• Please take a moment and update your account profile. If you have an updated account profile with basic information on why you are on Air Warriors it will help other people respond to your posts. How do you update your profile you ask?

    Go here:

    Edit Account Details and Profile

Road to 350: What Does the US Navy Do Anyway?

Pags

N/A
pilot
It was a great start for sure, and those numbers are still only a fraction of what was produced by 1944-1945. We really didn’t start rolling production lines hard until mid-late 1942. The amazing fact is that is just one service. The total combined/joint force production of mechanized vehicles, ships, munitions, weapons, transports, artillery pieces, and aircraft will probably never occur again in human history. Link below shows the Navy ships numbers in detail.

Ship force levels since 1886

The near peer conflict shortage will not be in tonnage or shear capacity, but in precious metals, electronics, and technical manpower. I would submit we are in a better place now for a near peer fight vice where we were when we started WWII. Especially when we include all of our mutual defense treaties and partners. However that will not be true in about 10-20 years if we’re specifically talking about the PLAN. So I agree that total capacity/capability needs to be increased. It’s also part of the reason we’re seeing a lot of rhetoric and posturing in the news by the CNO and CMC.
Not arguing with you but just continuing the discussion...to get production where it was by 1944 that wheel needed to be started spinning early so that the companies/industries could get cash in hand and start ramping up workforce, raw materials, facilities, etc. That would also spin up suppliers to do the same once they get the demand signal. Essentially the Naval Act of 1940 told BUSHIPS to start designing, told the yards to start expanding, told the bethlehem steel works to start expanding, and so on.
 

Griz882

Frightening children with the Griz-O-Copter!
pilot
Contributor
Not arguing with you but just continuing the discussion...to get production where it was by 1944 that wheel needed to be started spinning early so that the companies/industries could get cash in hand and start ramping up workforce, raw materials, facilities, etc. That would also spin up suppliers to do the same once they get the demand signal. Essentially the Naval Act of 1940 told BUSHIPS to start designing, told the yards to start expanding, told the bethlehem steel works to start expanding, and so on.
These are all good points. 1940 was a pivotal year in the US as the government also called the National Guard to active duty, alerted the "national army" (meaning reserve officers at that time) and prepared the Selective Service system for activation. The same effort that went into ship building also went into aircraft production. The thing that kicked all of this activity off? Nazi Germany.

In the next war if China gives us a year long break by jabbing at South Korea and Taiwan we will probably see something similar. That seems unlikely. The good news, however, is that China won't have the operational shake-down time the German and even the Japanese had when the US declared war. For all of their wizbang stuff and stunning size, the Chinese have never projected power very far. That kind of institutional knowledge matters.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
We won't have a shortage in conflict because, as has been pointed out by senior government officials not so tactfully, you go to war with the <Fleet> you have. And to the DOD's credit, we're probably generally capable of scrapping with the PRC now to achieve some objectives.
'Scrapping' with the PRC is an understatement. Sure they can turtle up and make life difficult, but that has at least as much to do with geography as it does military capabilities.

It's the post-conflict situation where we may have a problem...ie Round 2, or 3, or 4.
When you look at both development/upgrade cycles and production times, it's entirely possible we will enter the second fight worse off than the first, and so on.
To even go into 'round 2' on equal footing the PRC would have to deliver a series of victories on par with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The capability gap might be closing, but it's still there and still quite large. The sky isn't falling.

I'll agree that over the next few decades we'd be better off focusing on how we should ramp up production vice sustaining a fleet that is 3x the size of PRC's because the American public probably won't agree to pay for the latter.

You may be mixing up some of the details.
490 includes all of USNS and Ready Reserve/Reserve Fleet, even barracks barges, etc.
Command/Unmanned ships count towards battle force.The decomm of the 2 CVNs is also made up in the same study by expanding numbers to incorporate CVLs.
The point was to ensure we're making an 'apples to apples' comparison. The study isn't recommending an increase of 60-70% to the current force structure, but instead 10%, because it covered everything including reserve ships. And I'm willing to bet that they were smart enough to consider our potential to ramp up ship building in that analysis.

I don't disagree with either statement on its own necessarily, but you realize these 2 statements are directly contradictory right?
Not really. Cost effective has two components - how much the item cost, and how well it does the task it's designed to do. I just don't see a lot of utility in USVs / UUVs in a potential high end conflict.
 
Last edited:

BigRed389

Registered User
None
'Scrapping' with the PRC is an understatement. Sure they can turtle up and make life difficult, but that has at least as much to do with geography as it does military capabilities.

To even go into 'round 2' on equal footing the PRC would have to deliver a series of victories on par with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The capability gap might be closing, but it's still there and still quite large. The sky isn't falling.

I think you may be letting your community's relative comfort in the underwater domain color your perception of the Joint domain.
Folks in the PACOM world whose business this is are nowhere near as enthusiastic. We're not going to be able to talk about the details here, but if you're confident that they've got it wrong, well, hopefully you've got more to shape that opinion than gut feeling.

