, operational and tactical should intersect. Familiarity with the mission, a la Hummer/Growler bubbas, is good, but if one major part of the mission planning can be delegated, why not the other part?

 

[insanebikerboy]

Well they better get used to using the 'run of the mill CVN squadron' or whatever because 84 and 85 are supposed to be going away pretty soon.

Which, ironically, ties all of the arguments being made here together. Big Navy sees fit to shutter two squadrons whose entire focus is on the tactical environment and a daily relationship with SOF. Kind of illustrates senior leadership's take on helos and tactical relevance.

The SOF folks won't have to get used to it because they'll just revert back to calling on the 160th more often. That, or just simply go without helos, which they will just as readily do.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Well that's how it ran on the Airwings and deployments I've seen the past 15 years - maybe its just more evidence of the micromanaging that goes on. CATC ran things but definitely deferred to CAG / DCAG - later in deployment you might see the CAG Duty officer (aka, the sqd XO/CO of the day) calling the shots, but for a no shit emergency that you describe like major issues landing / tanking / barricade, no way CAG wasn't having ALOT of input to that evolution.

That is still the norm. I remember one very early morning, I was SDO, and our stan was for the SDO to stand tower flower/CATCC (if case III) for the first in country wave. I had just finished, still barely awake at 0500 or whatever it was, rolled into the duty desk and got the call that one of our jets was coming back dual bleed off. I get into CATCC (closest avenue of approach to ready 6), and as soon as I get on the radio, come to find out that sister charlie squadron guy is also dual bleed off. So two guys out there that are going to have to blow tanks pretty soon or divert. Before I can even get my groggy head around the problem and grab a PCL, I am interrupted by DCAG, and then moments later by the Admiral himself. It honestly wasn't my most stellar rep moment (no coffee yet, think I just woke up from an ambien sleep after getting back from in country at 00 dark thirty the night before + 4 hrs of sleep), but those two were most definitely calling the shots. I don't even think the Boss said anything. Nothing wrong with those guys, both were good guys who I trusted, but it is definitely CAG or his/her rep that is making the big dollar decisions around the boat. Not sure how that plays out for our RW brothas, but in FW at least, you execute what CAG wants in his jet.

 

[picklesuit]

That is still the norm. I remember one very early morning, I was SDO, and our stan was for the SDO to stand tower flower/CATCC (if case III) for the first in country wave. I had just finished, still barely awake at 0500 or whatever it was, rolled into the duty desk and got the call that one of our jets was coming back dual bleed off. I get into CATCC (closest avenue of approach to ready 6), and as soon as I get on the radio, come to find out that sister charlie squadron guy is also dual bleed off. So two guys out there that are going to have to blow tanks pretty soon or divert. Before I can even get my groggy head around the problem and grab a PCL, I am interrupted by DCAG, and then moments later by the Admiral himself. It honestly wasn't my most stellar rep moment (no coffee yet, think I just woke up from an ambien sleep after getting back from in country at 00 dark thirty the night before + 4 hrs of sleep), but those two were most definitely calling the shots. I don't even think the Boss said anything. Nothing wrong with those guys, both were good guys who I trusted, but it is definitely CAG or his/her rep that is making the big dollar decisions around the boat. Not sure how that plays out for our RW brothas, but in FW at least, you execute what CAG wants in his jet.

So the guy who signed for, and is strapped into, the jet has how much say/input to this process?

 

[wlawr005]

Not as much of a say as the guy who's in charge of the runway.

"Signing" for the jet doesn't have the same implications for single piloted aircraft as it does for a crewed aircraft. Especially around the boat. I've got like 6 hours in the Hornet and have already signed for the jet three times. If CAG got on the radio and told me to divert, then I'm gonna divert. It goes back to that idea that you'd like to have an experienced guy that you really, really trust calling the shots.

I don't know, but I would hope the combined brains of CAG, Air Boss, CVN CO, and VFA skipper would come up with a better solution than me 95% of the time.

