USS Fitzgerald collision in C7F

[scoolbubba]

Why doesn't the Navy send SWO's to train with the experts: the Coast Guard. There is a reason that the Coast Guard makes it difficult for SWOs to transfer "SWO time" to a Coast Guard license: SWOs have to be able to document their actual bridge time (i.e., OOD Underway).

That might actually be a useful exchange program for the instructors. However, with the institutionalized abysmal performance at the basics of not hitting other ships, shoals, reefs, etc, it might take a while before our SWOs would be trained to the standard required to instruct at the Coast Guard's school.

It'd be akin to how Naval Aviators and USAF pilots go to the sister service's pilot training bases. This way, the Coasties would get to practice bleeding for a while around our SWOs and then go back to the loving embrace of their service.

 

[BarryD]

Why doesn't the Navy send SWO's to train with the experts: the Coast Guard. There is a reason that the Coast Guard makes it difficult for SWOs to transfer "SWO time" to a Coast Guard license: SWOs have to be able to document their actual bridge time (i.e., OOD Underway).

As in a CG 3rd Mate's License, like that the Maritime Academies set people up for, or going to the CG version of SWOS/BDOC/ADOC?

Why don't they just reestablish SWOS already? As the Midshipman points out in his article, that I failed to read before posting about SWOS, it would provide a sorely needed baseline for all SWOs before they show up to a ship.

This. I also liked the idea he brought up of opening up more YP cruises to everyone, people I've talked to who have gone on YP cruises said they took a lot away from them. I'm guessing that the best practice for conning a ship is conning a ship, and sims can only take you so far.

 

[Flash]

Coasties would get to practice bleeding for a while around our SWOs and then go back to the loving embrace of their service.

I worked with a few Coastie JO SWO types previously, they had been XO or CO's on patrol boats/small cutters, and they said the Medium and High Endurance cutters, similar to FF's and DD' in the Navy, had a pretty bad rep the Coast Guard for being very SWO-like and were to be avoided at all costs.

 

[nittany03]

Pro Publica has now published a survey, and is actively soliciting anonymous replies/anonymous sources from the Fleet.

Things that make you go "hmm." ?

 

[Brett327]

Surveys conducted like this are notorious for providing skewed data. Every chicken little will come out of the woodwork

 

[nittany03]

Surveys conducted like this are notorious for providing skewed data. Every chicken little will come out of the woodwork

I don't disagree, but they seem to have shot straight before. Hence one of the reasons it makes me go "hmm." What statistical controls do they have in place in order to get anything approaching reliable data out of a self-selected sample? Or are they just going to run with everyone who's butthurt? I mean, if there wasn't value in anonymity or at least a waiver of ability to go after people, we wouldn't grant privilege in safety investigations. But those aren't conducted by journalists.

I'm also interested in Big Navy's reaction to this, and I'm glad I'm not an SJA on any of the flag staffs in WESTPAC right now. Or any of the numbered fleets they call out. Not being a lawyer, just a layman law geek, I can't say where the bounds are between a servicemember's right to free expression and a commander's right to make filling this survey out an Article 92 violation. AFAIK, you've got the right to talk to your Congressional representative, not some rando reporter. But if The Powers That Be tried to crack down on this, I'm sure Pro Publica would love to make journalistic hay with that.

 

[Brett327]

Legally, unless you’re divulging particular kinds of info (classified, privileged, OPSEC, etc), there’s nothing to stop a servicemember from talking to the press. It may be frowned upon, but that’s probably it. Besides the above caveats, you can’t order someone to not speak to the press. There are probably whistle-blower laws to consider as well.

 

[Hair Warrior]

The Navy has a program to recruit merchant mariners (some of whom have captained USNS types), commission them as 166X strategic sealift officers, and have them evaluate/support bridge procedures and watchstanding underway during busy transits to improve safety. The merchant marines do a good job at nautical instruction. The Navy could probably benefit from schools like SUNY-Maritime as a source of new SWO accessions, because trying to teach someone to safely drive big ships is not a fast process.

It’s also worth asking whether SWO should be split into a couple designators like aviation splits NAs and NFOs, with one designator focused solely on safe ship driving (bridge procedures) and the other focused on everything else (weaps, propulsion, maintenance, etc.). The idea would be to take work off the plate of surface navy JOs so they can focus on a narrower skill set, and become more specialized in it. I think the surface navy is already going that route with COMMOs on CRUDES as either a SWO-IP option selectee or a straight stick 1820.

 

[BigRed389]

The Navy has a program to recruit merchant mariners (some of whom have captained USNS types), commission them as 166X strategic sealift officers, and have them evaluate/support bridge procedures and watchstanding underway during busy transits to improve safety. The merchant marines do a good job at nautical instruction. The Navy could probably benefit from schools like SUNY-Maritime as a source of new SWO accessions, because trying to teach someone to safely drive big ships is not a fast process.

