Deputy Commandant Waiver?

[Swanee]

And what do you think Marine TACAIR should be doing? And against what threat country? And on what day of the war?

I suppose that's the real question. Right now, it appears that Marine TACAIR community, wants to be doing all of the things, against all of the threats and enemies, across the entire spectrum, on every day of the war, with pretty much the same airplane. But with only a handful of squadrons and people, and even less money.

I also think it's a mistake for the USMC to buy MQ-9s. It's a lot more than a light attack airplane, and it's capabilities go well beyond the scope of the 6 functions of Marine Aviation. Not to mention the cost associated with maintaining the GIANT tail that is required to fly them is probably beyond the Marine Corps' capability to pay. (I suppose you could sub out F-35 for MQ-9 and F/A for light attack here).

I suppose that's an interesting observation- the USMC is hanging their fixed-wing TACAIR plan on two very big, very expensive platforms that have Airforce and Navy capabilities inherent to them, that perhaps the Marine Corps doesn't need.

 

[Odominable]

From the cheap seats I’ve always been very impressed with both VMA/VMFA, stateside and on two floats. Granted, that was only within the limited scope of their missions which I was directly involved in (OAS) but pros nonetheless - and also doing so with generally way fewer reps than I had the benefit of having as a skid dude

I can also recognize with how painful it’s gotta be as a nug fighter guy covering down on billets that would each be an individual Lt responsibility in a HMLA. Do any of the airline guys here regularly stand duties as gate agents as broadening professional experience?

IRT the F-35 - the ship has kind sailed I think, and we’ve decided which wagon we’re hitching to. The better question might be how to better leverage the very slow, very vulnerable L-class wagon those jets are now handcuffed to for the next few decades apparently.

 

[Brett327]

Very small chance we’ll need an extra 2-3 CSG, but a very high probability we’ll need every L-Class for whatever crisis or operation pops up next that doesn’t need a sledge hammer.

Yes and no. The way the COCOMs plan for force allocation, the high end fight sits in that low probability/high impact part of the ORM matrix. In truth the COCOMs (INDOPACOM to be specific) don't see war w/ China as low probability, but that's the world they live and breathe, so that mindset kinda comes with the job. L-class may get called in during a crisis, but we've also got those SP-MAGTF constructs, though I get that they have different capes. I guess to clarify my previous statement, I'm not saying we get rid of L-class... just reexamine the cost/benefit, given that we're likely to face a pretty significant force on force scenario with out CSGs if China does ever happen.

 

[whitesoxnation]

I suppose that's an interesting observation- the USMC is hanging their fixed-wing TACAIR plan on two very big, very expensive platforms that have Airforce and Navy capabilities inherent to them, that perhaps the Marine Corps doesn't need.

Flying a complex weapons system like the F-35 that has USAF and USN backing is a huge benefit, if not a necessity. IMO, the USMC doesn't have the ability to manage every aspect of a program like that to fully take advantage of its capabilities, from requirements, acquisition, test, TAC D&E, employment recommendations, etc. It needs USAF and USN assistance.

 

[Hotdogs]

So, again, what are those plenty of other platforms? And what do you think Marine TACAIR should be doing? And against what threat country? And on what day of the war?

If the plenty of other platforms you are talking about is USAF/USN, and USMC gets out of TACAIR completely, then OK I agree. Doing it half-hearted is a waste.

A single seat VMFA with 12 dudes in it has the same collateral requirement BS as a skid squadron with aloooot more dudes to share the pain. Things like one person filling two DH roles, or DHs being gapped, is a real thing. With BS like that going on, it’s not whining. It’s everything Brett said.

Arguably Marine TACAIR could be replaced with some mix of Gen 4, Armed UAS, and/or a dedicated FW multirole gunship. The nuclear option is complete TACAIR divestment but there is value in dedicated assets, but just not on the scale of the budget monster of the F-35. Show me a requirement that Marine TACAIR needs to be a day 1 asset against a peer adversary to accomplish what our Marine ground customers need. The lack of Group 4/5 Armed UAS procurement until very recently in the Corps is directly from undue influence from the TACAIR mafia, and then made the crappy RQ-21 buy fall under green dollars robbing ground Marines of funding. Lots of heartburn and trust issues with Marine Air from the Infantry community due to that issue.

