Hitler's generals were terrified of any major conflict with Czechoslovakia because of the capability and size of the Czech military and warned Hitler that the German military was not in any state to take on that country. The Czechs had been building up their military for two decades at that point. They had a very professional and capable general staff, ability for rapid mobilization, first-rate equipment (very good tanks, artillery, firearms, etc...) and a sizable force that was roughly comparable to Germany's when comparing to the German forces with actual capability, and mountainous terrain with lots of fortifications, whereas Germany was still in the building up process. The Czechs had the best arms factories in the world at the time as well, and the addition of the country to Hitler's empire helped greatly increase its strength.
The military staff's concern about Czech military power ≠ the Czechs stopping Hitler. In early '38, Hitler restructured the high command and solidified the de facto role for himself as the chief military decision-maker (however unqualified he may have been). While the Czech military situation affected the occupation plan in various ways, Hitler was determined to go to to war with Czechoslovakia over the continued objections of many of his generals, and his vote was the only one that mattered by that time. Some of the generals actually would've initiated a coup against Hitler if war with Czechoslovakia proceeded, but that doesn't really matter because Hitler didn't know of these plots.
Hitler himself later admitted, "When after Munich, we were in a position to examine Czechoslovak military strength from within, what we saw of it greatly disturbed us; we had run a serious danger. The plan prepared by the Czech generals was formidable. I now understand why my generals urged restraint.”
Hitler admitting after the fact the significance of the Czech military defense ≠ the Czechs stopping Hitler. His mindset prior to the Munich conference in September is what matters, not his mindset months later when he arrived in Prague. Scholars disagree on the exact motivations for Hitler shifting from a certain path of war with Czechoslovakia to agreeing to meet at Munich for a diplomatic solution, but intel on Czech defenses is just one of several factors, with Italy's flagging support of the operation and both French and British pressures appearing to be the more significant.
In addition, had Hitler attacked, Britain and France might well have attacked as well and German would almost certainly have been defeated.
The broader response from major powers that might have happened ≠ the Czechs stopping Hitler. First, the Czech mobilization ultimately had no bearing on this. Second, all leaders involved in the crisis made their decisions based not only what they knew but also on what they believed about their adversary (whether such beliefs are warranted or not). Hitler had intel on Czech defenses, but believed that the Wehrmacht would somehow prevail against it. Hitler knew that France and Britain would likely have made the war costly if not fatal for Germany if they had intervened, but believed that they wouldn't intervene. France and Britain should've known that the balance of power was in their favor, but believed that it wasn't, and in any case acted on the motivation that war with Germany was simply unacceptable for the interests at stake. Benes knew (or should've known) that Czechoslovakia stood a chance to face Germany alone, but his defense policy was so linked to his arrangement with France and Britain that he lost faith when they left him with the choice to cede Sudetenland or fight alone.
For more information:
- Black, Naomi. “Decision-Making and the Munich Crisis.” British Journal of International Studies 6, no. 3 (1980): 278–303. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096894.
- Hill, Leonidas. “Three Crises, 1938-39.” Journal of Contemporary History 3, no. 1 (1968): 113–44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/259970.
- Daryl G. Press. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s.” International Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 136–69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137558.
- Vital, David. “Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938.” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 4 (1966): 37–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/259891.
- Campbell, Kenneth J. “Colonel General Ludwig Beck: Conspirator.” American Intelligence Journal 31, no. 1 (2013): 123–29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26202052.
I was responding to Mirage's post about what the Germans faced in conquering Europe and peoples standing up to aggressors.
It's obvious that you're responding to Mirage, but seems like you're generalizing what was a more specific conversation, i.e., military performance of countries against Germany during WWII. The Czech government diplomatically ceded their borderlands to the Germans in September '38, and the rest of itself in March '39, without any state of war or significant national resistance. Seems like apples and oranges to compare this with the other nations that Germany occupied thereafter.
