Prowler Replacement:
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EA-18 Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft
F/A-18G "Growler"
The EA-18 was selected to replace the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. The EA-6B will begin retirement in the 2010 timeframe, after a career that exceeded 40 years of deployments in support of USN, USMC, and USAF strike forces. As of early 2000, Defense Department planning for replacing the EA-6B Prowler include a scheme under which the Navy would buy an F/A-18G "Growler" -- an F/A-18E/F modified for escort and close-in jamming. The Air Force would provide standoff jamming with modified EB-52s or EB-1s, and close-in jamming with unmanned air vehicles such as the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk or General Atomics Predator.
The DoD’s only air-based EA jamming capability is provided by 123 EA-6B Prowlers. It is projected that these 123 aircraft will no longer adequately support required Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) missions beyond the year 2010 due to attrition and airframe life limits. In order to maintain the tactical advantage over enemy air defenses, the DoD must augment and ultimately replace its aging and diminishing fleet of EA-6B aircraft with an equal or better AEA capability.
In November 2001 Boeing successfully completed an initial flight demonstration of its EA-18 Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) concept aircraft. The test used an F/A-18F Super Hornet to carry three ALQ-99 jamming pods and two fuel tanks while measuring noise and vibration data and assessing aircraft flying qualities.
The EA-18 will perform full-spectrum electronic surveillance and electronic attack of enemy threat radars and communications nets. The EA-18 leverages the U.S. Navy's investment in the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet platform. A derivative of the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet – a platform which is in production today – the EA-18 is a highly flexible design that enables the warfighter to perform a broad range of tactical missions, operating from either the deck of an aircraft carrier or land-based fields. The EA-18 is 99 percent common with the Super Hornet and would be expected to significantly reduce support and training costs for the US Navy.
The EA-18 is the result of an engineering design, development and test effort that began in late 1993. This effort has included avionics and aircraft conceptual design, engineering analysis, high- and low-speed wind tunnel testing, electromagnetic interference/compatibility laboratory testing, antenna range testing and extensive crew-vehicle interface development. The combination of a validated design, proven platform and proven electronics positions the EA-18 program to begin a system development and demonstration phase as early as 2003.
In April 2002 Boeing completed the third successful flight demonstration of its EA-18 Airborne Electronic Attack concept aircraft. The test, conducted April 5, used an F/A-18F Super Hornet to carry three ALQ-99 jamming pods and two fuel tanks while measuring noise and vibration data and assessing aircraft flying qualities. Boeing teammate, Northrop Grumman, instrumented the ALQ-99 jamming pods to gather the noise and vibration information.
The F/A-18G has minor shortcomings relative to the EA -6B ICAP-III baseline of the Advanced Electronic Attack (AEA) Analysis of Alternatives study. By incorporating alterations, such as inclusion of a digital receiver system, complete communications electronic attack system, and routable network information system, this valid core can become a viable force for the future. The mission radius and time on station figures with typical air defense suppression loads are nearly identical. AEA system components designed for the EA -6B ICAP-III are easily adaptable for use in the F/A-18G. An initial study of the electro-magnetic interference susceptibility for the F/A-18G was concluded with favorable results. Although the LR-700 can be adapted for use in this airframe, a digital implementation revolutionizes electronic surveillance with low probability of intercept radar and complex modulation waveform detection, coherent jamming capability, active cancellation look through, and specific emitter identification. An internet protocol routable network approach is introduced as a possible means to seamless connectivity and fully integrated data picture. The multi-role capability of the F/A-18G will provide synergistic strike and survivability advantages as well as training and readiness challenges. A quantification of overall effectiveness demonstrates the F/A-18G is a viable EA -6B follow-on and AEA platform.
The EA-18 is the only alternative to the EA-6B based on a derivative from an in-production, aircraft carrier adept aircraft. It will have the basic tactical capabilities of the F/A-18F Super Hornet coupled with the enhanced electronic attack capability of the ICAP III Prowler. The EA-18 will eliminate the type model series airplane off the flight deck. The configuration of the airplane in terms of capability will be equivalent to what is anticipated in the EA-6B with ICAP III installed, and a concentration on the LR-700 receiver, which will allow tracking of threats. Instead of pre-emptive jamming it will provide selective reactive jamming.
