FLRAA and FARA update

[Best-22]

I don't think the USAF has any KC-130s. I'm 99.999% sure it's all -135s and KC-10s.

So, good luck to the Army getting support from the VMGRs. They're already tapped out.

And I'm not sure if the KC-10 or KC-135 can get slow enough to refuel helos.

V-22's are compatible with KC-10 and KC-46, refueling happens at around 200kts

First in-air refueling between KC-46, AFSOC CV-22

The 20th Special Operations Squadron and 349th Air Refueling Squadron brought a CV-22 Osprey and KC-46 Pegasus together for in-air refueling training over Cannon AFB early June.

www.af.mil

Google Image Result for https://media.defense.gov/2016/Nov/21/2001670726/-1/-1/0/161118-F-UQ958-0063.JPG

and the USAF (AFSOC) has MC-130J's

 

[Best-22]

MC-130J is the organic tanker for AFSOC/SOCOM low speed progue and drogue tanking CV-22, HH-60W, MH-47G, MH-60M, etc.

We can use VDD, VSD, or HSD's, no low speed drogue for the V-22's.

 

[Hotdogs]

You may be overestimating these problems. In the V-22 (USAF) air refueling is a 6 month currency and can be accomplished in the sim provided you plug twice total in real life every year. It doesn't have to be a -130 either; KC-10, KC-46, and contract tankers (Omega for example) can all support. I've also been hearing rumors of serious discussions to procure the KC-390 but worst case only few select air assault units maintain currency but it's nice to have the option if you know your unit will need it on an upcoming deployment. We have 10 years to figure this out so it's not an urgent problem.

My understanding of the army's plan is to have a dedicated attack version that would have the same range and speed: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ts-for-a-future-high-speed-assault-helicopter
What do you mean by a lack of USAF fixed wing escorts? There is no need for enroute escort with a platform like this (except for SEAD), you just need fires in the terminal area which many fixed wing communities train to.

Supporting the entire joint force with extra aircraft for air to air refueling will be problematic. There aren’t enough tankers to go around as it stands right now. Lastly (as I’m sure you know) there’s a difference between currency and proficiency. You maybe confident in average joe Army aviator plugging at night twice a year to maintain a qual, but I wouldn’t (Nor would I recommend to a commander) to put Marines in the back of that aircraft on a combat mission. I imagine this will most likely end up like Army boat quals - Nice to have, good experience, but operationally not practical unless extensive prep time is alloted.

Disagree on the need for an enroute escort capability. Enroute escort is mission dependent. There are good reasons to have both enroute FW and RW escorts. I am not at all confident the USAF will provide FW escorts for Army assault missions in a conventional near-peer fight. They will have other ATO lines to fill. Hence the reason to have an organic escort that can keep pace.

The Russian VDV air assault into Hostomel is a great example of fucking away the enroute portion. There is a reason why TRAP-A missions in Syria had attached A-10s. Not being accusatory, but I wouldn’t let your SOF experience clout the realities of conventional capability. Conventional Risk tolerances are lower; proficiency and experience is lower; and near-peer adversaries offer unique and robust challenges that differ from SOF mission sets. We are probably looking at this problem set with two distinct perspectives.

(The article you cited didn’t offer any details on FARA specs as it relates to the FLRAA. Just that services were looking at different things)

 

[ChuckMK23]

We can use VDD, VSD, or HSD's, no low speed drogue for the V-22's.

Nice - learned something ???

 

[Swanee]

MC-130J is the organic tanker for AFSOC/SOCOM low speed progue and drogue tanking CV-22, HH-60W, MH-47G, MH-60M, etc.

Cool! I figured that's where that animal would live. Probably not a highly available asset though.

 

[phrogdriver]

You may be overestimating these problems. In the V-22 (USAF) air refueling is a 6 month currency and can be accomplished in the sim provided you plug twice total in real life every year. It doesn't have to be a -130 either; KC-10, KC-46, and contract tankers (Omega for example) can all support. I've also been hearing rumors of serious discussions to procure the KC-390 but worst case only few select air assault units maintain currency but it's nice to have the option if you know your unit will need it on an upcoming deployment. We have 10 years to figure this out so it's not an urgent problem.