It's not so much a "sky is falling" as, the trend lines don't favor continuing our continued superiority. And there are aspects where the capability gap isn't just closing, but past and opening.
Again, the sky isn't falling. There are fortunately plenty of areas of quality where they continue to lag behind.

I'll agree that over the next few decades we'd be better off focusing on how we should ramp up production vice sustaining a fleet that is 3x the size of PRC's because the American public probably won't agree to pay for the latter.

Sure. Not arguing for any particular solution vs another.
The problem statement, though, is simply that when looking at "capability" we also need to look at reconstitution, particularly if we make the assumption that any conflict with China doesn't have an objective of burning down Chinese industry to destroy their supporting infrastructure (which is...unlikely).
To simplify things, you can kill 4 DDGs for every DDG we lose...but if the enemy is also pumping out 8 DDGs for every 1 you make, in the long run, what looks like a favorable 4:1 kill ratio actually turns into a losing one.

The point was to ensure we're making an 'apples to apples' comparison. The study isn't recommending an increase of 60-70% to the current force structure, but instead 10%, because it covered everything including reserve ships. And I'm willing to bet that they were smart enough to consider our potential to ramp up ship building in that analysis.

Sure. What I'm saying is the 490 includes a considerable number of ships I would not consider likely to contribute meaningfully to any conflict.
Roughly half the Reserve Fleet ships making up that number aren't even nominally considered ready, and I don't consider the not insignificant number of tugs and berthing/barracks barges to be worth counting other than to pad the numbers.

Not really. Cost effective has two components - how much the item cost, and how well it does the task it's designed to do. I just don't see a lot of utility in USVs / UUVs in a potential high end conflict.

Your original post was this:
The Virginia class sub has ASW, ASUW, strike, SOF, and ISR in its mission sets and that program is doing just fine. So there's proof of concept that it's possible to design a ship to do more than one mission and come in under budget.

My point was over/under budget programmatically, isn't the arbiter of whether a particular solution type is viable or not.

Virginia could have come in the same amount over budget instead...it still would have been a valid solution to the problem, because a different/better one simply doesn't exist. If it had come in over budget due to crappy shipyard management, that doesn't mean a larger number of specialized subs would have panned out any better. I'm sure some budget sheet out there has F-22 over budget. Doesn't mean it was ever a flawed concept.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
I think you may be letting your community's relative comfort in the underwater domain color your perception of the Joint domain...
"I'll never understand the Navy's unwillingness to accept that casualties are a part of war."
-Former Army Batallian XO with 3 combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan after seeing a joint brief where the Navy dominates a wargame scenario but loses a carrier in the process, thus prompting follow on discussions on the need for drastic changes.

Why are you willing to disregard a recommendation from the task force commissioned by the SECDEF as completely bunk, but then want to hang on other analyses done by staffs in pac?

Many analysts who look at this stuff as part of staffs also tend to have a secondary objective to help fight for more resources for their piece of the pie. They're also looking at more than just lethality - as many of our recent conflicts going back to Korea have shown, we can come out of conflict the losers even if we're really good at killing the other side. Many of those factors exist in a potential conflict with China and won't be fixed with moar warships.

The problem statement, though, is simply that when looking at "capability" we also need to look at reconstitution, particularly if we make the assumption that any conflict with China doesn't have an objective of burning down Chinese industry to destroy their supporting infrastructure (which is...unlikely).
I can't imagine a direct conflict where warships are sinking each other yet we decide to avoid limiting China's ability to replenish forces.

To simplify things, you can kill 4 DDGs for every DDG we lose...but if the enemy is also pumping out 8 DDGs for every 1 you make, in the long run, what looks like a favorable 4:1 kill ratio actually turns into a losing one.
I understand the principle you're trying to illustrate, but these numbers aren't grounded in reality.

Sure. What I'm saying is the 490 includes a considerable number of ships I would not consider likely to contribute meaningfully to any conflict.
Ditto for the 530. That's the point. Additionally, the bulk of the delta between 490 and 530 is being filled with USVs with limited to no combat capabilities.

Your original post was...
I think you have to go back to what I was originally responding to. 'Viability' wasn't the topic; the cost-effectiveness of multi-mission capable platforms was.
 
Last edited:

Pags

N/A
pilot
"I'll never understand the Navy's unwillingness to accept that casualties are a part of war."
-Former Army Batallian XO with 3 combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan after seeing a joint brief where the Navy dominates a wargame scenario but loses a carrier in the process, thus prompting follow on discussions on the need for drastic changes.
This isn't just a USN problem, this is a problem of every navy ever. The Admirals build these amazing technological marvels of warships and then don't use them because they don't want to see their babies disappear in a flash.

See also: Fleet In Being
 
Last edited:

BigRed389

Registered User
None
"I'll never understand the Navy's unwillingness to accept that casualties are a part of war."
-Former Army Batallian XO with 3 combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan after seeing a joint brief where the Navy dominates a wargame scenario but loses a carrier in the process, thus prompting follow on discussions on the need for drastic changes.

Why are you willing to disregard a recommendation from the task force commissioned by the SECDEF as completely bunk, but then want to hang on other analyses done by staffs in pac?

