Please enlighten us...."There I was, at 12 knots, er, make it 14 knots with line of bearing, decreasing range at 20,000 yds! What to do, what to do?"
Captain to the Bridge!!
-
Please take a moment and update your account profile. If you have an updated account profile with basic information on why you are on Air Warriors it will help other people respond to your posts. How do you update your profile you ask?
Go here:
Edit Account Details and Profile
Captain to the Bridge!!
Haha, my point was that with such a low speeds (believe me - 13 kts is pushing it on those old YP's nowadays!), getting to discuss cultural differences between our countries and Navies was very easily done.
As far as shiphandling goes, we did Divtacs basically all day and got to do some neat things like UNREPS. I'll admit that in terms of actual tactical knowledge, I'm sure it's pretty minimal, but in terms of getting confidence on the bridge, I thought it was great experience.
As far as shiphandling goes, we did Divtacs basically all day and got to do some neat things like UNREPS. I'll admit that in terms of actual tactical knowledge, I'm sure it's pretty minimal, but in terms of getting confidence on the bridge, I thought it was great experience.
My record at that range is about 300 knots of closure....I know HJ, you have got to have had more than that at some point in the TomPlease enlighten us....
OldNavy
Registered User
Please enlighten us....
Reminds me of an old "Broadside" comic right after Top Gun came out...
"Target bears 156 degrees....10,000 yards.... speed 12 knots.....CPA 5000 yards!"
Nervous JOOD says "Come on Mav, do some of that SWO stuff"
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/04/navy_subcollision_cofired_041409/
The CO of the USS Hartford was just relieved. The article doesn't say exactly what happened but the evidence found was substantial enough for the change. Sounds like the command climate was not what it should have been.
The CO of the USS Hartford was just relieved. The article doesn't say exactly what happened but the evidence found was substantial enough for the change. Sounds like the command climate was not what it should have been.
So was the Nav and the OOD. Oh and BTW...they are going to bring Hartford all the way back to CONUS....ON THE SURFACE!
Oh, that's gonna suck and sure will be depressing.
Correct me if I am wrong, but I feel this is the training/mindset that is being taught to all SNAs whether it be a multi piloted or single piloted aircraft.
Just one more reason why Naval Aviation is the place to be!
Well, the "have an accident, Captain gets fired" SOP for the Surface and Sub Navy is one of the reasons you'll always find him hovering over your shoulder, and why he never seems to sleep when certain OOD's have the Midwatch. Initiative gets beaten out of the JO's pretty quickly.
I can't disagree with the philosophy that the Captain is ultimately accountable for what happens to his ship, but I also think there's a subtle but distinct difference between "accountable" and "responsible". Squadron CO's don't automatically get fired if the squadron has a Class A. If they did, I don't know if they'd ever let a plane go off the pointy end of the Boat without at least an O-4 driving.
Usually when these mishaps happen, it's because the Captain has created a command climate of fear and/or utterly crushed initiative. More than one has occurred, for example, because a JOOD didn't want to speak up about the constant bearing, decreasing range to that boat over there and get yelled at again; or a petty officer in CIC is certain by radar bearings that they're out of the channel, but after the CO tells him to shut the hell up, the petty officer sits back and goes into "chump don't want no help, chump don't get no help" mode. The ironic thing is, the Captain probably created that atmosphere out of fear of his crew doing something stupid and getting him relieved.
I can't disagree with the philosophy that the Captain is ultimately accountable for what happens to his ship, but I also think there's a subtle but distinct difference between "accountable" and "responsible". Squadron CO's don't automatically get fired if the squadron has a Class A. If they did, I don't know if they'd ever let a plane go off the pointy end of the Boat without at least an O-4 driving.
Usually when these mishaps happen, it's because the Captain has created a command climate of fear and/or utterly crushed initiative. More than one has occurred, for example, because a JOOD didn't want to speak up about the constant bearing, decreasing range to that boat over there and get yelled at again; or a petty officer in CIC is certain by radar bearings that they're out of the channel, but after the CO tells him to shut the hell up, the petty officer sits back and goes into "chump don't want no help, chump don't get no help" mode. The ironic thing is, the Captain probably created that atmosphere out of fear of his crew doing something stupid and getting him relieved.
Again, it's very unfortunate such a climate exists. An atmosphere like that would not be tolerated in the cockpit (I have been in some situations like that before and it's not good). I don't know if SWOs or subs are taught CRM, but it would be a good place to start.
Bridge Resource Management.
Defined by SWOs as: "Using every resource available to the bridge to prevent collision."
That plus a few case studies derived from post-mishap investigative reports, lots of speculation in the classroom about what we could have done better, and that's your BRM class.
I think another issue may be CO/XO confidence levels as well. I only speculate here, but you only get 4 years served at sea where you stand a bridge watch. After that, there's ~10 year interval to you becoming a XO/CO...I asked about this, and was told they get a LOT of simulator time for the PCO/XO course.
Still has to make you wonder...
I honestly worry for the future though...with CONTINUING cutbacks to underway times, bridge watchstander time is decreasing when indications are that we need more ship driving training. Hopefully they'll start mandating increased sim time. We have sims available, but to many COs they're low priority to the continuous inspections and certifications we do leading up to deployment.
Still has to make you wonder...
I honestly worry for the future though...with CONTINUING cutbacks to underway times, bridge watchstander time is decreasing when indications are that we need more ship driving training. Hopefully they'll start mandating increased sim time. We have sims available, but to many COs they're low priority to the continuous inspections and certifications we do leading up to deployment.
So it turns out that a certain family friend's son lead that...effort. He's a solid dude, you couldn't ask for a better guy to lead it. My hat is off to those guys. There are those who can do it, and those who wish they could - i'm in the second group for this one.
USS Hartford returns to CONUS
090521-N-5188B-016 GROTON, Conn. (May 21, 2009) Line handlers from the Virginia class attack submarine USS Virginia (SSN 774) await the arrival of the Virginia class attack submarine USS Hartford (SSN 768). Hartford returned to Naval Submarine Base New London after a month-long surface transit from Bahrain. Hartford is expected to enter Electric Boat shipyard for a thorough inspection to assess required repairs after the March 20 collision with the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18) in the Strait of Hormuz. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Peter D. Blair/Released)
090521-N-5188B-016 GROTON, Conn. (May 21, 2009) Line handlers from the Virginia class attack submarine USS Virginia (SSN 774) await the arrival of the Virginia class attack submarine USS Hartford (SSN 768). Hartford returned to Naval Submarine Base New London after a month-long surface transit from Bahrain. Hartford is expected to enter Electric Boat shipyard for a thorough inspection to assess required repairs after the March 20 collision with the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18) in the Strait of Hormuz. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Peter D. Blair/Released)
