Also, I think this point gets glossed over way too much, THE POINT OF A CVN IS TO PUT FIGHTERS AND STRIKERS INTO HARMS WAY. Everything else is there for support.
That's a pretty simplistic and very narrow view of an aircraft carrier. There's a bit more to it than that.
The recent wars have confronted us with a narrow slice of the spectrum of naval conflict. The Navy's primary combat role is not overland strike, although we can fill a niche role as a quick reaction force or when land basing or flight routes are an issue, as they often are. In the first Gulf War, the AF did like 90% of the strike missions. Yes, the overland strike mission is important, but...
What no one else can do is control the oceans and conduct war at sea. It's only been 70 years since that happened last, which is not long in the balance of history. And in that short time, we have tended to lose sight of other scenarios for which we must always be ready. That's the hard part (and this is where I bring it back to the whole discussion of helo guys training for cool combat missions but never getting to do them): being ready for types of combat that aren't actually happening at the moment. That's our whole job during peace!
So what would you say "the point of a CVN is..." if you're meeting force on force in the middle of the ocean, and everyone's sweating about cruise missiles, subs, and shark attacks? In that case, the question of who is at the tip of the spear and who is supporting might be answered differently. My point is that in order to avoid getting short-sighted and myopic about our nation's naval needs, we must approach these questions with foresight, study, patience, and vigilance.
(sarcasm)
