Interesting Air Superiority article

[ea6bflyr]

http://www.nationalreview.com/artic...lanes-cant-defeat-our-enemies-mike-fredenburg

Interested in thoughts about this article. At first glance, the article is pretty one dimensional; not taking into account the whole effort...but it is about aviation and possible future issues.

 

[Flash]

That article has so many holes in its facts and assumptions it is hard to even know where to begin. A good place to start though would be to point out that anyone who calls Carlo Kopp an 'expert' should stop writing at that point because they don't have a clue what they are taking about.

 

[wink]

COL Boyd is in the house.

 

[ryan1234]

The author, unfortunately, is not very well informed and just doesn't really know what he is talking about. Just for the record the Air War College paper that was quoted was written by a Comm/Space officer, not someone who was/is flying in tactical aviation, let alone fighter aviation.

 

[Catmando]

FWIW, although I may not agree with all that was written, I thought it an interesting and thought provoking article, regardless of the author's lack of credentials. Some thoughts:

Although state of the art technology provides immense BVR capabilities, there can be a tendency of overreliance on it. While stealth and all-aspect, launch-and-leave tactics work well within a set-up, sterile training environment; actual air combat with a similar and opposing strike force muddies the waters, especially when over advanced enemy terrain and not a Warning or Restricted area.

As is oft said, the first casualty of war is the plan. Consider the strike fighter flying over enemy territory. The opposing enemy fighters may not be at the convenient 50-mile head on set-up. Indeed they can be all around you, and possibly in large numbers. Or launched from a field behind you. Or some as decoys.

Meanwhile trying to employ your BVR weapon system – if you aren’t already surrounded by enemy fighters WVR – at a distance target, while being interrupted by multiple SAM launches at your aircraft and having to counter, is a tall order. Furthermore your BVR missiles can be defeated. Indeed I have personally defeated quite a number of Mach III+ SAMS with multiple countermeasures and maneuvers. So numbers of missiles can be a large factor above and beyond their advanced technology and capability. Same can be said for numbers of fighters.

It was said that BVR missile firing was not allowed in Vietnam. While generally true, this was however not always the case. In fact I once was given a “cleared to fire” from Red Crown on a bogie we had locked up at 20 miles. Fortunately I held my fire to sweeten the shot and put the now confirmed bandit in the heart of the missile envelope… when I noticed he was smoking. Couldn't see the aircraft but could see smoke. MiGs did not smoke. With Master Arm red lights on, had I then fired on that confirmed enemy BVR, I would have downed a pilot from my sister squadron. With lots of aircraft, friend and foe buzzing around, the effectiveness of BVR is reduced and confusion begins, even with outside AWACS help.

 

[azguy]

The 0.6% BVR Pk stat seems insane, especially when he contradicts himself in the very next paragraph by noting that AMRAAM stats aren't included in that figure.

Also, obviously not a pilot, but on the ship all shots are BVR. Given the technology we have in AEGIS, and some of the systems I know a/c have, I think his hang up on BVR IFF is very dated. Combat ID sucks sometimes, but there are many layers in place to tell the good guys from the bad.

 

[Randy Daytona]

The 0.6% BVR Pk stat seems insane, especially when he contradicts himself in the very next paragraph by noting that AMRAAM stats aren't included in that figure.

Also, obviously not a pilot, but on the ship all shots are BVR. Given the technology we have in AEGIS, and some of the systems I know a/c have, I think his hang up on BVR IFF is very dated. Combat ID sucks sometimes, but there are many layers in place to tell the good guys from the bad.

And sometimes - despite visual ID and AWACS - the many layers fail. Back in 1994, 2 USAF F-15 shot down 2 unsuspecting Army Blackhawks (killing 26). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Black_Hawk_shootdown_incident

 

[azguy]

And sometimes - despite visual ID and AWACS - the many layers fail. Back in 1994, 2 USAF F-15 shot down 2 unsuspecting Army Blackhawks (killing 26). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Black_Hawk_shootdown_incident

Sure - look, blue on blue happens. It happens in air defense, it happens with infantrymen, it happens in all facets of armed combat. It's always a tragedy. What's your point?

Many of the systems and TTPs we have today are a result of past losses. The process continues to improve. The author is using mostly Vietman-era examples for evidence why BVR shots are dangerous. My post was highlighting that long range IFF has improved dramatically, it continues to improve, but it will never be perfect.

When there's a war on we will do the best with what we have. Throwing up your hands and refusing to conduct BVR/OTH engagements because we don't have a 100% perfect IFF system isn't the right answer.

 

[Catmando]

One can also envision an airspace battle far away from AEGIS and similar assets, at ranges beyond their impressive capabilities, along with perhaps IFF deception techniques and other confusion.

