Good idea fairy: sUAS SELRES units for GPC

[Hair Warrior]

Given the asymmetric success, Tiktok/Instagram publicity, and battlefield ubiquity of sUAS units in UKR, it’s almost certain that RUS and PRC have taken note and adjusted their operations, and also, that the way of war has fundamentally changed.

If the USN is truly gearing up for GPC readiness (as all of our NSS, NMS, and naval strategy documents reflect), why not establish a number of East and West Coast maritime-focused sUAS SELRES units and train to that fight? If I were CNR for a day, I think the CCMDs would find it valuable if USNR could offer up that capability ashore or afloat to augment whatever the CCMD wants to augment.

I’m imagining a handful of 30-50 person reserve units with a URL-IWC mix that could reasonably mobilize 1-2 forward deployable Dets with an OIC (CWO2 to LT), LCPO, LPO, and a handful of sailors to fly the sUAS and do spot TCPED. They would have organic sUAS hardware but maybe also develop and experiment with TTPs for commercially available off the shelf drones. Put them ashore or afloat in the sand, forest, on small boats, on big hulls, wherever the CCMD would send them to achieve the CCDR’s PIRs and EEIs. One core competency would be all-weather, day and night sUAS ops (and sUAS navigation) over water… bc we are the Navy after all. The cost would be pretty low, IMHO, and reservist training can be done anywhere a (random field on base, in urban environments, in simulators, etc.).on AT and DWEs.

Heck, maybe even have 2x sister units (East/West) who specialize in counter-sUAS, because that might be a high demand capability for CCMDs as well. After the “crawl” and “walk” phases of inplementstion, you could even have annual FTX (“run”) where these units blue team red team each other.

Not that it really matters, but these all could be considered “hardware” units and be fenced from IA mob. The CONOP would be to deploy Dets as a team, with the team having already trained and done a workuo together.

/good idea fairy idea o’ day

 

[Mos]

Given the asymmetric success, Tiktok/Instagram publicity, and battlefield ubiquity of sUAS units in UKR, it’s almost certain that RUS and PRC have taken note and adjusted their operations, and also, that the way of war has fundamentally changed.

If the USN is truly gearing up for GPC readiness (as all of our NSS, NMS, and naval strategy documents reflect), why not establish a number of East and West Coast maritime-focused sUAS SELRES units and train to that fight? If I were CNR for a day, I think the CCMDs would find it valuable if USNR could offer up that capability ashore or afloat to augment whatever the CCMD wants to augment.

I’m imagining a handful of 30-50 person reserve units with a URL-IWC mix that could reasonably mobilize 1-2 forward deployable Dets with an OIC (CWO2 to LT), LCPO, LPO, and a handful of sailors to fly the sUAS and do spot TCPED. They would have organic sUAS hardware but maybe also develop and experiment with TTPs for commercially available off the shelf drones. Put them ashore or afloat in the sand, forest, on small boats, on big hulls, wherever the CCMD would send them to achieve the CCMDs PIRs. One core competency would be all-weather, day and night sUAS ops (and sUAS navigation) over water… bc we are the Navy after all. The cost would be pretty low, IMHO, and reservist training can be done anywhere a (random field on base, in urban environments, in simulators, etc.).on AT and DWEs.

Heck, maybe even have 2x sister units (East/West) who specialize in counter-sUAS, because that might be a high demand capability for CCMDs as well. After the “crawl” and “walk” phases of inplementstion, you could even have annual FTX (“run”) where these units blue team red team each other.

Not that it really matters, but these all could be considered “hardware” units and be fenced from IA mob. The CONOP would be to deploy Dets as a team, with the team having already trained and done a workuo together.

/good idea fairy idea o’ day

That kind of already exists in the form of the VUP SAU.

