This is part of why Ike actually came home earlier than planned.It would be interesting to see how she is doing on EFPH, that extra yard time she had very well could mean she has more wiggle room than other carriers.
This is part of why Ike actually came home earlier than planned.It would be interesting to see how she is doing on EFPH, that extra yard time she had very well could mean she has more wiggle room than other carriers.
The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.“It’s an asinine strategy,” said Bryan Clark, a former senior aide to the chief of naval operations and now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, in a March interview. “The Iranians don’t perceive carriers and a threat to their ability to project power because they project power through gray zone activities and terrorism — the kinds of things that carriers aren’t very good at dealing with.”
I now see that that is clearly not your perspective!
I also think that it's a fools errand to 'implicitly agree to run the force ragged for no reason' in order to attempt guarantee funding for a future force with the hope that that force will neither be run ragged, or at least have a 'good reason' to be run so. Not saying that's your point, necessarily, but there are those that see it that way and the logic is circular at best.The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.
COCOMs do seem to have an insatiable appetite for carriers and submarines that exceeds what our Navy was built to handle.
I don't care about Bryan Clark's take. My point was based on my personal observations over the last 12 years. The repeated surge deployments and quick turn second deployments have led to a carrier force that is overstretched. We're clearly seeing the effects on the maintenance side (reference our inability to get carriers out of the yards on time).The details of whether or not Bryan Clark is correct exceeds the classification level of aw.com. I'm simply saying that the argument 'we're running the force ragged for no reason' is an implicit agreement with this take and can have ripple effects on future force shaping and funding.
COCOMs do seem to have an insatiable appetite for carriers and submarines that exceeds what our Navy was built to handle.
On a completely separate point, this is a problem in of itself. DOD's capability requirements should drive future procurement, not entrenched political interests.If you were any number of senior military officers or Congressmen with a vested interest in carrier funding, would you be as willing to say 'nah, we don't really need one of those to keep Iran in check.'
This is never going to happen with Congress holding the purse strings.On a completely separate point, this is a problem in of itself. DOD's capability requirements should drive future procurement, not entrenched political interests.
I wasn't saying that I think that double pumps were the right answer. I am saying that there are a lot of factors to be considered. Sailor happiness is one of them. Most of them we don't have visibility on, so it's really difficult to put together a reasoned argument for or against them beyond the sailor happiness factor, which is very clearly in the 'against' column.I don't care about Bryan Clark's take. My point was based on my personal observations over the last 12 years. The repeated surge deployments and quick turn second deployments have led to a carrier force that is overstretched. We're clearly seeing the effects on the maintenance side (reference our inability to get carriers out of the yards on time).
Call me shortsighted, but I don't give a shit about future funding. The Navy needs to find a better balance now between meeting COCOM demands and the health of the force. This isn't a new problem, and it blows my mind that we keep repeating the same mistakes.
Independent of this decision:
From what I've learned about sourcing, the "Navy" (as in CNO, Fleet Forces, and/or SECNAV) will non-concur with using USN assets citing force regeneration, preservation, readiness, etc. to source Combatant Commanders' Request for Forces. The denials to the Combatant Commanders (some more than others) seem infrequent at best.
And, I just feel bad for those guys, because you know they aren't going to get port calls again. Woof.
Yeah everyone is talking about the Ike, but the TR is heading out again as well, maybe sooner than expected.The MAP is has several double pumps scheduled. It’s certainly not a new thing, or some thing that is done only in extremis. The piece does make a good point about the merits of burning out our peacetime force. There‘s a balance to be found in the value of forward presence and the overall readiness of the force to conduct MCO. I’m not convinced we’ve found the sweet spot just yet.
Or the title of your sex tape.Damn, I got excited about the title and thought this thread was about the time in college I drank two car bombs faster than my SWO buddy drank one... what a letdown.
That designator does sound like a letdown.Damn, I got excited about the title and thought this thread was about the time in college I drank two car bombs faster than my SWO buddy drank one... what a letdown.
if you want to get a glimpse into some of that, read the SDOBs on SIPR. Can give you a sense of what issues are being considered in these decisions. Sometimes the services get overridden, sometimes it’s the GCCs. Shoot me an email on SIPR if you’d like a link.Realizing now that the second part of my thought here would have completed this first thought a lot better if I worded it as I intended - that is - the denials from the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders are infrequent at best.