I'm not sure which part of the SECDEF TF you think I'm calling bunk. I'm onboard with the increase as well as more diversity of platforms in the force structure. I am saying the PACOM staff analysis is done by the organization that owns the OPLAN and is supposed to figure out how we intend to actually fight in that conflict.

I would agree we need to re-evaluate our risk aversion to CVN losses (or as SECDEF's study recommended-look at more of a mix in the force structure) if people are freaking out because a CVN might get hit in a high end war OPLAN.

Many analysts who look at this stuff as part of staffs also tend to have a secondary objective to help fight for more resources for their piece of the pie. They're also looking at more than just lethality - as many of our recent conflicts going back to Korea have shown, we can come out of conflict the losers even if we're really good at killing the other side. Many of those factors exist in a potential conflict with China and won't be fixed with moar warships.

First part is fair. Yeah, every COCOM can easily make a case they need more assets. I'd like to think PACOM staff is more conscientious than to blur the lines on the numbers, but it's a valid concern.
The second part I also sort of agree with (see my other point below regarding reconstitution)...except in a primarily air/naval conflict, killing the other side's assets is actually pretty damn important. No ships or aircraft? Doesn't matter how much ground force assets you've got left afterwards, for our interests in the region, you're a non factor. None of our recent conflicts have involved industrial force on force - smashing guys driving Hiluxes or assassinating HVTs with Hellfire missiles isn't always going to give us the right lessons.

I can't imagine a direct conflict where warships are sinking each other yet we decide to avoid limiting China's ability to replenish forces.

I can very easily see us getting tangled up in the SCS, distant blockade, or limited intervention to support Taiwanese sovereignty where we are initially required to refrain from strikes against the mainland. In fact I think the actual intervention is more improbable to occur at all, than it is that we're going to jump into mainland strikes without some really careful consideration.

I understand the principle you're trying to illustrate, but these numbers aren't grounded in reality.

They weren't meant to be. Actual analysis would obviously be classified.
But then think about what it means if those exchanges actually aren't appreciably in our favor either.

Ditto for the 530. That's the point. Additionally, the bulk of the delta between 490 and 530 is being filled with USVs with limited to no combat capabilities.

If your point is that no USV immediately offers combat capabilities today, that would be a true statement.
If you are also implying that the intended USV roadmap offers only limited combat capabilities, that would be an uninformed assumption.

I think you have to go back to what I was originally responding to. 'Viability' wasn't the topic; the cost-effectiveness of multi-mission capable platforms was.

Whatever you want to call it. The point is you can take a "cost effective multi mission capable platform" and an outside factor like a freak price jump in raw materials, a pandemic, Congressional or DOD/NAVSEA incompetence can screw up a perfectly "cost effective platform" and bring it in over budget.
 

nittany03

Recovering NFO. Herder of Programmers.
pilot
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
These are all good points. 1940 was a pivotal year in the US as the government also called the National Guard to active duty, alerted the "national army" (meaning reserve officers at that time) and prepared the Selective Service system for activation. The same effort that went into ship building also went into aircraft production. The thing that kicked all of this activity off? Nazi Germany.
Those Angry Days by Lynne Olson is a great read into the politics of the day, especially FDR vs. Lindbergh. TL;DR, FDR's political maneuvering was impressive, but in shades of today, he also fucked himself by arrogantly squandering political capital on the court-packing scandal.
 

Randy Daytona

Cold War Relic
pilot
Super Moderator
CJCS Milley Predicts DoD Budget ‘Bloodletting’ To Fund Navy
"Look, I'm an Army guy,” Milley said. "And I love the Army...but the fundamental defense of the United States and the ability to project power forward will always be for America naval and air and space power."

 

Pags

N/A
pilot
CJCS Milley Predicts DoD Budget ‘Bloodletting’ To Fund Navy
"Look, I'm an Army guy,” Milley said. "And I love the Army...but the fundamental defense of the United States and the ability to project power forward will always be for America naval and air and space power."

Good to see an Army guy being objective about potential future conflicts and what capabilities will be needed. PTO in WWII was largely a USN/USMC war with limited USA involvement (compared to the ETO) until the B-29s showed up.
 

Griz882

Frightening children with the Griz-O-Copter!
pilot
Contributor
Good to see an Army guy being objective about potential future conflicts and what capabilities will be needed. PTO in WWII was largely a USN/USMC war with limited USA involvement (compared to the ETO) until the B-29s showed up.
Well, to be fair, there were nearly three times the number of army infantry divisions in the PTO than USMC divisions. Equally, the army participated in every campaign from Guadalcanal forward. It would be far more accurate to say it was a USN/Land Component show.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
Well, to be fair, there were nearly three times the number of army infantry divisions in the PTO than USMC divisions. Equally, the army participated in every campaign from Guadalcanal forward. It would be far more accurate to say it was a USN/Land Component show.
True, in the South and Central Pacific the USA largely worked for a USN chain of command.

MacArthur had a large force that gets lost between Guadalcanal and the Philippines doing yeoman work in New Guinea. Frankly I know very little of that campaign as much of my interest has been on campaigns led by the USN.
 
Top