It’s also worth asking whether SWO should be split into a couple designators like aviation splits NAs and NFOs, with one designator focused solely on safe ship driving (bridge procedures) and the other focused on everything else (weaps, propulsion, maintenance, etc.). The idea would be to take work off the plate of surface navy JOs so they can focus on a narrower skill set, and become more specialized in it. I think the surface navy is already going that route with COMMOs on CRUDES as either a SWO-IP option selectee or a straight stick 1820.

In the “other” model, which almost every other major Western Navy but us use, the 3 designators are Warfare (Ops, Shipdriving, Tactics), Marine Engineering (engines, generators, plumbing), Weapons/Electrical Engineering (basically C5I + things that go boom).

While it certainly has its advantages, I’ve seen it in action on Exchange, it’s not perfect either, and there are serious stove piping downsides as well.

COMMO is not IP. A basic SWO really needs to be able to understand how tactical radios and crypto work.
What they did do is split out IT/Network type stuff from Radio, so the IP can handle all of that. Your basic SWO is unlikely to really have a strong background to understand Cyber, and it's not really in their wheelhouse either.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

In the “other” model, which almost every other major Western Navy but us use, the 3 designators are Warfare (Ops, Shipdriving, Tactics), Marine Engineering (engines, generators, plumbing), Weapons/Electrical Engineering (basically C5I + things that go boom).

While it certainly has its advantages, I’ve seen it in action on Exchange, it’s not perfect either, and there are serious stove piping downsides as well.

COMMO is not IP. A basic SWO really needs to be able to understand how tactical radios and crypto work.
What they did do is split out IT/Network type stuff from Radio, so the IP can handle all of that. Your basic SWO is unlikely to really have a strong background to understand Cyber, and it's not really in their wheelhouse either.

There is an ultimate stupidity on the other side of the globe. On an average Russian FF/FFG, there are at least seven basic designators, as they listed in so-called Ship Order: Nav, Missile/Gunnery, Mine/Torpedo, Communications Means (my initial spec), Marine Engineering, Aviation Support, Operations (all radars/sonars/recco/ECM and CIC in one big trade). And there are DH slots for each, though sometimes united (say, on a smaller ships all weapons may be coupled for just one DH). But XO and CO billets are open only for Nav (aka "dividers"), Missile/Gunnery ("horns") and Mine/Torpedo ("romans") jerks, after their respective DH tour is completed. They say, in such system there are too much professionals to miss some bugs.

What's wrong with it? That is the CO of even nuclear missile cruiser remains a narrow specialist in his trade, period. Who runs the ship? No one fucking knows. Some "collective mind" at best. And no one on the bridge knows how the tactical radio works but me if I'm here as OOD underway. So, when we're mooring, anchoring, passing straits or firing live weapon, I'm OOD but I'm far from acting as real OOD as it's GQ condition and the Captain runs the show. I'm just here just in case to find the scapegoat (me) as soon as it's possible. When we're just guarding the missile range for somebody other, I'm on my paperwork or tech activity with apparatus and OOD is a torpedo dude who doesn't give a fuck to listen the targeting VHF circuit and just amusing himself by chattering with TAO vocally and to the gals of the shore stations via 16th channel. And when some dumb (though half-full of fuel) missile's seeker gets us a target instead of intended rusty wreck 50 miles off, the quiet "WTF???" would be said just too late...

No, keep your "generalist" line and stick with it. It's better. Just give Shoes much more time for rigorous training both before and after 1st DivO tour.

 

[Griz882]

The Navy has a program to recruit merchant mariners...

The maritime academies are genuine “trade” schools (and I don’t mean that in a bad way) while USNA/ROTC programs are academic programs. On average a USMMA graduate has over 400 days at sea before their senior year. Add to that several days in smaller training vessels. I am not recommending that USNA change their academic orientation, however, there is something to be said about a genuine, old fashioned, apprenticeship in the old seagoing midshipman way. Then again, during WWII the Navy was giving commissions (and shipboard combat duties) to guys with a solid application and zero time on the water. Somehow they managed to train them quickly and exceptionally well.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Somehow they managed to train them quickly and exceptionally well.

I think it happened mostly due to exceptionally high level of CPO corps of then-Navy. One example: USS CV-6 Enterprise in 1945 still had 61% of CPOs who were there on Shakedown cruise well before the war. CV-5 Yorktown a day before she went to bottom off Midway contained about 22% of such CPOs in crew roster, CV-8 Hornet had met her last day with less than 7% of initial enlisted shellback crowd. I'm sure it makes the main difference. Not the learning curve of USNR JOs who flowed through the ships companies and air groups like waterfall.