The airplane, though dedicated to the electronic attack mission, can be changed from an EA back to an ‘F’ with relative ease and vice versa. It allows flexibility on the flight deck. You can use up a certain portion of the life of the airplane flying it as an electronic attack airplane, and then shift missions, and use another section as a fighter. There is certainly a big difference in fighting Iraq with a strong intergraded jamming system compared to fighting in Afghanistan.
The EA-18 will retain everything in it that the F/A-18F Super Hornet has today with two exceptions. The wing tip stations will have receiving antennas. The gun will be replaced with avionics boxes containing the LR-700 receiver and satellite communications, which interface with the ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System pods.
The EA-18 is based on the two-seat F/A-18F with the Block 2 avionics upgrades, including active-array radar and advanced rear crew station, already under development for the Super Hornet. Production cost on a unit flyaway basis will be 15-18% more than a basic F/A-18F in then-year dollars. An EA-18 will cost $7-9 million more, based on the nominal Super Hornet unit price of $50 million by the end of the current multi-year procurement contract. But efforts are under way to drive the E/F cost down to $40 million by 2005. Concurrent production of EA-18s and E/Fs would further reduce the Super Hornet's price. The company estimates that, if 12 EA-18s are built each year alongside 48 E/Fs, the cost of each E/F would be reduced by up to $3 million. The US Navy would see operating and support savings, with the EA-18 expected to cost $7,400/h to operate, compared with over S17,000/h for the EA-6B.
The EA-18G aircraft, chosen to augment electronic attack capabilities across the services and replace the Navy’s EA-6B, will be a missionized F/A-18F airframe to provide capabilities to detect, identify, and locate hostile radio frequency emitters in order to direct jamming against radar and communications threats, and to fire suppression weapons such as High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs). The EA-18G incorporates a version of the airborne electronic attack (AEA) suite developed for the Improved Capability (ICAP) III EA-6B upgrade. The Navy plans to include a newly configured Communications Countermeasure Set as a replacement for the USQ-113.
Advanced Electronic Attack (AEA) Analysis of Alternatives
The EA-18 is one of the platforms under consideration in a Department of Defense analysis of alternatives to replace the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. The US Navy has an operational need to start replacing the Prowler by 2008.
The US Navy has an operational need to begin replacing the Prowler by 2008. Prowlers will be serving the nation through 2015 and the aircraft to follow it will fly for decades. They all will have Increased Capability III [ICAP III] as their electronic attack weapon. ICAP III capability forms the baseline for the Department of Defense's (DoD) follow-on airborne electronic attack system of systems. Northrop Grumman is the ICAP III prime contractor. Northrop Grumman's Improved Capability III radar receiver system represents a significantly reduced risk approach over other unproven platforms and systems.
In late 2000 the study for the follow-on to the EA-6B Prowler concluded, and the Navy began to move from concept to development. At that point each of the Naval Aviation communities was pursuing a “sundown” plan for legacy aircraft: P-3 Orion to Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA); SH-60B/F/H Seahawk to SH-60R and MH-60S; F-14, F/A-18A/B/C/D and S-3B Viking to F/A-18E/F and, later, Joint Strike Fighter; and EA-6B to the Airborne Electronic Attack aircraft.
The 22-month Joint Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives was initiated following the Kosovo campaign. The AEA Analysis of Alternatives, involving all the services, was begun in January 2000, but continued into 2002. The AEA AoA’s purpose was to provide information on cost-effective options to the Department of Defense (DoD) in support of its process of examining potential new acquisition programs to initially augment and eventually replace the EA-6B Prowler force beginning in 2010. The analysis focused on Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capability for the collective air superiority needs of the Services in suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) during the 2010-2030 timeframe.
The US Navy led the joint team that conducted a concept exploration phase Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to evaluate follow-on options to the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capabilities currently provided by the EA-6B Prowler. Mission functions include radar jamming, communications jamming, electronic surveillance measures (ESM), and electronic countermeasures (ECM). Options to be evaluated to accomplish the AEA mission for all of the Department of Defense, include manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft and new technologies.