 

[taxi1]

I’m imagining a handful of 30-50 person reserve units with a URL-IWC mix that could reasonably mobilize 1-2 forward deployable Dets with an OIC (CWO2 to LT), LCPO, LPO, and a handful of sailors to fly the sUAS and do spot TCPED. They would have organic sUAS hardware but maybe also develop and experiment with TTPs for commercially available off the shelf drones. Put them ashore or afloat in the sand, forest, on small boats, on big hulls, wherever the CCMD would send them to achieve the CCDR’s PIRs and EEIs. One core competency would be all-weather, day and night sUAS ops (and sUAS navigation) over water… bc we are the Navy after all. The cost would be pretty low, IMHO, and reservist training can be done anywhere a (random field on base, in urban environments, in simulators, etc.).on AT and DWEs.

Good idea, ideal for reserves.

That kind of already exists in the form of the VUP SAU.

The little sUAS compared to big platforms are like comparing bullets to ICBMs. Borderline expendable, you can make them from base parts and pizza boxes. Does that fit with the SAU mission?

 

[Mos]

The little sUAS compared to big platforms are like comparing bullets to ICBMs. Borderline expendable, you can make them from base parts and pizza boxes. Does that fit with the SAU mission?

You're right, they're not the same and I don't think VUP would or should take on the smaller platforms. But there may be some lessons to be learned from VUP as far as SELRES involvement.

 

[Flash]

Given the asymmetric success, Tiktok/Instagram publicity, and battlefield ubiquity of sUAS units in UKR, it’s almost certain that RUS and PRC have taken note and adjusted their operations, and also, that the way of war has fundamentally changed.

I would be a bit leery of taking too many lessons this early in the war so far and also on what folks can glean from what is publicly available. What smaller UAV's have been able to do, and just as importantly what they've not been able to do, in the war so far has been quite mixed. One important question, have they impacted the larger war effort other than making good TikTok videos? That's a good question that doesn't have an answer yet and the best ones that apply to us will likely be classified for years.

To be frank I'm not sure Russia is certain to actually 'learn' lessons from this conflict, especially after they supposedly 'learned' lessons from Chechnya (both times), Georgia and Syria. They certainly made a lot of noise like they learned some lessons but it turns out it was not much more than Instagram-reality, a façade that has crumbled when faced with a well-equipped and credible foe.

The Chinese are certain to learn, but maybe not necessarily what we may assume.

If the USN is truly gearing up for GPC readiness (as all of our NSS, NMS, and naval strategy documents reflect), why not establish a number of East and West Coast maritime-focused sUAS SELRES units and train to that fight? If I were CNR for a day, I think the CCMDs would find it valuable if USNR could offer up that capability ashore or afloat to augment whatever the CCMD wants to augment.

To do what exactly? With very short range and limited capabilities what exactly would units operating in the maritime environment do? Especially in a near-peer fight, what would a Navy Reserve small UAV squadron do? It sounds like you are proposing making the cart before figuring out what horse to hitch it up to.

 

[Griz882]

To do what exactly? With very short range and limited capabilities what exactly would units operating in the maritime environment do? Especially in a near-peer fight, what would a Navy Reserve small UAV squadron do? It sounds like you are proposing making the cart before figuring out what horse to hitch it up to.

I fully get what you say about lesson’s learned, and I agree, but I could readily think of a few ideas that might prove effective against a near-peer adversary. Think less of the main battle fleet that wins the war and more of the coast watchers that set the stage for victory and you get the idea.

 

[Flash]

I fully get what you say about lesson’s learned, and I agree, but I could readily think of a few ideas that might prove effective against a near-peer adversary. Think less of the main battle fleet that wins the war and more of the coast watchers that set the stage for victory and you get the idea.

I could as well, as many knowledgeable folks here could do, but this was concerning one specific idea the OP made.

 

[Hair Warrior]

One important question, have they impacted the larger war effort other than making good TikTok videos?

My assessment is yes. UKR has used them to find fix finish Russian armored columns, rear assembly points, supply depots, bridge crossings, and C2 posts. They use them with improvised munitions for harrassing fires. Also seem to use them as a quasi forward observer for artillery spotting. This enabled UKR to take on much larger, conventional forces with a smaller and lighter force, and deny the enemy safety in rear areas which has an effect on enemy morale.

To do what exactly? With very short range and limited capabilities what exactly would units operating in the maritime environment do? Especially in a near-peer fight, what would a Navy Reserve small UAV squadron do? It sounds like you are proposing making the cart before figuring out what horse to hitch it up to.

