Europe under extreme duress

[wink]

In this context I disagree, unless there is an attack actually underway (outside a war we are directly involved in) taking a step back and figuring out what happened is almost always the better option. That includes almost every significant incident this country has been involved in since I started serving, to include 9/11.

I didn't refer to "this context", as in the Polish missile damage. I specified "in some scenarios". I don't think you can disagree with that. If you want to disagree, I think we have disagreement over 9/11 response. More than one decision was made within 12 hours, indeed, some minutes. Decisions to shoot down civil airlines and close US airspace are only the two most well known. Tough calls with less than 100 % accurate information.

 

[hlg6016]

As far back as Gulf 1 the talking heads where surprised that gravity affected the debris after the Patriot batteries went into action

 

[villanelle]

The video proports that there never will be a more efficient way to write down an American adversary - in essence this is a *gift* to be able to fund Ukraine without the political implications of direct combat engagement.

Well reasoned argument and I think its right.

Cynically, I've wondered if maybe this isn't also a factor in the level of support we've given Ukraine. Just enough, but not too much. Yes, fears of escalation and all that make sense so we keep things limited to lesser weapons in moderate amounts. But also, if we gave them everything they need to end this conflict tomorrow, that would, well... end this conflict tomorrow. The longer it drags on, the more it hurts Russia, and Russian pain is to the US's benefit. Sure, one epic, decisive battle would take out significant Russian hardware, but seemingly less than months more fighting would. So we support to keep Ukraine fighting, but not to push them to a quick defeat. I'm faaar from a historian or war strategy wonk, but this sort of makes sense to me.

On the other side of that coin though, I worry that a drastically weakened Russia will be ripe for Chinese influence, and I don't know what that might look like, but it seems, um, bad. I'd love to hear the thoughts from those of you far more well-versed than I on this aspect of things. Does China go in to "rescue" a dramatically weakened Russia, and in doing so further expand its influence, and perhaps gain control of some of Russia's natural resources? Would China's support make Russia beholden to them in ways ultimately bad for the West?

Or could Russia perhaps become the new Taiwan? Taiwan is dicey and semi- maybe- probably- protected by the West. If Xi decides he needs a war to make him look good (and stimulate his economy) but thinks maybe Taiwan isn't worth the risk, does carving off some little part of neighbor Russia, who is clearly weak and unable to effectively fight off a determined, massive, well-stocked Chinese Army, suddenly start to look enticing? If they went after some part of Russia that was formerly Chinese territory, couldn't it be framed in roughly the same way as they frame Taiwan? Retaking part of China that was stolen by foreign governments? But a presumably much easier, less risky move for China, given that Russia has few friends left? Is a Chino-Russian war a plausible outcome of this?

Again, I'm but a lowly English major who knows pathetically little about history, so be gentle. But I know this place is thick with history, strategy, and international politics nerds, so I'd love to have your thoughts on my thoughts.

 

[jmcquate]

Justin Bronk has talent. The open source analysis that he co-wrote at RUSI is one of the best open source piece I've seen of the air war over Ukraine. In particular the long range Russian radar shots that put the AIM-54 to shame. Download the pdf.

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence

Further Western support is needed to ensure that Kyiv can counter Moscow's updated approach to the air war in Ukraine.

rusi.org

 

[Brett327]

The video proports that there never will be a more efficient way to write down an American adversary - in essence this is a *gift* to be able to fund Ukraine without the political implications of direct combat engagement.

Well reasoned argument and I think its right.

I'm sure the Soviet s thought that about Vietnam too... and they were right.

 

[Mirage]

Cynically, I've wondered if maybe this isn't also a factor in the level of support we've given Ukraine. Just enough, but not too much. Yes, fears of escalation and all that make sense so we keep things limited to lesser weapons in moderate amounts. But also, if we gave them everything they need to end this conflict tomorrow, that would, well... end this conflict tomorrow. The longer it drags on, the more it hurts Russia, and Russian pain is to the US's benefit. Sure, one epic, decisive battle would take out significant Russian hardware, but seemingly less than months more fighting would. So we support to keep Ukraine fighting, but not to push them to a quick defeat. I'm faaar from a historian or war strategy wonk, but this sort of makes sense to me.

On the other side of that coin though, I worry that a drastically weakened Russia will be ripe for Chinese influence, and I don't know what that might look like, but it seems, um, bad. I'd love to hear the thoughts from those of you far more well-versed than I on this aspect of things. Does China go in to "rescue" a dramatically weakened Russia, and in doing so further expand its influence, and perhaps gain control of some of Russia's natural resources? Would China's support make Russia beholden to them in ways ultimately bad for the West?

Or could Russia perhaps become the new Taiwan? Taiwan is dicey and semi- maybe- probably- protected by the West. If Xi decides he needs a war to make him look good (and stimulate his economy) but thinks maybe Taiwan isn't worth the risk, does carving off some little part of neighbor Russia, who is clearly weak and unable to effectively fight off a determined, massive, well-stocked Chinese Army, suddenly start to look enticing? If they went after some part of Russia that was formerly Chinese territory, couldn't it be framed in roughly the same way as they frame Taiwan? Retaking part of China that was stolen by foreign governments? But a presumably much easier, less risky move for China, given that Russia has few friends left? Is a Chino-Russian war a plausible outcome of this?

