Naval Aviations "One" Problem...

[AllAmerican75]

I think the promise of remote work is oversold and a lot of companies are expecting more of a hybrid work environment (that has certainly been my experience in the non airline pilot job market). There are definitely remote jobs out there, but they tend to be either pure tech (coding) or they are more rote (Medicare coding).

As you said, it's entirely dependent upon the job. One of friends' wives is a photographer and does photography and photoshop work and other admin for a photography business. Another is a school teacher and teaches remote classes at an online HS/GED/college prep school. The ones who absolutely need to be face-to-face do suffer but there are far more flexible opportunities than there used to be. Even in the Defense/Aerospace industry, there's been a move to remote work because it expands the talent pool outside of cities where they have an office. Again, it's all job and career field dependent. Choose your rate, choose your fate and all that.

So I spent a tour with the AF and worked a ton with the AF throughout my time on active and the reserves. The AF absolutely does admin better than the Navy and does a lot of things really well. That said, they too are hemorrhaging people. That tells me that the grass is perhaps not as green as many would make it out to be. I think they have serious cultural issues that are causing that.

Going through TAP at an AF base recently showed me that the grass isn't always greener. While they do admin very well, their corporate culture is stultifying and drives a lot of people out. Also, they are very admin-focused when it comes to promotions meaning enlisted don't promote quickly and rates/MOS'es get locked up quite often. Everybody I've interacted with across all of the branches have said that the grass isn't greener, just different. There seems to be a culture problem throughout the entire DoD.

 

[Griz882]

No worries, you may be right.



From a USMC perspective (speaking at a squadron level), the E-9' Sergeants Major were a somewhat mixed bag. A lot, or some, had infantry backgrounds and didn't understand how the air wing worked.

Some adapted, some didn't.

That’s why you go Master Guns…rifles over stars any day!

 

[JTS11]

That’s why you go Master Guns…rifles over stars any day!

In my brief career, I saw the impact of some good Master Guns...(also correlated to a healthy supply system)

 

[JTS11]

That’s why you go Master Guns…rifles over stars any day!

All jokes aside, the first squadron I was in, the Maint Chief was a black dude with a Jamaican/British accent who got shit done. I remember him working all the GSE when required. We get orders to deploy, and he's working GSE to get blades changed, and so forth...

He also looked at me like I had a dick growing out of my forehead, when I, as a boot O-2 working in the S-4, asked for something from Maint.

But he was a strong and effective Maint Chief.

 

[WhiskeySierra6]

I'd like to offer an alternative to the retention issue since I don't think it's unique to Naval Aviation (which a few people have pointed out). I think Naval Aviation is suffering from an identity crisis.
Since the end of WWII, we've brought a dynamic multi-mission capability with relatively low risk to our forces. Because of the asymmetrical maritime and technological advantages, we've been able to be involved in every major military operation regardless of where it happened. This includes, for better or worse, operations in land locked countries like Afghanistan and Kosovo/Serbia.
With the pivot to INDOPACOM, those advantages have evaporated and, in several circumstances, become significant disadvantages. CSGs don't have the luxury of sitting 10s of miles off a threat coast with impunity and launching waves of aircraft on offensive missions like they did in Vietnam and the Middle Eastern wars of the 90s and 2000s.
In my opinion, it's time for Naval Aviation to take a long hard look in the mirror and decide what we want to bring to the table in the future. Overland (or near to land) power projection against a peer adversary probably isn't it. IMHO, it's blue water supremacy and Rhino/Growler/JSF aren't going to get us there with their limited range and payload (regardless of MQ-25 status).
Again, just my opinion but hopefully this helps/sparks discussion/makes sense.

 

[AllAmerican75]

I'd like to offer an alternative to the retention issue since I don't think it's unique to Naval Aviation (which a few people have pointed out). I think Naval Aviation is suffering from an identity crisis.
Since the end of WWII, we've brought a dynamic multi-mission capability with relatively low risk to our forces. Because of the asymmetrical maritime and technological advantages, we've been able to be involved in every major military operation regardless of where it happened. This includes, for better or worse, operations in land locked countries like Afghanistan and Kosovo/Serbia.
With the pivot to INDOPACOM, those advantages have evaporated and, in several circumstances, become significant disadvantages. CSGs don't have the luxury of sitting 10s of miles off a threat coast with impunity and launching waves of aircraft on offensive missions like they did in Vietnam and the Middle Eastern wars of the 90s and 2000s.
In my opinion, it's time for Naval Aviation to take a long hard look in the mirror and decide what we want to bring to the table in the future. Overland (or near to land) power projection against a peer adversary probably isn't it. IMHO, it's blue water supremacy and Rhino/Growler/JSF aren't going to get us there with their limited range and payload (regardless of MQ-25 status).
Again, just my opinion but hopefully this helps/sparks discussion/makes sense.

