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Goodbye to the "Kiowa Warrior"?
- Thread starter KODAK
- Start date
Giving enlisted weapons release authority in the Army isn't nearly as problematic as it is in the Navy. Other than aerial, MOST weapons released in the Army are by enlisted. The real issue is getting an enlisted person trained well enough to operate a large UAV in the same environment as the OH-58. Its one thing to operate a glorified flying camera and another thing to operate something large enough to carry weapons. The more the UAV is capable of (tactically and performance wise), the more training it requires. At some point, the Army will decide it requires a warrant to operate the larger, more capable UAVs. We are already seeing some of our aviator officers and warrants going to UAV units.
I think the "scout" portion of the mission makes sense for a UAV. The "armed" part will create some growing pains. It is not the weapons release authority (at least not directly) that is the problem. It is actually getting rounds on target in a low altitude high threat environment. It will take a LOT of training and sensors to get the situational awareness available to two guys sticking their heads out of an open cockpit.
Edit: The AH-64E (AH-64D block III) started delievery in Novemebr 2011. It can control a UAV.
Of course we are talking aerial launch. That is why I mentioned it. I wasn't confusing a mortar for a Hellfire.
I think you have put specifics to my previous post. The senors and integration required to maintain the SA you mention is the sort of technology problem that may be a bridge to far for the Army today. Like you point out, the unarmed scout is doable. So maybe we just see the armed scout mission take a hiatus until an unarmed scout can mature into an armed aircraft.
Thanks. Thought I read something about that.
Specifically what's not going happen? Will UAVs/OH-58s never be put in that situation?,Will a UAV/OH-58 never be able to hit a target in that situation?
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Depends on your definition of "high threat." In general I don't see Helicopters flying around in a high threat situation very often if at all. Yea, we train to it and try to sound sexy about doing it, but in reality, if I'm dodging mountains/terrain in order to stay off of radar, then something has gone terribly wrong. Then again, Maybe I'm interpreting your post all wrong and you're simply just highlighting the difficulty of UAS operators to PID targets and orient their aircraft while looking through what basically amounts to telescopic toilet paper tubes.
I think he meant that if the IADS threat is high enough that we have to be that low to counter it, then something went wrong long before the helos got called in. Sure we train to fly in environments like that, but in all honesty we both know the real capabilities and limitations of our aircraft and the reality of the air defense game.
If we had spent the last decade fighting a more conventional war we'd be debating the merits of lower-threat medium-altitude tactics instead.
That was the idea I was getting at.
Obviously not a helo guy and I appreciate the direction this thread went. But, the comments above don't appear to be supported by history. I am reminded of Operation Normandy. Eight Apaches escorted by MH-53s opened Desert Storm by flying through/under the Iraqi IAD, much feared at the time, to fire 27 Hellfires and destroy a key node. I'd call that "high threat". And nothing had "gone wrong" at all. It was planned. It was a natural extension of the Cold War Army attack capability. Don't Army Apache guys still lay claim to Deep Strike? If so, then how can they not know the "real capabilities and limitations" of their aircraft and the reality of the air defense game? They have done it before with great success.
That was a very specific 'one-off' mission that had involved extensive planning but was not in a very high-threat area like many other places in Iraq at the time were, from what I know the sites were close to the border and while well defended were not deep in the middle of a dense SAM area.
If the Apache guys are laying claim to a 'deep strike' capability I am not sure that it means what they think it means. They did attempt two 'deep attack' missions during OIF and the first, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment tried to attack units of the 'Medina' Republican Guard division near Karbala on the night of 23 March, was a complete disaster. Reading a summary of the operation in the book 'On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom' highlights how ill-prepared the Army was to conduct that kind of large strike into a high-threat area. Their plan was to attack the enemy in an urban area at very low-level at night, their support for the mission consisted of firing off 32 ATACMs for SEAD......and that was it. Thirty-one Apaches took part in the mission and were met at the target area by a large volume of small arms and AAA fire. Of the 30 Apaches that made it to the target area (one crashed on take-off) 29 came back with battle damage and the remaining one was shot down and the crew captured. It took a 30 days for the unit to repair the damaged Apaches and recover to full strength. As it said in the book it is a testament to the Apache's durability that 29 Apaches made it back with the battle damage they recieved. And after all that they never found the tanks they were looking for.
The second 'deep attack' by the 101st went much better with much more support, but even then they were close enough to the friendly forces that a large part of the support they got was from artillery. The Army's 'deep attack' definition seems a bit different than what we would think of as 'deep'.
Certainly can't speak to Army doctrine or missions today. But in the mid '80s when I was a TACRON Ops O deep strike was claimed, and planning for instructed, at the two week joint air ops planning course I attended that was largely Army taught. Based on the course material, I am very confident they knew what deep strike involved and not a single USAF bubba took objection to any assumptions or definitions. That was then. Maybe not now. I'd like to know if the mission has been officially abandoned, perhaps due to lackluster results you mention above.
The development of joint aerial ops has come a long way since then with the constant exercises and operations we have done since then making interoperability between the USAF, USN and USMC along with some of our more competent allies second nature. Participation by the Army in the exercises and ops beyond direct support to their forces and special operations has been very limited from my experience, they just weren't a player at all in most cases. Nothing agains the Army, it just isn't their mission. So if 'deep attack/strike' is part of their claimed mission set it is something they likely do on their own and in a limited fashion compared to what we think of when it comes to large-scale or 'deep' strikes.
In fact, the very nature of that portion of the training was "we don't normally play the ATO/joint tasking game. But we understand we have to make nice with everyone else on the playground for deep strike." So, things change. But usually it involves more capabilities, and more mission sets due to improvements in technology, increased multimission platforms and fewer assets.