 

[jmcquate]

I trying to recall a quantity vs quality example with regard to airpower (not armor) on a large scale and all I can come up with are the IAF campaigns were quality crushes quantity. As for BVR, I would argue that it has never been allowed at a scale that would have proved it successful or not, and the authors use of AiM-7 stats (he never quite says that) is just dumb. The Sparrow was an abortion. Oh, Cat, I guess a J-79 out of burner is as good as any IFF interrogation.

 

[Catmando]

I trying to recall a quantity vs quality example with regard to airpower (not armor) on a large scale and all I can come up with are the IAF campaigns were quality crushes quantity. As for BVR, I would argue that it has never been allowed at a scale that would have proved it successful or not, and the authors use of AiM-7 stats (he never quite says that) is just dumb. The Sparrow was an abortion. Oh, Cat, I guess a J-79 out of burner is as good as any IFF interrogation.

It was... and that is what is interesting. We F-4s smoked big time in Mil. But on a hot vector, we always went to min-burner to eliminate any J-79 smoke. 'Stealth" at the time.

My friend, for whatever reason and who was on the same hot vector against the same MiGs (but did not have a lock or cleared to fire) inexplicably was still in Mil and smoking big time. That was a mistake, normally... but in this case probably saved his life.

 

[Flash]

One thing that really bothers me is that the authors of many of these articles and studies about AAM effectiveness lump in AAM performance from Vietnam with more modern day examples, it is like comparing phones from the 60's and today then averaging out their performance and capabilities. While Vietnam saw the bulk of AAM usage in combat it was also 0ver 40 years ago now and technology has improved greatly since then. That is not to say that all the problems with BVR air combat have been solved and today's missiles will perform flawlessly but today's AAM's are much improved over yesterday's.

Starting with the Falklands and continuing very shortly thereafter over the Bekaa Valley the successors to the Vietnam-era AAM's performed much better than those that performed poorly in Vietnam. While a lot of the success had to do with training the Brits and Israelis were using missiles that had been improved as a direct result of combat experience from just 10 years earlier and the results showed they worked, especially the IR AAM's. Almost every time a Brit fired a Sidewinder in combat it hit its target. While the Israeli success is harder to quantify because they are not as open about the details it appears their Pythons had a similar success rate. And while it took longer to get a really good radar AAM the success of the AMRAAM so far in its limited operational use seems to indicate it is a success.

So folks like this author and even RAND are being disengenious at best when they include the Vietnam War numbers into the overall success rate of AAM's and not provide any context, or better yet break the numbers down between Vietnam and post-Vietnam success rates. While there were still some issues the success rates of AAM's in the Falklands, Bekaa Valley, Desert Storm and Kosovo are dramatically different compared to the Vietnam War success rates. With even more advanced AAM's now operational their lethality has probably increased even more.

I agree that BVR will remain problematic for practical and political reasons, ROE will probably be a factor in almost any conflict we are in, but the missiles we have today are not the duds of Vietnam.

 

[MIDNJAC]

While I would agree that stats/anecdotes from Vietnam are generally outdated (at least when it comes to technology and TTP's), I'd also imagine that those stats are the only ones that a guy like this had access to, or at least the ability to include in an unclass "article". Anything remotely useful in this discussion is so far into the SECRET realm at a minimum, that trying to debate at an unclass level is just a waste of time IMHO.

 

[Flash]

While I would agree that stats/anecdotes from Vietnam are generally outdated (at least when it comes to technology and TTP's), I'd also imagine that those stats are the only ones that a guy like this had access to, or at least the ability to include in an unclass "article". Anything remotely useful in this discussion is so far into the SECRET realm at a minimum, that trying to debate at an unclass level is just a waste of time IMHO.

Actually the data from the Falklands, Desert Storm, Kosovo and Southern Watch are mostly available in open source and not too challenging to find. An excellent resource to start with is this book, which details every US 'kill' since the end of Vietnam and it includes numbers of missiles shot, etc. Details from the Falklands isn't that hard to piece together either from the histories of that conflict. All together that is over 60 kills versus 195 for Vietnam so at least a decent data point that is much more contemporary than the Vietnam one.

 

[nittany03]

Actually the data from the Falklands, Desert Storm, Kosovo and Southern Watch are mostly available in open source and not too challenging to find. An excellent resource to start with is this book, which details every US 'kill' since the end of Vietnam and it includes numbers of missiles shot, etc. Details from the Falklands isn't that hard to piece together either from the histories of that conflict. All together that is over 60 kills versus 195 for Vietnam so at least a decent data point that is much more contemporary than the Vietnam one.

Still, a cogent article would require detailed analysis of both sides' missile kinematics, as well as their aircraft capes, lims, and BVR TTPs. Not to mention any onboard/offboard EA, both TTPs and assessed effectiveness against both sides' IFF, BVR missiles, and AI radars.

Fat chance having anything approaching an intelligent discussion about all that in an unclass forum. Those who talk don't know; those who know can only talk in places like NSAWC Journal.