My point is although the service chiefs don't control the operational requirements since the COCOMs do, shouldn't the CNO be pushing back and saying the debt we're going to incur long term debt by operating this way which is going to lead us to more problems in manning, training, and equipping the force? In the wake of the C7F collisions, there was a lot made about ship COs not feeling like they could say no to a requirement without getting fired, yet I haven't heard any CNO in recent memory give pushback on similar demands at a larger scale.
I faintly remember Jay Johnson doing so, but my memory might be clouded.
Again, how do you know that he hasn’t? At the end of the day, it’s SD’s call. The aforementioned SDOBs can give you a glimpse at some of that, though that process is distinct from GFM, generally.
As Brett is saying, and I can't comment on the specifics of these ships, but there are lots of deployments that CNO, Fleet Forces, and/or SECNAV say "no can do," but are overruled by JCS/SECDEF, and out goes that ship/unit. In that sense, you could make the argument that even the CNO doesn't have the power he needs to equip his force properly.
Separately, WRT 7th Fleet, while I wasn't there pre-collisions, the way I see how business runs vs. how it happens now is there are certain maintenance and training periods that are 100% protected and they will not even be offered up for tasking to PACFLT and PACFLT knows it, so they don't typically ask, and when they do, they get a strong no. I get the sense there's a lot more of "yes, we can do that mission at the cost of mission x, y, or z," and a lot less of "yes, we can do that no matter what//break break// CO - get underway even if you aren't ready."