Now, at the field...different story. You have more room to make your own judgements, come up with your plan, and execute. But you're always gonna have a flight lead, SDO, or some other knowledgable entity to back you up.

 

[Gatordev]

As a JO in HSL, I also thought that the community didn't care about tactics. They sincerely wanted to care, but they couldn't. Getting officers promoted is where the rubber hits the road, and trying to reform the community back into tactical relevance was not high enough on the priority list to get one promoted. So the community then tried to shift its values by exalting the SWTI/NSAWC billets above all else. But that's just another bureaucratic move which encourages a certain check in the box in order to reach the top. What good is being a SWTI at the center of tactical excellence if that center is short on true acumen? Now, why do they lack credibility? No one can help the fact that our community doesn't exactly have a red phone linked to the oval office. But you can still have a quality set of tactics based on sound theories that are practiced and refined as you BUM-DA-DA DUUUMMMMM (drum roll, please!)....are willing to truly learn, fail, and critique. But our tactics centers of excellence, our "universities" if you will, don't have that. They are grooming shops dedicated to the achievement of preset milestones with ZERO failures to look good on FITREPs. The guidance I received from higher ups on my missile shot had been, and I quote, "Don't f- this up." Just hit the target. What it ought to be is something along the lines of, "Use this precious resource as an opportunity to simulate a real-world strike so we can all learn more about what in our tactical procedures works and what doesn't. I don't care as much about whether or not you hit the target as I do about (a) a challenging scenario, (b) your most realistic best effort response to that scenario, and (c) an insightful after-action analysis." When we're willing to fail in training, share what we learned publicly, and promote the guys who can demonstrate bona fide progress which builds upon those insights, we'll be on the right track.

All good stuff. And stuff I also saw on the HSL side. I also saw a noted difference in embracing the tactical side based on which coast and even how far west you were.

That said, my comments earlier were more pointed towards HSM and specifically CVW HSM. They've been allowed to play a lot more than HSL was in the past, and when they show up prepared and the CAG recognizes it, they tend to be needed and utilized a lot more than HSL was (or at least respected more for what they can bring).

Is it still a CO factory (like everywhere else)? Of course, but it's been interesting to watch the other changes.

 

[pilot_man]

There seems to be way to much emotion in this discussion. Yes it sucks to hear that your background might not be the best fit for a job but that is just how it is. When you consider how a CVW is composed it makes sense that the CVW Commander should come from someone who knows how to execute a strike and not from being a part of the supporting cast.
Also, I think this point gets glossed over way too much, THE POINT OF A CVN IS TO PUT FIGHTERS AND STRIKERS INTO HARMS WAY. Everything else is there for support. Yes, everything and everyone is just as important but the roll of the boat isn't to launch E-2s to keep an eye on things. Would it make sense that the commander of a SEAL team be from a COMMs shop background? Fuck no.

RHINOWSO's main first point is spot on and that is the fact that we spend way too much time doing the bull shit and not enough time doing what really matters. We spend way more time working on our CDO underway quals than it takes to become an Airwing Strike Lead and that is appalling. If only there was an initiative to combat administrative distractions and all of the bullshit.

As for the relationships between the "bosses" on the boat:
The AIRBOSS controls the flight deck and the pattern during the day. As in "Hey idiot that just broke on top of your interval, go ahead and depart my pattern and try that one again."

AIR OPS controls the case 3 pattern and controllers. My airwing has a CAG rep in CATCC during all case 3 recoveries, as in CAG actual, DCAG or the CAG Ops O. Those guys are making the decisions with buy-in from the Captain, unless the Admiral is in there then he of course has final say.

The Captain of course owns the boat and the planes on them. Since the Captain is senior to CAG that has to be a bit of a weird relationship.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Also, I think this point gets glossed over way too much, THE POINT OF A CVN IS TO PUT FIGHTERS AND STRIKERS INTO HARMS WAY. Everything else is there for support.

