SOAR

[jmcquate]

Got it. Thanks Nittnany.

 

[Griz882]

The Navy does train to CSAR, unless something drastically changed in the last 8 years. But the idea that a CSG is going to operate “unsupported” is probably more Hollywood than reality.

This isn’t The Bridges of Toko-Ri or Flight of the Intruder. The JFACC and JFMCC are going to work together to accomplish what the theater commander needs to have accomplished. And in the event of a real-world CSAR, that’s an evolution that’s going to be run out of the personnel recovery cell in the CAOC. They’re going to have the full range of joint capabilities available to them, and the CSG’s Sierras are probably not going to be their first pick when there are assets such as an Air Force RQS, Marine TRAP, SOF assets, and so forth available.

It doesn’t mean the CVW would never be called; folks are just saying it’s very unlikely.

I guess this is that place where we slightly disagree - primarily based on geography. A war with China will be, as Kirk Douglas said in In Harm’s Way, “A gut bustin', mother-lovin' Navy war.” and the CAOC will be a fleet based cell. In short, there will be no Air Force RQS unless deck space is surrendered for them on CVNs or LHDs. That leaves TRAP (forget SOF, they’ll be busy on hit-and-run work) maybe or a rather unprepared US Navy. But we are still thinking in terms of small aircrew rescues of one or two when war at sea will demand rescues of hundreds or more.

Can the Navy really do CSAR…sure. The real question is can they do it well and do it well enough from the start.

 

[Pags]

I guess this is that place where we slightly disagree - primarily based on geography. A war with China will be, as Kirk Douglas said in In Harm’s Way, “A gut bustin', mother-lovin' Navy war.” and the CAOC will be a fleet based cell. In short, there will be no Air Force RQS unless deck space is surrendered for them on CVNs or LHDs. That leaves TRAP (forget SOF, they’ll be busy on hit-and-run work) maybe or a rather unprepared US Navy. But we are still thinking in terms of small aircrew rescues of one or two when war at sea will demand rescues of hundreds or more.

Can the Navy really do CSAR…sure. The real question is can they do it well and do it well enough from the start.

Valid points about SAR for sunken ships. A lot of that will depend on who ends up in control of the sea space following a battle. I'd imagine lots of VP search work for survivors with surface assets and attached helos or subs doing the pickup. Landing a sea plane in the open pacific isn't going to happen, normal waves out there are big. The PBY that found and saved many of the Indy survivors never flew again after it landed due to getting beat up by the waves.

If we want to talk crazy for recovering people inside bad guy waters then maybe we should talk about a sub that can carry a section of helos. Otherwise I imagine the bubble heads will be on lifeguard duty like in WWII.

 

[fc2spyguy]

I don't know the specifics of the mishap you're talking about but a mishap doesn't prove Chuck's point. AFSOC is able to train for a very narrow scope of work. For all sorts of reasons the USN/USMC communities do not have this level of mission specific training. But it's not like AFSOC aircrew are supermen. They're normal due course URL pilots who go through the same FRS as the USMC flying the V-22 using essentially the same capabilities besides the TF radar.

There's also probably something to be said for services/communities selling themselves to COCOMs as equivalent to niche capabilities to get a piece of the glory/mission/budget as opposed to doing what's in their ROC/POE. Just because an MH-60S and a SOAR MH-60M look very similar and have four characters in common doesn't mean that the aircraft and crews can do the same thing due to differing requirements that drive different airplanes, different training, different specialization, etc.

Or put more simply, we shouldn't be surprised that the Patriots are a better football team than the Red Sox. Sure, both teams play a game with a ball in Mass, both have teams made up of professional athletes, but that doesn't mean we should compare them and say that "the Patriots really play football better than the Red Sox."

Horrible analogy. They're playing the same sport, it's more like the Red Sox are better at baseball than the Shuckers. They have the same equipment, but the Red Sox guys know how to use it better.