The AEA AoA study team operated under specific guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is governed by acquisition regulations such as DoD Regulation 5000.2 and SECNAVINST 5000.2B. An Executive Steering Group, composed of requirements and acquisition leaders from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, provides oversight of the study team. The study used extensive modeling and simulation capabilities to provide an analytical tool for a potential major defense acquisition program(s) Milestone I/II decision(s) in FY02.
The Government was interested in data from industry for use in the analysis to include concept of operations, technology applications, and realistic cost data which will result in a realistic assessment of alternatives for future AEA capability. Industry is encouraged to include innovative and cutting edge solutions for use in the analysis. Participation in the study was strictly voluntary, no funding or reimbursement is offered or implied. Furthermore, participation in this study should not be construed as an obligation or commitment on the part of the Government no claim for current or future contracts or funding for this requirement is authorized or implied.
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to define operational requirements that address the DoD’s AEA needs. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) can be utilized in the future for AEA. UAV Electronic Warfare (EW) payloads and smart weapons could help in this area as well. While much has already been written concerning UAVs, few resources exist that discuss the feasibility of UAV programs in the realm of EW. Even fewer resources discuss how these unmanned platforms must be linked in the future to conduct network-centric warfare.
The study considered six broad alternatives; each was generic, in that several vehicle or system options could provide the defined capability. Total ownership costs, however, were estimated for specific weapons systems, with resulting costs of sub-options presented as a range for each alternative.
The study identified around a dozen different platforms that could play host to the system, including existing fighters such as the Boeing F-15E, F/A-18F and Lockheed Martin F- 16C/D, as well as new develop ments like the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Lockheed Martin/Boeing F- 2 2 . Each platform was examined not just in terms of the development or production costs, but life costs over a 30 year period.
The classified 2,000-page AEA AOA was completed 15 December 2001, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviewed its findings. It identified 27 options to replace the EA-6B Prowler. Costs and solutions varied greatly, from buying a fleet of business jets with a total ownership cost of $26 billion to fielding a combination of jammer-equipped F/A-18 and F-22 fighters and B-52 bombers with a price tag of $82 billion. The cheapest option, costing about $20 billion, would be based on the Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle, used in conjunction with a smaller system such as a loitering drone or missile that could directly attack enemy radars and sensors. The study also concluded there might not be any significant breakthroughs in electronic warfare before the Navy begins replacing its fleet of Prowlers in 2010.
The Services had until June 2002 to determine which direction they will go to meet electronic warfare requirements as they relate to replacing the capability and function of the Prowler. The Department of Defense had planned to announce the results of the analysis of alternatives for the AEA mission by the end of 2001. The USMC would prefer to wait for an EW variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, if that project survives, and the USAF does not require a dedicated SEAD platform.
Unconvinced that a joint U.S. Navy and Air Force study on replacing EA -6B electronic jamming planes considered enough options, Gen. John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, sent it back to his staff for further review. In a 15 April 2002 interview, Jumper said he was not satis-fied with the results of the 22-month Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives (AEA AOA) because it focused more on replacing airplanes than on how to perform the mission. "Electronic warfare conjures up notions of pods that jam things and bash electrons," Jumper said. "Is that a mission? What are we trying to do? "What we are trying to do is penetrate warheads to targets - manned or unmanned. That's the objective of electronic warfare," he said. Jumper acknowledged that buying a new plane may be part of the solution, but he questioned whether the study considered the entire spectrum of options. "I am not satisfied that our analysis of alternatives on electronic Warfare has given us the right answer," he said. Instead, Jumper suggests the study should have pondered more ways to defeat threats like enemy surface-to-air missiles. "Well, you could take down the [enemy air defense] network, defend yourself with tow decoys [pulled behind an aircraft]. Certainly, jamming pods might be a piece of that," he said. "But you could probably [find] four or five ways that could come together to get this job done." The AEA AOA should have taken an effects-based approach, Jumper said. For example, rather than confront a threat head-on, it may be better to knock out something the threat depends on, such as its power source or communications links. "In the past, the main way was jamming," Jumper said. "There is a good part of the [electronic warfare] community that is a little bit angry with me, because I am not willing to go out and just give in to buying a bigger electron basher."