My understanding of the army's plan is to have a dedicated attack version that would have the same range and speed: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ts-for-a-future-high-speed-assault-helicopter
What do you mean by a lack of USAF fixed wing escorts? There is no need for enroute escort with a platform like this (except for SEAD), you just need fires in the terminal area which many fixed wing communities train to.

There is no Army plan for an attack version. FARA and Apache will be their scout and attack fleet for the foreseeable future. The Marines, on the other hand….

 

[Best-22]

Supporting the entire joint force with extra aircraft for air to air refueling will be problematic. There aren’t enough tankers to go around as it stands right now. Lastly (as I’m sure you know) there’s a difference between currency and proficiency. You maybe confident in average joe Army aviator plugging at night twice a year to maintain a qual, but I wouldn’t (Nor would I recommend to a commander) to put Marines in the back of that aircraft on a combat mission. I imagine this will most likely end up like Army boat quals - Nice to have, good experience, but operationally not practical unless extensive prep time is alloted.

Disagree on the need for an enroute escort capability. Enroute escort is mission dependent. There are good reasons to have both enroute FW and RW escorts. I am not at all confident the USAF will provide FW escorts for Army assault missions in a conventional near-peer fight. They will have other ATO lines to fill. Hence the reason to have an organic escort that can keep pace.

The Russian VDV air assault into Hostomel is a great example of fucking away the enroute portion. There is a reason why TRAP-A missions in Syria had attached A-10s. Not being accusatory, but I wouldn’t let your SOF experience clout the realities of conventional capability. Conventional Risk tolerances are lower; proficiency and experience is lower; and near-peer adversaries offer unique and robust challenges that differ from SOF mission sets. We are probably looking at this problem set with two distinct perspectives.

(The article you cited didn’t offer any details on FARA specs as it relates to the FLRAA. Just that services were looking at different things)

That's a fair point, I have minimal conventional force experience. Besides SEAD though I don't know what purpose enroute escort would fill, please feel free to educate me though. In my experience tiltrotor enroute speeds and altitudes mean you're either outside of of the threat WEZ entirely, or would be by the time your escort could position for an attack against the threat. Do conventional C-130's request enroute escort? Do any of you MV-22 folks request it? For the sake of this discussion I'm not counting SEAD, EW or A-A as enroute escort.

 

[Hotdogs]

That's a fair point, I have minimal conventional force experience. Besides SEAD though I don't know what purpose enroute escort would fill, please feel free to educate me though. In my experience tiltrotor enroute speeds and altitudes mean you're either outside of of the threat WEZ entirely, or would be by the time your escort could position for an attack against the threat. Do conventional C-130's request enroute escort? Do any of you MV-22 folks request it? For the sake of this discussion I'm not counting SEAD, EW or A-A as enroute escort.

In an ideal world - that would be the goal. In conventional environments with any potential IADS - we’ll be at lower altitudes and still relatively slow (<300 KIAS). We never assume a conventional air assault will be uncontested until the threat conditions allow and even then - We’re probably still coming along for the ride. Speed doesn’t provide as much sanctuary as we might assume. Small arms and MANPADs are still mobile and hard to isolate (Army Apaches in the Karbala Gap during OIF 1). Pop up RF threats still exist if our enemy is playing the mobile conceal/reveal game (Bosnia, Ukraine). Not to mention modern ADA systems are getting much more capable.

In its most simplified form detached escorts provide route reconnaissance to PID these in front of a package, sanitize the LZ, shuttle assaults to and from the zone, and attached escorts provide the reactive fires to suppress said threats. They also keep track of other aircraft and deconflict airspace while providing comms for the appropriate force flow into a zone. As you mentioned - The most dangerous position is during IP to LZ. FW ordnance yields, reaction timing, and correlation to a threat inside the IP is difficult (Even with significant fires planning). FW and Armed UAS looking through a soda straw through micro terrain, urban canyons, or foliage trying to sort out who’s who in the zoo is not ideal in a firefight (The enemy also understand this…). An asset that is at the hip with the same perspective is much more capable in that regime. This mission set is basically HMLA 101 and learned through painful lessons ever since Vietnam.