I'm not going to get into the specifics of the mishap, I'll just say it was a power required/available issue. It was basic airmanship that caused that crash. Something that a proficient pilot would likely not have had an issue with.

Also, the fact is a Marine V-22 pilot does not have the same capabilities compared to an AFSOC pilot. Training is so much more important than equipment in my opinion. Proficiency = capability. If someone is not proficient the risk factor is massively increased. There is a reason training is a crawl/walk/run mentality.

The 160th left half of an, ahem...very interesting...helo in OBLs backyard.

Drawing conclusions from an anecdotal combat loss doesn't prove much about the training or orthodoxy of one service over another.

Could the navy do CSAR? Yea, easy peezy. We've done a bunch in the past.

Is the juice worth the squeeze? Someone with stars and budgetary power decided no...so for all intents and purposes, it won't happen. Til it does when a different star thinks it's a good idea.

It is representative of the proficiency of what should have been the most highly trained aviators flying the machine at the time. I'm not referring to someone freshly out of a FRS. These were pilots that were on deployment and completed training cycles to get there. What they messed up was elementary when it comes to mountain flying.

Also, the CSAR in Iraq that the Navy did last time didn't exactly go well either.

 

[fc2spyguy]

The Navy does train to CSAR, unless something drastically changed in the last 8 years. But the idea that a CSG is going to operate “unsupported” is probably more Hollywood than reality.

This isn’t The Bridges of Toko-Ri or Flight of the Intruder. The JFACC and JFMCC are going to work together to accomplish what the theater commander needs to have accomplished. And in the event of a real-world CSAR, that’s an evolution that’s going to be run out of the personnel recovery cell in the CAOC. They’re going to have the full range of joint capabilities available to them, and the CSG’s Sierras are probably not going to be their first pick when there are assets such as an Air Force RQS, Marine TRAP, SOF assets, and so forth available.

It doesn’t mean the CVW would never be called; folks are just saying it’s very unlikely.

The Navy helo squadrons doing a CSAR would be akin to an E/A-18 conducting air-to-air. They probably train to it, I'm assuming, but the training isn't much, nor are they likely very good.

 

[wink]

Valid points about SAR for sunken ships. A lot of that will depend on who ends up in control of the sea space following a battle. I'd imagine lots of VP search work for survivors with surface assets and attached helos or subs doing the pickup. Landing a sea plane in the open pacific isn't going to happen, normal waves out there are big. The PBY that found and saved many of the Indy survivors never flew again after it landed due to getting beat up by the waves.

Of course who controls the sea survivors are floating in matters. But if it isn't controlled by the US Navy, then those subs, ships, helos and P-8s are not going to be out there looking for survivors, least of all, picking them up. So they cannot be the alterative to something like this C-130 proposal. And if we control the sea where survivors are located, diverting valuable shooters to search for and pick up survivors compromises offensive capability. I do believe sea state is an issue, but nothing like a float equipped C-130 has ever be tested in various seas states. We really do not know how it will perform. Even then, I have seen hundreds of days in the open ocean that were less than sea state 3. You treat sea state like any metrological limitation to flying. Having operated on the first contemporary NORPAC, I am well aware of limits to tactical flying. Yet there we were. Winter above the Arctic Circle. To listen to some of you guys, we never would have tried it.

 

[Pags]

Of course who controls the sea survivors are floating in matters. But if it isn't controlled by the US Navy, then those subs, ships, helos and P-8s are not going to be out there looking for survivors, least of all, picking them up. So they cannot be the alterative to something like this C-130 proposal. And if we control the sea where survivors are located, diverting valuable shooters to search for and pick up survivors compromises offensive capability. I do believe sea state is an issue, but nothing like a float equipped C-130 has ever be tested in various seas states. We really do not know how it will perform. Even then, I have seen hundreds of days in the open ocean that were less than sea state 3. You treat sea state like any metrological limitation to flying. Having operated on the first contemporary NORPAC, I am well aware of limits to tactical flying. Yet there we were. Winter above the Arctic Circle. To listen to some of you guys, we never would have tried it.

