http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/12/03/iran.nie.pdf
I would highly recommend that anyone interested in WMD issues in specific or intelligence in general take a good look at the declassified Iran Nuclear National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - and I mean read it, not just skim it. I recommend this for two reasons:
1) This is an excellent example of the structure and verbage of what real finished intelligence reporting looks like.
2) You really need to read it fairly closely to see that the headlines and the sound bites in the media are not even coming close to capturing the true substance of the report. It does *not* say that Iran has been wrongly accused of having a nuclear weapons program - they had one, they just suspended it because of perceptions that external pressures made it in their best interests to cease.
Two of the more salient points that haven't gotten a lot of press are towards the end:
a) "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."
b) "We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007." (my emphasis added)
The takeaway is that if the Iranians choose to press ahead with a weapons program, the authors assess it will be difficult to ascertain this fact by observing their acknowledged facilities. Also, the IC doesn't know for sure whether they have or have not ceased these efforts - only "probably" sure. The bottom line is that intelligence is not magic, absolute certainty can be hard to come by, and that relatively simple questions (e.g., "Do the Iranians have a nuclear weapons program?") can be remarkably difficult to answer with any degree of confidence.
I just hope that the lessons of the Iraq WMD situation don't get taken too much to heart, and that the willingness of analysts to extrapolate to reach conclusions isn't hamstrung by impossibly high evidentiary standards. There's a fine line out there - and this is as serious a business as it gets.
(As a sidenote: Keep in mind while you read the document that every single word and sentence has been deliberately chosen. If something strikes you as vague or a bit odd in presentation, think through the process that might have led to the verbage coming out that way.)
I would highly recommend that anyone interested in WMD issues in specific or intelligence in general take a good look at the declassified Iran Nuclear National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - and I mean read it, not just skim it. I recommend this for two reasons:
1) This is an excellent example of the structure and verbage of what real finished intelligence reporting looks like.
2) You really need to read it fairly closely to see that the headlines and the sound bites in the media are not even coming close to capturing the true substance of the report. It does *not* say that Iran has been wrongly accused of having a nuclear weapons program - they had one, they just suspended it because of perceptions that external pressures made it in their best interests to cease.
Two of the more salient points that haven't gotten a lot of press are towards the end:
a) "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."
b) "We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007." (my emphasis added)
The takeaway is that if the Iranians choose to press ahead with a weapons program, the authors assess it will be difficult to ascertain this fact by observing their acknowledged facilities. Also, the IC doesn't know for sure whether they have or have not ceased these efforts - only "probably" sure. The bottom line is that intelligence is not magic, absolute certainty can be hard to come by, and that relatively simple questions (e.g., "Do the Iranians have a nuclear weapons program?") can be remarkably difficult to answer with any degree of confidence.
I just hope that the lessons of the Iraq WMD situation don't get taken too much to heart, and that the willingness of analysts to extrapolate to reach conclusions isn't hamstrung by impossibly high evidentiary standards. There's a fine line out there - and this is as serious a business as it gets.
(As a sidenote: Keep in mind while you read the document that every single word and sentence has been deliberately chosen. If something strikes you as vague or a bit odd in presentation, think through the process that might have led to the verbage coming out that way.)
