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@DanMa1156 PERS got caught with their hand in the cookie jar violating the DoDI. I remember one of the PERS-43 briefs at Hook or NHA where they said something along the lines of “yeah so turns out we can’t shorten people’s shore tours to make them retainable, so we ‘fixed that glitch’”. That was the 18/19 timeframe, and I believe folks showing now are all getting what they should.
What I really meant was, most people in aviation probably signed up to be aviators. Not shooters, not FACs, etc regardless of what brief we were given when we signed the dotted line. Perhaps it’s not in the cards right now but “not flying” seems to be a consistent reason people don’t want to stay. Not saying it’s right or wrong but I hear it often enough.
The Army does Warrant Officer pilots who only fly. Why can’t the Navy do the same?
In other words and of more importance to Naval Aviation would you say that instead of forcing aviators, which the Navy is already short on, to do non-flying tours instead keep them in aviation for their whole career is a possible path in the future? I understand the argument that those non-flying tours make you a more well rounded Naval Officer but like you say it doesn't seem to make much sense to take somebody who the Navy has spent millions of dollars and time to train and have them do a job they neither signed up for nor trained for.
If we pull out of the Middle East in a few short years, well, nature abhors a vacuum. If we stay until...? Well, that's what we've been doing.
Something else to think about - have our practices in personnel and assignments kept up with what we expect of our pilots compared to the 20th century? Also, has the structure of squadrons evolved to support increased expectations from pilots?
I ask the above based off an assumption I'm making that pilots flying F-XX or F/A-XX in 2021 have way more asked of them than when life was Sparrows and dumb bombs. I'm supposed to be proficient at every mission out there, able to do everything from Harpoon and SLAM-ER to CAS to an FI DCA to an OCA with HARM/AARGM. And the threat is a peer threat now. Deep down inside I have just a tiny sliver of doubt that, in my TMS, if - today - we were to do something like put yellow striped weapons on, employ against actual emitters, with permanent blue air kill removal, doing all the high end things we can say we can do on paper, but with sim unboxed... it wouldn't go so well. Hopefully the threat has the same issues.
Is the design of a squadron where I spend more time on collateral duties than training to do all the above the right way to do things? Is 36 months and then you may never see a grey jet again the right way to do things? Is that the way things have always been done? Maybe we need to evolve the design of our squadrons and the way we do manpower to keep up with the mission. Maybe we need to change the way we assess readiness and the ability of squadrons to do all the things they say they can do.
The Army does Warrant Officer pilots who only fly. Why can’t the Navy do the same?
Assuming you accounted for your IPs (and all the GS civilians at the squadron) pay and family benefits too?You sparked my nerd nerve so I just did some quick excel math as I happen to have an old copy of the FY-18 DoD flight hour rates. For me, the Navy spent between $5.5-$6 million to get me from brand new ensign to SWTP Level IV. That includes my annual salary.
Assuming you accounted for your IPs (and all the GS civilians at the squadron) pay and family benefits too?
Why not plus up the reserves...substantially? Place every airframe in the reserves and scatter them across the country like they used to do (save on infrastructure by co-locating at ANG bases).
In short, give the skill set a place to go while they exercise other options yet keep them in the service and in the cockpit.
I grew up down the street from NAS Willow Grove which was a ANG/Reserve base at the time. USMC had a reserve MAG there with 53s, 130s, and A-4s. USN had a reserve ASW force of several VP squadrons and an H-2 squadron. PA ANG had A-37s, A-10s.When was this a thing? How big was each "det" for lack of a better word? My immediate thoughts are lack of standardization and no economy of scale on maintenance, but I'm super interested to hear that this was apparently a thing in the past? What do you see as the supposed benefits (other than infrastructure cost reduction)? (Serious, not sarcastic.)
NAS Atlanta, NAS Willow Grove, NAS New Orleans...When was this a thing? How big was each "det" for lack of a better word? My immediate thoughts are lack of standardization and no economy of scale on maintenance, but I'm super interested to hear that this was apparently a thing in the past? What do you see as the supposed benefits (other than infrastructure cost reduction)? (Serious, not sarcastic.)
I grew up down the street from NAS Willow Grove which was a ANG/Reserve base at the time. USMC had a reserve MAG there with 53s, 130s, and A-4s. USN had a reserve ASW force of several VP squadrons and an H-2 squadron. PA ANG had A-37s, A-10s.
Immediately following WWII there were NASs all over the country near big cities that allowed reservists to easily maintain currency. Think LT Harry Brubacker from Bridges of Tiki Ri. The novel and movie are based on the real events of VF-884 "bitter birds" and their activation and deployment ISO Korea. VF-884 was a squadron from the Midwest (NAS Olathe?), their logo was a jayhawk, and they were bitter because they had been activated to go fight a war.
Why not plus up the reserves...substantially?
IndeedI'd like to see a larger reserve force even if it comes at the expense a smaller active duty force.
No sarcasm detected. As @Pags and @Jim123 have already noted naval air reserves used to be quite large. My dad flew with, and commanded squadrons out of NAS Olathe and NAS Dallas (NAS Grand Praire when he was there). At Dallas they had the full line including PV-2s, SH-3's, A-4's, F-8's and F-4's. At one point the Navy and Marines shared aircraft and you had this look...When was this a thing? How big was each "det" for lack of a better word? My immediate thoughts are lack of standardization and no economy of scale on maintenance, but I'm super interested to hear that this was apparently a thing in the past? What do you see as the supposed benefits (other than infrastructure cost reduction)? (Serious, not sarcastic.)