Again, I'm but a lowly English major who knows pathetically little about history, so be gentle. But I know this place is thick with history, strategy, and international politics nerds, so I'd love to have your thoughts on my thoughts.

This would require a book length response to fully cover, but I'll try to hit the highlights.

It's doubtful the west is trying to help Ukraine survive but not win decisively. It's a minor miracle Russia didn't win decisively, and I think if we could help Ukraine end this tomorrow without triggering a nuclear response then we would.

Also find it doubtful that Putin/Russia would sell it's soul to the Chinese. Putin/Russia's long term goal has been for a long time to regain the status they had during the Soviet era. You don't do that by ceding control of your own affairs to China. Doubtful China would even trust any long term agreements with Russia anyway.. look how quickly Russia took control of foreign assets (oil industry mostly) when it became convenient.

The idea that Russia could become a new Taiwan, threatened by China with war and protected by the US, is just... Extremely extremely unlikely. Lots of reasons why. The Russian nuclear arsenal being one of the big ones.

 

[Griz882]

Cynically, I've wondered if maybe this isn't also a factor in the level of support we've given Ukraine. Just enough, but not too much. Yes, fears of escalation and all that make sense so we keep things limited to lesser weapons in moderate amounts. But also, if we gave them everything they need to end this conflict tomorrow, that would, well... end this conflict tomorrow. The longer it drags on, the more it hurts Russia, and Russian pain is to the US's benefit. Sure, one epic, decisive battle would take out significant Russian hardware, but seemingly less than months more fighting would. So we support to keep Ukraine fighting, but not to push them to a quick defeat. I'm faaar from a historian or war strategy wonk, but this sort of makes sense to me.

On the other side of that coin though, I worry that a drastically weakened Russia will be ripe for Chinese influence, and I don't know what that might look like, but it seems, um, bad. I'd love to hear the thoughts from those of you far more well-versed than I on this aspect of things. Does China go in to "rescue" a dramatically weakened Russia, and in doing so further expand its influence, and perhaps gain control of some of Russia's natural resources? Would China's support make Russia beholden to them in ways ultimately bad for the West?

Or could Russia perhaps become the new Taiwan? Taiwan is dicey and semi- maybe- probably- protected by the West. If Xi decides he needs a war to make him look good (and stimulate his economy) but thinks maybe Taiwan isn't worth the risk, does carving off some little part of neighbor Russia, who is clearly weak and unable to effectively fight off a determined, massive, well-stocked Chinese Army, suddenly start to look enticing? If they went after some part of Russia that was formerly Chinese territory, couldn't it be framed in roughly the same way as they frame Taiwan? Retaking part of China that was stolen by foreign governments? But a presumably much easier, less risky move for China, given that Russia has few friends left? Is a Chino-Russian war a plausible outcome of this?

Again, I'm but a lowly English major who knows pathetically little about history, so be gentle. But I know this place is thick with history, strategy, and international politics nerds, so I'd love to have your thoughts on my thoughts.

Geographically there are significant issues with China refocusing on Russia, they simply don’t need Putin (or his turf) that much. Economically the Chinese can’t afford to do what we are doing even with Xi’s new hold on power. For the moment China is facing east, her eyes on the Pacific and how they can effect change there. I could easily see China helping North Korea in a proxy fight against South Korea (much as we are with the Ukraine) but even there existing alliances make that kind of scenario almost impossible.

Right now China can sell the Russians some hardware (as can a deeply challenged and dangerous Iran) and that is good for their bottom line. Russia, however, isn’t in the market for big hardware as the Ukrainians are so the impact is different. In the end I think we are looking at a regional a war that has benefited NATO remarkably but potentially troubles China more. No one cares if China sells Russia some bullets and rockets and such…but China needs the U.S. economy too much to directly ally with (or attack) Russia.

 

[Gonzo08]

Justin Bronk has talent. The open source analysis that he co-wrote at RUSI is one of the best open source piece I've seen of the air war over Ukraine. In particular the long range Russian radar shots that put the AIM-54 to shame. Download the pdf.

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence

Further Western support is needed to ensure that Kyiv can counter Moscow's updated approach to the air war in Ukraine.

rusi.org

Second this. I'm currently working on an article about Russian air power use in Ukraine, and Bronk's work has been a treasure trove as far as references go.

If you have a few extra bucks, the War on the Rocks membership program has a new members-only podcast called "The Russia Contingency." Brock was just featured for an hour-ish-long interview about this document. The host, Michael Kofman, is one of the leading experts on the Russian military, and his commentary is fantastic as well.

 

[nittany03]

Ukrainian S-300s as it turns out. "Sorry folks, WWIII is postponed."

Sigh . . . one of the most mildly infuriating things about the end of the Cold War is people insisting we have to use Russia’s awkward-ass and confusing weapons nomenclature.

