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IKE Double Pump

Brett327

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
It would be interesting to see how she is doing on EFPH, that extra yard time she had very well could mean she has more wiggle room than other carriers.
This is part of why Ike actually came home earlier than planned.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
“It’s an asinine strategy,” said Bryan Clark, a former senior aide to the chief of naval operations and now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, in a March interview. “The Iranians don’t perceive carriers and a threat to their ability to project power because they project power through gray zone activities and terrorism — the kinds of things that carriers aren’t very good at dealing with.”

I now see that that is clearly not your perspective!
The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.

COCOMs do seem to have an insatiable appetite for carriers and submarines that exceeds what our Navy was built to handle.
 

UInavy

Registered User
pilot
Super Moderator
Contributor
The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.

COCOMs do seem to have an insatiable appetite for carriers and submarines that exceeds what our Navy was built to handle.
I also think that it's a fools errand to 'implicitly agree to run the force ragged for no reason' in order to attempt guarantee funding for a future force with the hope that that force will neither be run ragged, or at least have a 'good reason' to be run so. Not saying that's your point, necessarily, but there are those that see it that way and the logic is circular at best.
 

Jim123

DD-214 in hand and I'm gonna party like it's 1998
pilot
COCOMs have an insatiable appetite for a lot of things. IAs and GSAs are like crack- shortcut proper troop deployment and manpower processes to poach a warm body from commands that do follow those processes. They're better vetted nowadays, although 10+ years ago when I demobilized with the assistant deputy historian of Afghanistan (that was the guy's no shit billet, random senior officer who happened to be in my group on the way back through Kuwait), the vetting was less than robust.

COCOMs will always ask for more shit until someone tells them "no," but even then they'll keep asking. It's just the way it is in the eternal war.
 

cfam

Well-Known Member
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Super Moderator
Contributor
The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.

COCOMs do seem to have an insatiable appetite for carriers and submarines that exceeds what our Navy was built to handle.
I don't care about Bryan Clark's take. My point was based on my personal observations over the last 12 years. The repeated surge deployments and quick turn second deployments have led to a carrier force that is overstretched. We're clearly seeing the effects on the maintenance side (reference our inability to get carriers out of the yards on time).

Call me shortsighted, but I don't give a shit about future funding. The Navy needs to find a better balance now between meeting COCOM demands and the health of the force. This isn't a new problem, and it blows my mind that we keep repeating the same mistakes.

Your second point is spot on.
 

cfam

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If you were any number of senior military officers or Congressmen with a vested interest in carrier funding, would you be as willing to say 'nah, we don't really need one of those to keep Iran in check.'
On a completely separate point, this is a problem in of itself. DOD's capability requirements should drive future procurement, not entrenched political interests.
 

SynixMan

HKG Based Artificial Excrement Pilot
pilot
Contributor
I think, nineteen years on in this endeavor, the tail has been wagging the dog too long. I've seen it at the Squadron, Numbered Fleet, and now Service HQ levels. God help us if we leave the current conflicts and CENTCOM doesn't get downsized accordingly.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
I don't care about Bryan Clark's take. My point was based on my personal observations over the last 12 years. The repeated surge deployments and quick turn second deployments have led to a carrier force that is overstretched. We're clearly seeing the effects on the maintenance side (reference our inability to get carriers out of the yards on time).

Call me shortsighted, but I don't give a shit about future funding. The Navy needs to find a better balance now between meeting COCOM demands and the health of the force. This isn't a new problem, and it blows my mind that we keep repeating the same mistakes.
I wasn't saying that I think that double pumps were the right answer. I am saying that there are a lot of factors to be considered. Sailor happiness is one of them. Most of them we don't have visibility on, so it's really difficult to put together a reasoned argument for or against them beyond the sailor happiness factor, which is very clearly in the 'against' column.

You mentioned material management, but if there's no drydock available and no people available to do the work package, then what? I think our depot maintenence woes are ironically helping to drive a higher optempo. 'Idle time' is a dirty phrase... And that's politically driven on some level, too. I feel like the Deepwater Horizon incident has some pertinent lessons here.
 
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DanMa1156

Is it baseball season yet?
pilot
Contributor
Independent of this decision:

From what I've learned about sourcing, the "Navy" (as in CNO, Fleet Forces, and/or SECNAV) will non-concur with using USN assets citing force regeneration, preservation, readiness, etc. to source Combatant Commanders' Request for Forces. The denials to the Combatant Commanders (some more than others) seem infrequent at best.

And, I just feel bad for those guys, because you know they aren't going to get port calls again. Woof.

Realizing now that the second part of my thought here would have completed this first thought a lot better if I worded it as I intended - that is - the denials from the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders are infrequent at best.
 

Farva01

BKR
pilot
The MAP is has several double pumps scheduled. It’s certainly not a new thing, or some thing that is done only in extremis. The piece does make a good point about the merits of burning out our peacetime force. There‘s a balance to be found in the value of forward presence and the overall readiness of the force to conduct MCO. I’m not convinced we’ve found the sweet spot just yet.
Yeah everyone is talking about the Ike, but the TR is heading out again as well, maybe sooner than expected.
 

Brett327

Well-Known Member
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Super Moderator
Contributor
Realizing now that the second part of my thought here would have completed this first thought a lot better if I worded it as I intended - that is - the denials from the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders are infrequent at best.
if you want to get a glimpse into some of that, read the SDOBs on SIPR. Can give you a sense of what issues are being considered in these decisions. Sometimes the services get overridden, sometimes it’s the GCCs. Shoot me an email on SIPR if you’d like a link.
 
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