I am assuming the FARA will have similar performance characteristics to the FLRAA decision. I just haven’t seen it. The Marines are not in an ideal spot with the differences in performance between the H-1 and MV-22s. Lots of shenanigans went into buying upgrades H-1s vice a TR attack variant. The glitch will correct itself in due time. I assume it will be attack/utility variant of the V-280 or derivative. There’s much more to go into on this subject, but probably best to end it with generics vice more specifics for obvious reasons.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Speaking of KC-130'S

 

[phrogdriver]

@Hotdogs FARA’s performance, no matter the winner, will have nowhere near the performance of FLRAA. Bell’s entry is a conventional helicopter design that gets a little extra speed by using a wing to unload the rotors. Sikorsky’s is a smaller version of its X2 technology with a coax.

Neither can reach V-22 speeds, much less V-280.

 

[Lawman]

Tanking? I admittedly don't know much about the V-280, but in all the pictures the pointy thing off the nose looks like a test/prototype pitot-static probe.

180 day currencies will be the factor that like our shipboard ops requirement are just abandoned by conventional CABs as unsustainable. It will take a lot to shift the conventional Army outside a few locations to allocate white space on a training calendar to make these events a thing.

…and exactly zero programmed tankers to support it. I’d be surprised if only a handful of conventional Army assault aircrew actually remain current and qualified in TAAR. The only reason Marine assault support aircraft can maintain any semblance of currency is because of dedicated VMGR support. Unlikely the USAF is going to pony up C-130s at the cyclic rate to support that training Army wide. Depending on how FARA shakes out any TAAR will likely out range the capability of any dedicated RW escorts. (Yes, I know it provides extended contingency holding, flexibility, sour tanker plans etc). The lack of dedicated USAF fixed wing escorts is also problematic. The Marines are also in this problem but to a lesser extent. Marine TACAIR platforms are limited in escort capabilities and should probably be off doing pointy nose things anyways.



I am curious how the FLARA decision will influence the FARA program. Both Bell and Sikorsky are submitting somewhat conventional RW designs. Both of which are probably not apt to support the V-280. I get it coax rotors, pusher props, and wings help speed/range, but I am not convinced it will be able to support the FLRAA decision. Anyone have a copy of the FARA requirements specs? I’m taking a wild shot in the dark here but I am assuming the Army has thought through the problem set and I am just ignorant.

You’d be surprised how quickly the RC guys were to providing us tankers. Their Load masters need currency quals also…. Funny enough geographically East Coast was far and above easier to source tankers between rescue and AFSOC. 4/160 between weather and geography has a much harder time keeping their guys current. 3/160 meanwhile gets everything Moody can send…. Deployment was the easy button. Always an MC crew thrilled to do option IIs etc.

You may be overestimating these problems. In the V-22 (USAF) air refueling is a 6 month currency and can be accomplished in the sim provided you plug twice total in real life every year. It doesn't have to be a -130 either; KC-10, KC-46, and contract tankers (Omega for example) can all support. I've also been hearing rumors of serious discussions to procure the KC-390 but worst case only few select air assault units maintain currency but it's nice to have the option if you know your unit will need it on an upcoming deployment. We have 10 years to figure this out so it's not an urgent problem.

If the Marines solve the V-22 Tanker problem expect the Army to follow suit with a farp/fatcow/drogue config just to solve the problems above on currency and capability. The ability to plug on a drogue wasn’t specific to profiles or types of 130. If we can get a Valor to tow a drogue for another Valor and move any amount of gas through it that will be more than “good enough” for the people to call it the currency for the conventional Army side of things.

 

[Griz882]

180 day currencies will be the factor that like our shipboard ops requirement are just abandoned by conventional CABs as unsustainable. It will take a lot to shift the conventional Army outside a few locations to allocate white space on a training calendar to make these events a thing.