Interesting, I walked away from cruise with the realization that it was us who were there to support ship's company, and work around their schedule and drills

 

[SynixMan]

Which, ironically, ties all of the arguments being made here together. Big Navy sees fit to shutter two squadrons whose entire focus is on the tactical environment and a daily relationship with SOF. Kind of illustrates senior leadership's take on helos and tactical relevance.

The SOF folks won't have to get used to it because they'll just revert back to calling on the 160th more often. That, or just simply go without helos, which they will just as readily do.

Therein lies the rub. There's what, three helo bubbas with a Star? If our brown shoe leadership is all TACAIR folks, because they get the billets that get a star (CVN CO/CAG), did they care if two ancillary (in their mind) reserve helo squadrons went away. If our leadership is single minded in its solutions to problems, we keep getting the same priorities: "Bad guys? We can bomb that!"

Your second statement is true, but I dearly hope the relationships we continue to build at home during training evolutions bear fruit over time, even moreso as the reserve squadrons taper off. The cynicism of the JOPA (witness jtmedli and others I'm sure you've seen) and belief that operational HSC squadrons are somehow the "minor leagues" is painful to watch. We're only as serious as we want to be, and that starts with leadership.

 

[PhrogLoop]

...I dearly hope the relationships we continue to build at home during training evolutions bear fruit over time, even moreso as the reserve squadrons taper off. The cynicism of the JOPA (witness jtmedli and others I'm sure you've seen) and belief that operational HSC squadrons are somehow the "minor leagues" is painful to watch. We're only as serious as we want to be, and that starts with leadership.

Bubbas, I think that there is a gross conceptual error at work in the HSC community along the lines of, "if we could just convince the right leaders of all the great things we could do, then maybe we will get to do them." Circa 2009, I was at a CNO All Hands call at North Island when a smart highly respected HSC-85 patch wearer asked ADM Roughead a question along the lines of "when are we going to get the call to do the missions we train for?" ADM Roughead's response was as direct as it was clear. "That's not what we bought those helos for." Our Echelon 1 leadership is smarter (sometimes) than we give them credit for. In the case of HSC, I strongly believe that we have been given toys and an SWTP structure that gets the community just enough of what it needs to get the job done in case the shit hits the fan, but not until (and this has rarely happened) the Army officially and loudly asks for something specific. Otherwise, it's defend the ship, haul trash, and pick a pointy nose guy/gal out of the water now and then. Good work, if you can get it.

 

[lowflier03]

Phrog hits the heart of the problem. The HS/HSC community has on occasion gotten to do some of the missions it trains to (and many want to do). 2515th, EMIO, HVBSS, SOF, and yes even CSAR. You just don't tend to hear about the actual missions that go down. The real problem is that Naval leadership doesn't want to actually use these aircraft in that manner, because as ADM Roughead and others like him have professed, the Navy doesn't want to risk losing them, and any mission over land or away from mom increases that risk in their eyes.

That being said, myself and others I know have gotten the opportunity to work with US and allied SOF units. Both training for and actually carrying out real missions. What I have seen is that usually a squadron will finally make the stars align to train together with a unit and get a foot in the door, and right when the relationship has been built and interoperability is going well, a change of command happens, usually at the CAG level. Suddenly the new boss decides that he doesn't actually know what a helicopter does or trains to do, so he decides to pull the plug because he doesn't want to risk an asset or just doesn't understand the missions and doesn't want to learn.

Just look at the ignorant, ass-covering shitshow that happens on a CVN when a -60 loads up with hellfire, M-197 or even .50cal, versus what happens when jets operate with ordinance.

So part of the problem is that 1. Big Navy doesn't actually want to risk losing a helicopter doing any of the missions we train to, and 2. CAG's just don't know enough and don't care enough to learn about helo capabilities, so they become extremely risk averse and thus we rarely get to carry out any actual missions.

 

[squorch2]

(also, this is some damn fine discussion)

 

[robav8r]

We spend way more time working on our CDO underway quals than it takes to become an Airwing Strike Lead and that is appalling. If only there was an initiative to combat administrative distractions and all of the bullshit.