Got it - Manning sucked. I have yet to be an HMLA squadron that wasn’t split 2-3 ways across the pacific during a deployment. I think I was in a 1.0 HMLA a total of about 1 year in my entire fleet tour. We also have over 30 aircraft in 1 squadron plus a maintenance department twice the size of a VMFA. There are more aircraft in some HMLAs than some FW MAGs. You think we don’t need every bit of those officers and SNCOs to maintain readiness?

The rest of the assault support communities have also picked up the vast majority of FW FAC and IA tours - so the shitty job complaints are an equal opportunity employer. You also have PMOS school trained officers now running VMFA principle staff positions. No other community gets a dedicated LogO and is usually gapped an intel officer until deployments. Lastly, some manning issues (AV-8B community) were self inflicted wounds from poor community production management (Not sequestration or the airlines initially).

Yes and no. The way the COCOMs plan for force allocation, the high end fight sits in that low probability/high impact part of the ORM matrix. In truth the COCOMs (INDOPACOM to be specific) don't see war w/ China as low probability, but that's the world they live and breathe, so that mindset kinda comes with the job. L-class may get called in during a crisis, but we've also got those SP-MAGTF constructs, though I get that they have different capes. I guess to clarify my previous statement, I'm not saying we get rid of L-class... just reexamine the cost/benefit, given that we're likely to face a pretty significant force on force scenario with out CSGs if China does ever happen.

Good points, Brett. I will counter that L-Class are comparatively way cheaper than an CSG. To the point that it would likely take divestment of a large portion of L-Class to procure just 1 CSG and it’s airwing (Dollar for dollar). We will likely not get away from the CENTCOM vs INDOPACOM food fight over resourcing in our lifetimes. SPMAGTF was a result of poor L-Cass availability from the Libya fiasco. Lots of limitations on those forces but that’s another topic (BOG limits, flexibility, diplomatic issues). We need to convince the Surface Navy to ditch the LCS, Zumwalt, and other pet projects that have yielded little to no benefit.

Flying a complex weapons system like the F-35 that has USAF and USN backing is a huge benefit, if not a necessity. IMO, the USMC doesn't have the ability to manage every aspect of a program like that to fully take advantage of its capabilities, from requirements, acquisition, test, TAC D&E, employment recommendations, etc. It needs USAF and USN assistance.

It’s even easier if you buy a mix of platforms that were already developed, bought, and paid for by another service. Although every other community in the Marines has done exactly what you describe over the last 2 decades. Not sure why you assume it would be other wise for a separate FW platform.

 

[UInavy]

Good points, Brett. I will counter that L-Class are comparatively way cheaper than an CSG. To the point that it would likely take divestment of a large portion of L-Class to procure just 1 CSG and it’s airwing (Dollar for dollar).

Really good analysis that takes a deep dive into the cost and capability tradeoffs here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2006.html

 

[Randy Daytona]

Really good analysis that takes a deep dive into the cost and capability tradeoffs here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2006.html

Maybe I missed it, but didn’t see anything concerning shipyard capability of what could be built, where and how fast if it becomes necessary to surge naval construction.

 

[UInavy]

"National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 directed the Navy to do the following:.....

......Develop a notional acquisition strategy for development and construction of the ships and expected Navy shipbuilding demands."

I believe (but am not sure at all) that resulted in the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

RAND addresses the surge capacity a bit (on page 54) here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1951/RAND_RR1951.pdf

 

[whitesoxnation]

It’s even easier if you buy a mix of platforms that were already developed, bought, and paid for by another service. Although every other community in the Marines has done exactly what you describe over the last 2 decades. Not sure why you assume it would be other wise for a separate FW platform.

I didn't mean to convey an assumption that it would be different for a RW platform. I mentioned FW only because that's my background.

 

[whitesoxnation]

Arguably Marine TACAIR could be replaced with some mix of Gen 4, Armed UAS, and/or a dedicated FW multirole gunship. The nuclear option is complete TACAIR divestment but there is value in dedicated assets, but just not on the scale of the budget monster of the F-35. Show me a requirement that Marine TACAIR needs to be a day 1 asset against a peer adversary to accomplish what our Marine ground customers need. The lack of Group 4/5 Armed UAS procurement until very recently in the Corps is directly from undue influence from the TACAIR mafia, and then made the crappy RQ-21 buy fall under green dollars robbing ground Marines of funding. Lots of heartburn and trust issues with Marine Air from the Infantry community due to that issue.