For example, to put a Det IVO the Baltic or ECS that can perform certain, limited maritime reconnaissance missions but is far cheaper and more survivable against a peer adversary than a P8 or MQ-4C. It’s not supposed to replace a P8 or MQ-4C, but rather, to augment the options in the CCDR’s toolkit using drones that are expendable.

 

[Hair Warrior]

To clarify, my definition of sUAS is ScanEagle and smaller (10’ wingspan or less). I know the active duty has several Dets like this already, but I’m saying the Navy Reserve might find success in establishing some special purpose units, and offering forward deployable, go-anywhere naval drone teams (and maybe counter-drone teams) to CCMDs.

I bet SELRES sailors would line up to go fly drones on DWEs from a field or small boat rather than do what their current unit does today.

 

[Swanee]

To clarify, my definition of sUAS is ScanEagle and smaller (10’ wingspan or less). I know the active duty has several Dets like this already, but I’m saying the Navy Reserve might find success in establishing some special purpose units, and offering forward deployable, go-anywhere naval drone teams (and maybe counter-drone teams) to CCMDs.

I bet SELRES sailors would line up to go fly drones on DWEs from a field or small boat rather than do what their current unit does today.

There are already NSW units who are doing that. They're flying Group 3 and below, and they're doing pretty well.

The USMC UAS Center of Excellence is working on integration of Group 1 and 2 sUAS into squad, platoon, and company level tactics and sUAS as an organic weapons system.

What needs to happen is to continue to think of Group 3 and below UAS as organic weapons systems to a battalion, company, platoon or squad that live in the Weapons Company, much like where mortars and machine guns live. We tried the VMU sUAS det to MARSOC concept a few times when the VMUs were in search of a new mission. It didn't really work in a reliable and repeatable fashion.

 

[Flash]

My assessment is yes. UKR has used them to find fix finish Russian armored columns, rear assembly points, supply depots, bridge crossings, and C2 posts. They use them with improvised munitions for harrassing fires. Also seem to use them as a quasi forward observer for artillery spotting. This enabled UKR to take on much larger, conventional forces with a smaller and lighter force, and deny the enemy safety in rear areas which has an effect on enemy morale.

I think while Ukraine has made a big deal out of what they have been able to do with their UAV's the reality is a bit more mixed. They are a great enabler but their overall effect on the battlefield may not be as big as most assume, and it will likely take some time to assess their real impact in the war.

For example, to put a Det IVO the Baltic or ECS that can perform certain, limited maritime reconnaissance missions but is far cheaper and more survivable against a peer adversary than a P8 or MQ-4C. It’s not supposed to replace a P8 or MQ-4C, but rather, to augment the options in the CCDR’s toolkit using drones that are expendable.

I think you are making a lot of assumptions on how we may or may not be able to operate in particular areas. Merely getting to those areas in a timely manner would be a real stretch for a reserve small UAV squadron in wartime with much higher priority cargo flowing to the warzone much less trying to employ them as part of the larger fight.

 

[Hair Warrior]

Roger. I agree with you.

I’m not saying they would be game-changers. Just that they might be useful and inexpensive to prototype and do as a 3-4 year trial run. Based on what I have seen of “DWE/AT production” from current non-hardware reserve units, to me it would maybe be a worthy use of time and resources.

Trying to produce timely, quality intel reporting on a DWE when you aren’t seeing the intel feeds for 28 days of the month, or trying to keep up URL-like skill sets when you aren’t in a hardware unit with any vessels/aircraft and keeping current in your platform… those skills are perishable and I think that’s why a lot of the IA mobs seem to end up being “go here and please just be a staff officer for us.”

The model of excellence to me would be perhaps the Seabee reserve units and VAQ-209. They have a specific mission. They train to it year round. Seabees do a check-out exercise to get certified before mobilizing. They mobilize together as a unit (fenced) and not as IAs. The CCDR knows exactly what kind of capability he or she is getting when that Seabee/Growler unit gets tapped to go forward.