From my unwashed opinion, the CSG desperately needs organic ASW patrol and long-loiter tanking capabilities. The likelihood that you'll have tankers in the middle of the Pacific whenever you need them or have P-8s with enough time on station is slim. With all the investment the Chinese are making in submarines (and what those submarines are capable of) we absolutely need better ASW support and we need to be able to keep it in the air for a long time. This becomes especially necessary when you're having to fly from outside certain threat envelopes.

If it were up to me, I'd put an RFP out for a common airframe to replace the E-2, C-2 (with internal tanking tank and stores like the KC-130), and S-3/P-8 within the air wing.

 

[Swanee]

As you said, it's entirely dependent upon the job. One of friends' wives is a photographer and does photography and photoshop work and other admin for a photography business. Another is a school teacher and teaches remote classes at an online HS/GED/college prep school. The ones who absolutely need to be face-to-face do suffer but there are far more flexible opportunities than there used to be. Even in the Defense/Aerospace industry, there's been a move to remote work because it expands the talent pool outside of cities where they have an office. Again, it's all job and career field dependent. Choose your rate, choose your fate and all that.

Did you really just say "choose your rate, choose your fate." in regard to spousal employment around Navy installations?

 

[Brett327]

is the unstable trajectory

This has been a GOP talking point since Reagan ran up the debt in the 80s.

 

[Brett327]

Others may feel differently, but I think Aquilino is out of touch, incredibly condescending, and compensating for some kind of insecurity. He has that old school 1990s “I’m a Tomcat guy and you’re a homo” vibe.

I've heard a lot of cringe-worthy anecdotes contrasting how he treats his staff vs. how Paparo does. It's interesting to watch these personalities as the settle into these roles. If you're the COM at IPC, you've gotta think and act like the balloon is going to go up during your watch. Nobody wants to be the next Husband Kimmel. We've all seen these guys get into this persona where they're convinced that a war with China is imminent. I think Paparo's approach will be somewhat more measured, more thoughtful, more quiet confidence than Lung's junkyard dog approach.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I think Paparo's approach will be somewhat more measured, more thoughtful, more quiet confidence than Lung's junkyard dog approach.

That’s consistent with what I’ve seen from both. Paparo was CO of the FRS when I was a cat 1. I liked him well enough then. Not sure what he’s like to work for as an Admiral, but he interviews well.

 

[Brett327]

That’s consistent with what I’ve seen from both. Paparo was CO of the FRS when I was a cat 1. I liked him well enough then. Not sure what he’s like to work for as an Admiral, but he interviews well.

On paper, he's my Boss, but they're very hands off, which is awesome, and helps me maintain my off the grid, Apocalypse Now existence here... at our westernmost outpost.

 

[cfam]

That’s consistent with what I’ve seen from both. Paparo was CO of the FRS when I was a cat 1. I liked him well enough then. Not sure what he’s like to work for as an Admiral, but he interviews well.

He was my CAG for most of my JO tour. He made it a point to come hang out in the ready rooms and get to know everyone. Incredibly smart and personable guy (albeit intense). The Airwing really liked him.

 

[Griz882]

I'd like to offer an alternative to the retention issue since I don't think it's unique to Naval Aviation (which a few people have pointed out). I think Naval Aviation is suffering from an identity crisis.
Since the end of WWII, we've brought a dynamic multi-mission capability with relatively low risk to our forces. Because of the asymmetrical maritime and technological advantages, we've been able to be involved in every major military operation regardless of where it happened. This includes, for better or worse, operations in land locked countries like Afghanistan and Kosovo/Serbia.
With the pivot to INDOPACOM, those advantages have evaporated and, in several circumstances, become significant disadvantages. CSGs don't have the luxury of sitting 10s of miles off a threat coast with impunity and launching waves of aircraft on offensive missions like they did in Vietnam and the Middle Eastern wars of the 90s and 2000s.
In my opinion, it's time for Naval Aviation to take a long hard look in the mirror and decide what we want to bring to the table in the future. Overland (or near to land) power projection against a peer adversary probably isn't it. IMHO, it's blue water supremacy and Rhino/Growler/JSF aren't going to get us there with their limited range and payload (regardless of MQ-25 status).
Again, just my opinion but hopefully this helps/sparks discussion/makes sense.

Great post, and I agree. Any Pacific war is going to be about defending existing resources (and space) while destroying enemy maritime capacity. I’m not sure what the right mix is for that…but it does need to be considered.

 

[robav8r]

This has been a GOP talking point since Reagan ran up the debt in the 80s.

Brett - you’re comparing a $34T national debt with a GOP talking point from the 80’s? When I joined in 81, I got a 12% pay raise, a SECNAV marching towards a 600 ship Navy, and a defense industrial base that was in a different universe than today.

 

[Swanee]

Great post, and I agree. Any Pacific war is going to be about defending existing resources (and space) while destroying enemy maritime capacity. I’m not sure what the right mix is for that…but it does need to be considered.

There is a lot of momentum driving combat capabilities to develop and move in that direction- especially within the ISR communities.