It’s an SA-10. Or maybe an SA-12. Or maybe an SA-20. I literally have no idea when people use this stupid “S-300” crap.

And that’s before having to keep it straight in my head that a Kub is a freaking SA-6 and a Buk is its more modern successors. But hey, that could still be an SA-11 or an SA-17, because ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

 

[Brett327]

Sigh . . . one of the most mildly infuriating things about the end of the Cold War is people insisting we have to use Russia’s awkward-ass and confusing weapons nomenclature.

It’s an SA-10. Or maybe an SA-12. Or maybe an SA-20. I literally have no idea when people use this stupid “S-300” crap.

And that’s before having to keep it straight in my head that a Kub is a freaking SA-6 and a Buk is its more modern successors. But hey, that could still be an SA-11 or an SA-17, because ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

It pretty standard in non-military defense circles. Based on a lot of the open source reporting, I’m wondering if either RUS or UKR are using these in a surface to surface role. Wouldn’t be a completely novel concept.

 

[nittany03]

Justin Bronk has talent. The open source analysis that he co-wrote at RUSI is one of the best open source piece I've seen of the air war over Ukraine. In particular the long range Russian radar shots that put the AIM-54 to shame. Download the pdf.

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence

Further Western support is needed to ensure that Kyiv can counter Moscow's updated approach to the air war in Ukraine.

rusi.org

FTA, emphasis mine:

Modern encrypted radio sets have been found without the encryption keys needed to use them, and in others the radar and other sensors have been found either in the stowed position or with pins or covers still fitted that prevent them from working.

Today I learned that Russian Ka-52 crews would be getting ready room downs or FNAEBs in any credible Western force.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Sigh . . . one of the most mildly infuriating things about the end of the Cold War is people insisting we have to use Russia’s awkward-ass and confusing weapons nomenclature.

It’s an SA-10. Or maybe an SA-12. Or maybe an SA-20. I literally have no idea when people use this stupid “S-300” crap.

And that’s before having to keep it straight in my head that a Kub is a freaking SA-6 and a Buk is its more modern successors. But hey, that could still be an SA-11 or an SA-17, because ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

Yeah, that is a pet peeve of mine too for some reason. Probably because in my mind, it somehow legitimizes them beyond being mindless soviets. Which they have recently proven themselves once again to be.

 

[SynixMan]

Second this. I'm currently working on an article about Russian air power use in Ukraine, and Bronk's work has been a treasure trove as far as references go.

If you have a few extra bucks, the War on the Rocks membership program has a new members-only podcast called "The Russia Contingency." Brock was just featured for an hour-ish-long interview about this document. The host, Michael Kofman, is one of the leading experts on the Russian military, and his commentary is fantastic as well.

Kofman really bought the Russian line about their readiness. I've been listening to him on the regular WotR podcast and he always seems surprised when the Russians get clowned.

BT BT

I find it pretty awesome we are significantly attritting a near peer adversary's ground force using mostly Cold War surplus stock plus a few fancy newer toys (Javelin, NASAMS, GMLRS).

 

[wink]

I find it pretty awesome we are significantly attritting a near peer adversary's ground force using mostly Cold War surplus stock plus a few fancy newer toys (Javelin, NASAMS, GMLRS).

THE CHINESE find it pretty instructive that we are significantly attritting a near peer adversary's ground force using mostly Cold War surplus stock plus a few fancy newer toys (Javelin, NASAMS, GMLRS). Lucky for them, these observations come just in time for them to tweak their Taiwan OPLANs.

 

[Flash]

Sigh . . . one of the most mildly infuriating things about the end of the Cold War is people insisting we have to use Russia’s awkward-ass and confusing weapons nomenclature.

It’s an SA-10. Or maybe an SA-12. Or maybe an SA-20. I literally have no idea when people use this stupid “S-300” crap.

And that’s before having to keep it straight in my head that a Kub is a freaking SA-6 and a Buk is its more modern successors. But hey, that could still be an SA-11 or an SA-17, because ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

You have no idea. At all. All the names, all the designators...so, so many.

Here is fun question that is somewhat related, can anyone ID the enemy SAM's in Top Gun 2? They're 'real' missiles but it is a little bit of a trick question.

It pretty standard in non-military defense circles. Based on a lot of the open source reporting, I’m wondering if either RUS or UKR are using these in a surface to surface role. Wouldn’t be a completely novel concept.

Been going on for a few months apparently, at least according to 'British Intelligence' (who I have to compliment BTW for running such a good PR game recently) who says "‘critical shortages’ of Russian ground-attack missiles force Putin’s army to use S-300 air defense missiles instead".

Who woulda thunk that pervasive corruption would have an effect on a country's military and its ability to wage war?

THE CHINESE find it pretty instructive that we are significantly attritting a near peer adversary's ground force using mostly Cold War surplus stock plus a few fancy newer toys (Javelin, NASAMS, GMLRS). Lucky for them, these observations come just in time for them to tweak their Taiwan OPLANs.

Fortunately for Taiwan there is only so much the Chinese can do to counter many of those weapons. Unfortunately for Taiwan they may have only so much time to incorporate and implement many of those capabilities and the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.