The issue is what the "system" recognizes in terms of your professional development and ability to promote. CDO underway plays pretty well in the tank against all the other designators. And, let's face it, if your CO thinks you have what it takes to replace him, he's going to push you towards the accepted norms of the Navy. I hear (and agree) with your argument though. It's interesting to read about what was considered important professionally both before and after the start of WW II. Pearl Harbor comes to mind . . . .

 

[jtmedli]

The cynicism of the JOPA (witness jtmedli and others I'm sure you've seen) and belief that operational HSC squadrons are somehow the "minor leagues" is painful to watch. We're only as serious as we want to be, and that starts with leadership.

To be clear, I feel like operational HSC squadrons SHOULD be the "major leagues" but our leadership continually pushes us back down to AAA because 'you're not ready for that yet, son' as a cover tactic for their CYA which has resulted in our leadership (o-4s and o-5s) having never done anything.

Otherwise, it's defend the ship, haul trash, and pick a pointy nose guy/gal out of the water now and then. Good work, if you can get it.

And that's all well and good, but then why is the community's weapons school and certain HSC squadrons running around getting all 'super tactical' and acting like a bunch of fucking 'know-it-alls' and running everyone else through the ringer with 2000 slide powerpoint briefs and unrealistic, asinine check-ride scenarios in the name of doing something that we all know we're not gonna do? How's about we all "get real" and relax a bit?

...because as ADM Roughead and others like him have professed, the Navy doesn't want to risk losing them, and any mission over land or away from mom increases that risk in their eyes.

That being said, myself and others I know have gotten the opportunity to work with US and allied SOF units. Both training for and actually carrying out real missions. What I have seen is that usually a squadron will finally make the stars align to train together with a unit and get a foot in the door, and right when the relationship has been built and interoperability is going well, a change of command happens, usually at the CAG level. Suddenly the new boss decides that he doesn't actually know what a helicopter does or trains to do, so he decides to pull the plug because he doesn't want to risk an asset or just doesn't understand the missions and doesn't want to learn.

Just look at the ignorant, ass-covering shitshow that happens on a CVN when a -60 loads up with hellfire, M-197 or even .50cal, versus what happens when jets operate with ordinance.

So part of the problem is that 1. Big Navy doesn't actually want to risk losing a helicopter doing any of the missions we train to, and 2. CAG's just don't know enough and don't care enough to learn about helo capabilities, so they become extremely risk averse and thus we rarely get to carry out any actual missions.

Then why bother? If you can't risk losing a helo for sake of your career then what are we doing here? Cause it sure as hell isn't fighting wars anymore. It's career progression and cover your ass school at that point.

It's honestly laughable when the helos start carrying ordnance on the carrier. Jets can sit up there for months with bombs and bullets pointing in every possible direction but a helo landing on spot 4 is all-of-the-sudden like we're sitting around playing Russian Roulette with daddy's loaded gun or some crap.

 

[JackyB]

From JaxAirNews 7/1/15

"Lt. Cmdr. Justin Cobb, the training officer of HS-11 and a former instructor at NAS Fallon stated, “the headline of our year-long training vision – capped off by air wing Fallon – is that we will have the most experienced, qualified, well-rounded helicopter squadron in the navy.”

The HH-60H Seahawk helicopters of HS-11 were utilized in three primary mission areas; anti-surface warfare (ASuW), combat search and rescue (CSAR), and special operations forces support (SOF). The aircrews of HS-11 flew more than 50 sorties totaling almost 250 flight hours in the most austere environment that many of them had ever flown.

During these missions more than 85,000 rounds of 7.62 and .50 cal. rounds were fired down range, as well as six AGM-114B Hellfire missiles.

The overarching purpose of this training is to prepare the squadrons in Carrier Air Wing (CVW)-1 for its Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX), a month long evaluation of the air wing and the carrier strike group as a whole, taking place in Jan. 2015.

The Dragonslayers will be deploying with Carrier Strike Group 12 aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in March 2015."

Based upon the recent entries this is for naught!