Using capabilities you have, ie operating within an approved envelope in a non-traditional way is very different than developing new capabilities of questionable utility.

I know I'm coming off as very narrow minded here but that's not the case. If there's a mission that this relevant for or it provides some sort of revolutionary capability than I'm all ears. I just haven't heard it here. But maybe the answer is we haven't read the right documents to get why this is the best solution. I've been guilty of poo-pooing various novel solutions and then ending up championing them when I understand how truly useful they are.

 

[Pags]

Horrible analogy. They're playing the same sport, it's more like the Red Sox are better at baseball than the Shuckers. They have the same equipment, but the Red Sox guys know how to use it better.

I'm not going to get into the specifics of the mishap, I'll just say it was a power required/available issue. It was basic airmanship that caused that crash. Something that a proficient pilot would likely not have had an issue with.

Also, the fact is a Marine V-22 pilot does not have the same capabilities compared to an AFSOC pilot. Training is so much more important than equipment in my opinion. Proficiency = capability. If someone is not proficient the risk factor is massively increased. There is a reason training is a crawl/walk/run mentality.

It is representative of the proficiency of what should have been the most highly trained aviators flying the machine at the time. I'm not referring to someone freshly out of a FRS. These were pilots that were on deployment and completed training cycles to get there. What they messed up was elementary when it comes to mountain flying.

Also, the CSAR in Iraq that the Navy did last time didn't exactly go well either.

Again, I haven't read the SIR so I can't talk specifics. But I think we're talking about slightly different things. Your points on proficiency and currency are very valid and seem to be causal factors in many mishaps.

However, when I say "capability" I use that word to specify what the aircraft is capable of. If the mishap was caused by Pa exceeding Pr then a CV-22 would have balled it up too as the capabilities of the CV-22 and the MV-22 in that environment are essentially identical. The VMS is the same, the motors are the same, the wing is the same, the blades are the same, and the flight planning equipment is the same. There's no secret hardware sauce that would have enabled a CV to change the Pa vs Pr relationship of the zone.

Now we're getting into the overlap of organizational culture, doctrine, risk management, tactical decision making, currency, and proficiency that can contribute to mishaps. Without diving into readiness metrics we can't really compare how proficient and how much better trained other operators may have been. I've worked with CV-22 folks and my impression is that their training is more narrowly focused but they're still not getting some amazing bounty of flight hours that's above and beyond that of a USMC squadron.

Which comes back to my point that AFSOC guys aren't hand selected supermen like the 160th guys. They're just normal guys doing cool stuff with toys that are very specifically tailored. And it's a small niche community with a very narrow focus. Rough numbers are there are around 50 CVs and 350 MVs so they're able to be much more focused than a VMM that has a much broader Assault Support mission.

 

[fc2spyguy]

Again, I haven't read the SIR so I can't talk specifics. But I think we're talking about slightly different things. Your points on proficiency and currency are very valid and seem to be causal factors in many mishaps.

However, when I say "capability" I use that word to specify what the aircraft is capable of. If the mishap was caused by Pa exceeding Pr then a CV-22 would have balled it up too as the capabilities of the CV-22 and the MV-22 in that environment are essentially identical. The VMS is the same, the motors are the same, the wing is the same, the blades are the same, and the flight planning equipment is the same. There's no secret hardware sauce that would have enabled a CV to change the Pa vs Pr relationship of the zone.

Now we're getting into the overlap of organizational culture, doctrine, risk management, tactical decision making, currency, and proficiency that can contribute to mishaps. Without diving into readiness metrics we can't really compare how proficient and how much better trained other operators may have been. I've worked with CV-22 folks and my impression is that their training is more narrowly focused but they're still not getting some amazing bounty of flight hours that's above and beyond that of a USMC squadron.