 

[BigRed389]

There is an ultimate stupidity on the other side of the globe. On an average Russian FF/FFG, there are at least seven basic designators, as they listed in so-called Ship Order: Nav, Missile/Gunnery, Mine/Torpedo, Communications Means (my initial spec), Marine Engineering, Aviation Support, Operations (all radars/sonars/recco/ECM and CIC in one big trade). And there are DH slots for each, though sometimes united (say, on a smaller ships all weapons may be coupled for just one DH). But XO and CO billets are open only for Nav (aka "dividers"), Missile/Gunnery ("horns") and Mine/Torpedo ("romans") jerks, after their respective DH tour is completed. They say, in such system there are too much professionals to miss some bugs.

What's wrong with it? That is the CO of even nuclear missile cruiser remains a narrow specialist in his trade, period. Who runs the ship? No one fucking knows. Some "collective mind" at best. And no one on the bridge knows how the tactical radio works but me if I'm here as OOD underway. So, when we're mooring, anchoring, passing straits or firing live weapon, I'm OOD but I'm far from acting as real OOD as it's GQ condition and the Captain runs the show. I'm just here just in case to find the scapegoat (me) as soon as it's possible. When we're just guarding the missile range for somebody other, I'm on my paperwork or tech activity with apparatus and OOD is a torpedo dude who doesn't give a fuck to listen the targeting VHF circuit and just amusing himself by chattering with TAO vocally and to the gals of the shore stations via 16th channel. And when some dumb (though half-full of fuel) missile's seeker gets us a target instead of intended rusty wreck 50 miles off, the quiet "WTF???" would be said just too late...

No, keep your "generalist" line and stick with it. It's better. Just give Shoes much more time for rigorous training both before and after 1st DivO tour.

Having that many specializations is pretty stupid. But then if your Navy (apparently) relies on Officers to perform technical maintenance....well, no wonder you need so many.

The maritime academies are genuine “trade” schools (and I don’t mean that in a bad way) while USNA/ROTC programs are academic programs. On average a USMMA graduate has over 400 days at sea before their senior year. Add to that several days in smaller training vessels. I am not recommending that USNA change their academic orientation, however, there is something to be said about a genuine, old fashioned, apprenticeship in the old seagoing midshipman way. Then again, during WWII the Navy was giving commissions (and shipboard combat duties) to guys with a solid application and zero time on the water. Somehow they managed to train them quickly and exceptionally well.

Honestly, because driving a warship is not that hard. Fighting one and understanding the concepts of how those key systems work is, but simply driving one isn’t. Anybody with average intelligence and a basic sense of relative motion will do fine.

The issues of FTZ and JSM appear to have had more to do with a mix of not having a quality filter for JOs (FTZ OOD didn’t trust TAO, her 2nd on the bridge was on a “redo” tour to recover, her 3rd was basically brand new), undermanned ships (see previous plus no lookouts), overly demanding operational schedules (cut pierside time short because...stuff) , cuts to maintenance periods (like deferring maintenance on your 25 year old salt water car), cuts to enlisted and technician training (time sump to get them where they need to be via OJT), poor configuration control and parts supply/readiness (fucked up nav radar, cross decks didn’t know how to operate new steering console), and of course, overworked ships (NKO, Safety audit, Maintenance Admin inspections).

Having a shipdriving Yoda isn’t what fixes those kinds of problems.
You fix the above by properly funding and scheduling maintenance and engineering activities, training and retaining quality people, and establish clear baselines you can use to push back a “no” signal until issues get fixed.
But nobody gives a shit about that kind of solution because it’s not as catchy.

If the helm console is too complex for the 20 year old BM3 to easily operate, either fix the console or the helmsman training. If we have to rely on officers to be the experts to fix and operate every single fucking thing, we are screwed.

 

[Hair Warrior]

The maritime academies are genuine “trade” schools (and I don’t mean that in a bad way) while USNA/ROTC programs are academic programs. On average a USMMA graduate has over 400 days at sea before their senior year. Add to that several days in smaller training vessels. I am not recommending that USNA change their academic orientation, however, there is something to be said about a genuine, old fashioned, apprenticeship in the old seagoing midshipman way.

Agree! It would be nice if the Navy took more ENS SWOs from the graduating classes of USMMA and USCGA (and those academies in turn encouraged it). Not sure what an exchange program to USMMA or semester-at-sea would look like, but the published collision reports indicate that the surface navy should explore a variety of options for improvement.

Then again, during WWII the Navy was giving commissions (and shipboard combat duties) to guys with a solid application and zero time on the water. Somehow they managed to train them quickly and exceptionally well.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L._Ron_Hubbard#Military_career

But he is the exception.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

But then if your Navy (apparently) relies on Officers to perform technical maintenance

Yeah, this biggest fucking country is really big and O-people turn wrenches everywhere over here. E-people are conscripts, almost all of them, thus who will teach and train that very 18-years old BM3 if he'll inevitably get out at 20?