HM-14 sun down?

[KODAK]

“The mission”

Yes, the mission. It’s pronounced “airborne mine countermeasures”. No one cares about it until it’s needed and then it’s all anyone can care about. And if you don’t think that the Navy still cares about mine warfare or that it affects how we operate in multiple parts of the world on a daily basis then you simply haven’t been exposed to the problem. Could more be done to better fund and number of sustainment and follow-on systems for the mission? Absolutely. But I know that the 53 community is not the only corner of Naval Aviation where this can be said..

For years people have been predicting the imminent demise of HM and, rightly or wrongly, the mission cannot be performed to the same level (or in some cases, any level) with the systems that currently exist. The recent rumor mill line giving ‘exact’ sunset dates for HM-14, HM-12, and HM-15 is just the latest in a long line of will they, won’t they. Personally, when NAVCENT certifies that he no longer needs the the MH-53E in 5th Fleet that’s when I believe that things are coming to a close. I know one pilot who was told after coming back from the Gulf in the early 90’s that his HM squadron was going away “within months” only to go on to eventually serve as CO of that very same squadron. Certainly I’m not saying that is a trend anyone should expect for the future, but rumors coming from the seawall count for very little in my humble opinion. Congress will let us know when they want the aircraft to fly west and for the time being they still need us.

 

[TxSNA2013]

Yes, the mission. It’s pronounced “airborne mine countermeasures”. No one cares about it until it’s needed and then it’s all anyone can care about. And if you don’t think that the Navy still cares about mine warfare or that it affects how we operate in multiple parts of the world on a daily basis then you simply haven’t been exposed to the problem. Could more be done to better fund and number of sustainment and follow-on systems for the mission? Absolutely. But I know that the 53 community is not the only corner of Naval Aviation where this can be said..

For years people have been predicting the imminent demise of HM and, rightly or wrongly, the mission cannot be performed to the same level (or in some cases, any level) with the systems that currently exist. The recent rumor mill line giving ‘exact’ sunset dates for HM-14, HM-12, and HM-15 is just the latest in a long line of will they, won’t they. Personally, when NAVCENT certifies that he no longer needs the the MH-53E in 5th Fleet that’s when I believe that things are coming to a close. I know one pilot who was told after coming back from the Gulf in the early 90’s that his HM squadron was going away “within months” only to go on to eventually serve as CO of that very same squadron. Certainly I’m not saying that is a trend anyone should expect for the future, but rumors coming from the seawall count for very little in my humble opinion. Congress will let us know when they want the aircraft to fly west and for the time being they still need us.

Couldn't have put it better myself.

 

[squorch2]

Check out "The Generals' War" (Desert Shield/Storm) for some good explication & numbers on why no one - not even during war - cares about AMCM, and why AMCM modernization/funding is continually reprogrammed/rerouted for other, more pressing issues.

 

[squorch2]

Also - this really is not personal. It's just business.

 

[drgndrvr]

I think a good discussion about AMCM and the MH-53E is overdue on this forum. In my opinion, this discussion occurs at two levels: 1) doctrinal and 2) operational.

Regarding the first, I completely agree with KODAK. Mines pose a serious challenge to maritime dominance and thus need a countermeasure. We had this slide we used to show in briefings showing US naval casualties after WWII by cause - the overwhelming majority (albeit a small number) was due to mines. No strategist wants to admit to decision makers that "we can't do x because of y" so we have to develop contingencies for every possibility. Although I do wonder if we should question the prevailing sentiment - we didn't see a huge spike in oil prices this summer or see shipping grind to a halt in the Strait after the news broke of a possible mine attack.

The doctrine is exposed to the reality of limited resources at the operational level. AMCM looks great on paper - rapid response, sweeping/hunting out of the medium, etc. - but its performance doesn't inspire confidence that it would be able to successfully prosecute the mission under most circumstances. The equipment isn't reliable, the community doesn't train under real conditions, and the number of assets is too small.

For most people on this forum still in uniform the operational level is home. To them, KODAK is right: the HM community is likely to remain as long as people at the top, viewing tidy PPTs with the MCM triad capabilities on it, demand the capability. So to those of you in the community, I'd say focus on doing the best you can with limited resources, putting in guardrails to prevent other mishaps (both for the aircrew and the maintainers), and speaking truth to power. For those of us who are out, we can question the assumption that we need to pour resources into a community to provide some level of comfort on paper only - or whether we should acknowledge that there's a gap in capability when the 60 is plugged into the MCM triad and work to develop solutions to counter it. Keeping the 53 around makes it too easy to default to how we've done things in the past.

 

[squorch2]

Although I do wonder if we should question the prevailing sentiment - we didn't see a huge spike in oil prices this summer or see shipping grind to a halt in the Strait after the news broke of a possible mine attack.

This.

The equipment isn't reliable, the community doesn't train under real conditions, and the number of assets is too small.

Aaaaand this.

I implied this before, I'll state it explicitly now: in the last war where we encountered mines, MCMs found orders of magnitude more mines than 53s.

There are better ways to do AMCM than existing 53-centric doctrine.

 

[Pags]

I think a good discussion about AMCM and the MH-53E is overdue on this forum. In my opinion, this discussion occurs at two levels: 1) doctrinal and 2) operational.

Regarding the first, I completely agree with KODAK. Mines pose a serious challenge to maritime dominance and thus need a countermeasure. We had this slide we used to show in briefings showing US naval casualties after WWII by cause - the overwhelming majority (albeit a small number) was due to mines. No strategist wants to admit to decision makers that "we can't do x because of y" so we have to develop contingencies for every possibility. Although I do wonder if we should question the prevailing sentiment - we didn't see a huge spike in oil prices this summer or see shipping grind to a halt in the Strait after the news broke of a possible mine attack.

The doctrine is exposed to the reality of limited resources at the operational level. AMCM looks great on paper - rapid response, sweeping/hunting out of the medium, etc. - but its performance doesn't inspire confidence that it would be able to successfully prosecute the mission under most circumstances. The equipment isn't reliable, the community doesn't train under real conditions, and the number of assets is too small.

For most people on this forum still in uniform the operational level is home. To them, KODAK is right: the HM community is likely to remain as long as people at the top, viewing tidy PPTs with the MCM triad capabilities on it, demand the capability. So to those of you in the community, I'd say focus on doing the best you can with limited resources, putting in guardrails to prevent other mishaps (both for the aircrew and the maintainers), and speaking truth to power. For those of us who are out, we can question the assumption that we need to pour resources into a community to provide some level of comfort on paper only - or whether we should acknowledge that there's a gap in capability when the 60 is plugged into the MCM triad and work to develop solutions to counter it. Keeping the 53 around makes it too easy to default to how we've done things in the past.

The best way to do MCM is to avoid having to do it in the first place. Make it so the mines never get laid by killing the mines/delivery methods at the pier or by not needing to continually operate in the littoral environment where mines are a more prominent threat. Once mines get in the water you're screwed; MCM just takes too long to do.