Which comes back to my point that AFSOC guys aren't hand selected supermen like the 160th guys. They're just normal guys doing cool stuff with toys that are very specifically tailored. And it's a small niche community with a very narrow focus. Rough numbers are there are around 50 CVs and 350 MVs so they're able to be much more focused than a VMM that has a much broader Assault Support mission.

First part is completely false, you can dump gas. I don't think there is a 5k minimum altitude over bad guy territory to lighten the aircraft.

The second part about the hand selection. Agreed, and this is where specific training comes in. When you use all of your flight hours with a narrow focus it creates a very proficient pilot, in that focus.

To be honest, at this point I have kind of forgotten what we were originally referring to, I guess I need to reread some of the thread. Oops

 

[Pags]

First part is completely false, you can dump gas. I don't think there is a 5k minimum altitude over bad guy territory to lighten the aircraft.

The second part about the hand selection. Agreed, and this is where specific training comes in. When you use all of your flight hours with a narrow focus it creates a very proficient pilot, in that focus.

To be honest, at this point I have kind of forgotten what we were originally referring to, I guess I need to reread some of the thread. Oops

Both airplanes can dump gas so I'm not sure why that means the first part is false. Unless it's a relevant part to the SIR as there are some differences for gas dumping for the two airframes that I could see potentially being a part of the decision making.

The original point I was trying to refute was that "AFSOC has more capable airplanes and better pilots" and my overall point is that comparing airplanes and pilots across services based on some sort of arbitrary cool factor is silly when each services aircraft and communities are tailored to the unique mission needs of the service. These needs fall on a spectrum between more focused (160th, AFSOC) and "jack of all trades" (HSC). Back to the sports analogy, AFSOC is a south paw reliever and USN is a utility in fielder. Or maybe AFSOC is the Raptor and USN is the 1500WT.

 

[taxi1]

If there's some sort of actual requirement that makes sense then by all means do the creative thinking necessary to make it happen.

EABO is going to generate that requirement. It’s driving the emergent DARPA WIG program too.

 

[Pags]

EABO is going to generate that requirement. It’s driving the emergent DARPA WIG program too.

So it's a community grab for relevance and budget in a non-COIN world. If a seaplane is really what's needed for EABO then do what someone else said and make a real one. Or maybe this idea of a stepping stone to that in which case say "it's a demo to see if this is something worth sinking more money in to." In which case maybe someone can dust off the design for the Convair Tradewind:

Last of the Great Flying Boats

Why the Convair Tradewind was a beautiful, versatile, fast failure.

www.airspacemag.com

A flying boat with a bow ramp sounds like something that would actually be able to move larger things on and off an island.

 

[taxi1]

Here's the gouge from the DARPA RFI

• Takeoff and land in the water (up to Sea State 3) for runway independence
• Maximize flight time in ground effect for increased range, endurance, and survivability
• Extended out of ground effect flight capability for obstacle avoidance, flight over land, weather avoidance, etc.
• High sea state operation for in-ground effect flight as well as takeoff and landing and extended on water operations
• Low cost manufacturing techniques and design choices (e.g. unpressurized fuselage)
• Large operational payload (100+ tons) and capability of carrying multiple amphibious vehicles

DARPA seeks to identify additional novel concepts and configurations that meet these objectives. Ongoing engagements with potential service partners have identified a wide variety of use cases that indicate the utility of the concept. Examples of potential mission areas include:

• Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
• Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)
• Distributed logistics and logistics under threat operations
• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), on-site triage, mass casualty rescue
• Amphibious operations
• Unmanned vehicle operations
• Low payload, long duration arctic patrol flights

 

[nittany03]

OK, but given that a C-130 with floaties isn't an ekranoplan . . . how do DARPA requirements for the latter justify the former?

 

[taxi1]

OK, but given that a C-130 with floaties isn't an ekranoplan . . . how do DARPA requirements for the latter justify the former?

Time to market. A C-130 with floats is probably a relatively quick thing compared to a clean sheet WIG craft.