Got it - Manning sucked. I have yet to be an HMLA squadron that wasn’t split 2-3 ways across the pacific during a deployment. I think I was in a 1.0 HMLA a total of about 1 year in my entire fleet tour. We also have over 30 aircraft in 1 squadron plus a maintenance department twice the size of a VMFA. There are more aircraft in some HMLAs than some FW MAGs. You think we don’t need every bit of those officers and SNCOs to maintain readiness?

The rest of the assault support communities have also picked up the vast majority of FW FAC and IA tours - so the shitty job complaints are an equal opportunity employer. You also have PMOS school trained officers now running VMFA principle staff positions. No other community gets a dedicated LogO and is usually gapped an intel officer until deployments. Lastly, some manning issues (AV-8B community) were self inflicted wounds from poor community production management (Not sequestration or the airlines initially).

Yeah rog, life sucks for everyone. Saying suck it up and color is very Marine Corps, but doesn't increase capability. There's probably a better way to do things.

 

[Swanee]

Yeah rog, life sucks for everyone. Saying suck it up and color is very Marine Corps, but doesn't increase capability. There's probably a better way to do things.

There are admin things the USMC gets right though. The fact that every O-5 Commander has all six warfighting functions at his level is something I really miss. Yes, we needed more pilots/officers to do the jobs, but the first place to ensure everyone is going same day/same way and reading out of the same playbook is at the O-6 level in the USAF.

USAF Squadron Commanders are about equivalent to, and own as much responsibility and authority as, an OpsO in the USMC/USN.

 

[Hotdogs]

Yeah rog, life sucks for everyone. Saying suck it up and color is very Marine Corps, but doesn't increase capability. There's probably a better way to do things.

…and I don’t disagree with any of those points. I’ve been fortunate to have a good amount of background on these subjects due to my previous billets. It provides clarity and perspective when some one says “Marine FW Aviation is a clown show” but doesn’t understand the factors that are causal to its current status or requirements in the middle of a large force transition.

Most Navy Aviators don’t understand the needs or risk decisions of a MEF or MAW commander as it relates to the Marine TACAIR community. I wouldn’t want anything to do with Navy Aviation for a litany of reasons. However, I at least have the humility to admit I’m not familiar with the exact needs of the CSG or fleet commander before I pass judgement.

 

[Randy Daytona]

"National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 directed the Navy to do the following:.....

......Develop a notional acquisition strategy for development and construction of the ships and expected Navy shipbuilding demands."

I believe (but am not sure at all) that resulted in the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

RAND addresses the surge capacity a bit (on page 54) here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1951/RAND_RR1951.pdf

Thanks for the link. If the Bougainville is the last LHA for a while, wonder what contracts the Navy will steer that way to keep that industrial base. Would be curious to know if Huntington Ingalls could build that CVN-LX mentioned in the previous RAND study.

 

[mapache2426]

Most Navy Aviators don’t understand the needs or risk decisions of a MEF or MAW commander as it relates to the Marine TACAIR community. I wouldn’t want anything to do with Navy Aviation for a litany of reasons. However, I at least have the humility to admit I’m not familiar with the exact needs of the CSG or fleet commander before I pass judgement.

Do you mind elaborating on those reasons? Just for my own edification.

 

[Hotdogs]

Do you mind elaborating on those reasons? Just for my own edification.

I could go into some deep historical and doctrinal rationale about Marine Aviation and by extension why Marine TACAIR exists, but I’ll try to keep this short. The Corps warfighting organizations are tailored to control battlespace and are nested in Title 10 requirements as an expeditionary force (and other assigned tasks). Dedicated air control, aviation ground support functions, and various aircraft are required to assuage the joint force concerns about the ability to command and control an assigned area. I.e. When we bite off on a piece of the three dimensional pie on a map - We better be able to seize, sustain, and defend it.

Statements about the Corps needing a capability or specific asset - have little to do with “…it’s not as good as XYZ” or “another service does this better…” but more so being able to tell the bosses “I can control this area with minimal or no augmentation from the joint force.” There is a lot more that goes into it, but that’s why we have TACAIR and it’s capabilities. We have been able to carve out large chunks of battle space from small to major theater contingencies for decades because of it. It’s a relatively unique Marine Corps capability not resident organically in the other services.