Jumper's stance on electronic warfare differed sharply from that of his predecessor, Gen. Michael Ryan. In November 2000, Ryan, then chief of staff of the Air Force, released a position statement on electronic warfare that took a completely different stance, calling for an organic system to support the service's Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs).
The Navy had no procurement budget for Advanced Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft in the February 2002 budget plans, but the 22 August 2002 draft budget for FY2004 showed four aircraft in FY '06, 12 in FY '07, 16 in FY '08 and 33 in FY '09. The Navy would like to replace the EA-6B with a variant of the Super Hornet, but top Pentagon officials had not made a decision as of August 2002. According to the AEA analysis of alternatives, an Electronic Warfare plan focused on the EA-18, adding new-technology jammer pods, would cost about $40 billion over the life of the program.
Rep. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., a former Prowler crew member served as a Navy intelligence officer aboard an EA-6B Prowler in Kosovo and Iraq. The congressman believes that the EA -6BC, a new variant of the Prowler; the F/A-18G, an electronic warfare version of the Super Hornet; or a jammer model of the multirole Joint Strike Fighter would be the best solution to replace the Prowler. An Electronic Warfare plan focused on restarting the EA-6 line and building brand-new EA-6C aircraft with new-technology pods would cost about $34 billion. An AEA version of the Joint Strike Fighter - with both carrier capable and conventional takeoff versions - could be developed and fielded for about $38 billion
EA-18G System Design and Development (SDD)
The EA-18G contract team received its first Pre-SD&D contract in September 2002 to support preparation efforts for the SD&D phase. A contract award for SD&D is now expected shortly. The 5-year SD&D program is expected to run from FY04 until mid FY09 and encompasses all laboratory, ground test, and flight tests from component level testing through full-up EA-18G weapons system performance flight-testing.
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) received Milestone B approval to proceed into System Development and Demonstration (SD&D) of the EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) Aircraft , December 18, 2003. Approval was granted by Mr. Michael Wynne, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense, (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).
On 29 December 2003 the US Navy awarded Boeing a $1 billion contract for system design and development (SDD) of the EA-18G airborne electronic attack aircraft. The 5-year SDD program for the EA-18G runs from FY04 until early FY09 and encompasses all laboratory, ground test, and flight tests from component level testing through full-up EA-18G weapons system performance flight-testing.
The EA-18G will provide the warfighter with abundant operational flexibility. It can carry up to five ALQ-99 jamming pods and will typically add two AIM-120 self-defense missiles and two AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missiles. While developing the EA-18G concept and configuration, the Boeing design team maintained as much of the inherent growth capacity in the F/A-18F as possible. The result will be a platform designed to take advantage of the latest airborne electronic attack and networking technologies, enabling significant improvements in threat suppression.
Upon initial fleet introduction the EA-18G will be capable of self-protection, freeing up dedicated escort aircraft for strike and other missions. It will be capable of rapidly locating and destroying surface-to-air missiles.
In addition to standoff and escort jamming missions, speed, maneuverability and advanced systems will enable the EA-18G to perform time critical strike mission targeting support. By combining two proven systems, the Boeing F/A-18F and the Northrop Grumman ALQ-218(V)2 receiver, the U.S. Navy will maximize the benefit of ongoing investments, while allowing for an initial operational capability by 2009.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18g.htm
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As for the JSF:
"The Joint Strike Fighter is a multi-Service/international cooperation warplane. The cornerstone of the program is affordability based on a next-generation, multi-role strike fighter aircraft that will have a 70 to 90 percent commonality factor for all the variants, significantly reducing manufacturing, support and training costs. First delivery of operational aircraft is anticipated in fiscal
2008.
www.jsf.mil
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I feel so ill informed right now I can barely think straight.
s/f,
usmcecho4
It is about as likely as NFO dying within a newly minted career.