You’d be surprised how quickly the RC guys were to providing us tankers. Their Load masters need currency quals also…. Funny enough geographically East Coast was far and above easier to source tankers between rescue and AFSOC. 4/160 between weather and geography has a much harder time keeping their guys current. 3/160 meanwhile gets everything Moody can send…. Deployment was the easy button. Always an MC crew thrilled to do option IIs etc.

If the Marines solve the V-22 Tanker problem expect the Army to follow suit with a farp/fatcow/drogue config just to solve the problems above on currency and capability. The ability to plug on a drogue wasn’t specific to profiles or types of 130. If we can get a Valor to tow a drogue for another Valor and move any amount of gas through it that will be more than “good enough” for the people to call it the currency for the conventional Army side of things.

Just another reason to revive the Zombie Viking!

 

[Hotdogs]

If the Marines solve the V-22 Tanker problem expect the Army to follow suit with a farp/fatcow/drogue config just to solve the problems above on currency and capability. The ability to plug on a drogue wasn’t specific to profiles or types of 130. If we can get a Valor to tow a drogue for another Valor and move any amount of gas through it that will be more than “good enough” for the people to call it the currency for the conventional Army side of things.

That is an option assuming there is not a major challenge to configuration and funding. The USMC explored VARS for MV-22s but determined it was not feasible or necessary due the amount of useful fuel give to make it a viable operational TTP. If the Army wants to throw money at it for training purposes then it might solve that problem. The USMC still predominately relies on KCs for MV-22 and CH-53 AR currency.

 

[phrogdriver]

That is an option assuming there is not a major challenge to configuration and funding. The USMC explored VARS for MV-22s but determined it was not feasible or necessary due the amount of useful fuel give to make it a viable operational TTP. If the Army wants to throw money at it for training purposes then it might solve that problem. The USMC still predominately relies on KCs for MV-22 and CH-53 AR currency.

The V-22 has a ramp that makes an AR kit more feasible from an airframe perspective.

Given the relative size of the V-280, I can’t picture a world where it would make sense to make the modifications to add AR just to support training plugs.

It would be far more cost effective to contact Omega to provide tanker assets. Or, in this day and age, to use simulation via VR or even AR (real flying on a virtual tanker) than to build a tanker V-280.

 

[Lawman]

The V-22 has a ramp that makes an AR kit more feasible from an airframe perspective.

Given the relative size of the V-280, I can’t picture a world where it would make sense to make the modifications to add AR just to support training plugs.

It would be far more cost effective to contact Omega to provide tanker assets. Or, in this day and age, to use simulation via VR or even AR (real flying on a virtual tanker) than to build a tanker V-280.

I would love to see the CABs adopt a workout cycle more akin to you guys going to the MEU decks for months prior to and not trying what we normally do of “maintain everything at all times” that results in maintaining almost nothing. The unpredictable nature of deployments though just make that impossible. Army Force Gen cycles are written entirely for ground units and the CAB organic to a division is always left out somewhere in space to meet other deployment readiness requirements or just produce a task force to help support training/CTCs/etc.

With regards to FVL, most of us don’t believe the thing will fly for more than a year before somebody bellies one doing traffic patterns for progression, and suddenly an AWR is written to pin the gear down and pull a CB so they stay that way. One guy craps his pants… but anybody watching Ukraine right now validating some of the COAs on the distance at which your security requirement forces you to back off realizes we have to get faster longer legs or we simply cannot be used in LSCO. Our aircraft are too complex and maintenance intensive to simply live with the ground elements and we have too much ass to be flexible and mobile. The TAA will be too far for a 120-140kt platform to actually affect anything in the fight.


ARSOA on the other hand will have no issue with this aircraft. In a lot of ways as long as it still has some useful ACL after they bolt all the mission equipment to it, it will finally get the 60s back into the show. Likewise if CSAR gets into this there may actually be options for recovery not limited by an overweight 60 airframe trying to do a 53 job.