Good points. Admittedly they had some advantages with regards to "existing designs" or airframe types on which to build new capabilities, but I take your point. Not all new programs have similar starting points.
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Applications Open for the CNO's Rapid Innovation Cell
- Thread starter ben4prez
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I don't know about that unless you are talking about CG(X). Have you seen the recent model prototype of the BMD ship? Take a San Antonio Class, replace well decks with more VLS cells than a CG, slap on the Spy-1D arrays on the masts and add mount space and a plant suitable for the rail gun. The thing looks beastly and very cold war esque (If a contract is ever awarded).
http://blogs.defensenews.com/intercepts/2013/04/hii-shows-off-new-bmd-ship-concept-at-sea-air-space/
DDG-1000 is limited to a run of 3 hulls while Arleigh Burke construction is allowed to continue. I guess we can call the new destroyers "Super Burke" or something of the like. They will be using a lot of the technology funded in the DDG-1000 project.
http://news.usni.org/2013/06/07/navsea-on-flight-iii-arleigh-burkes#more-3501
http://news.usni.org/2013/05/22/forbes-critical-of-new-navy-ship-design
Main issue I have with it is really only addresses AAW/BMD. Still going to be relatively subpar at SUW and ASW unless they're going to throw some money at that problem too.
Valid point, but LOOK at all of that available/unused main deck space, and I assume several "metric boatloads" (industry term…) of below main deck volume/space/cube…however you ship-design folks currently define internal "room for growth". Sheesh...
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
It helps when your entire platform goes on the chopping block. I bet if fighters were being given the axe, the Navy would figure out realll quick how to build a cheap, viable platform, too.
The more messed up part was while CNO, Zumwalt advocated for smaller cheaper vessels ( which eventually became the OHP FFG) vice the expensive, do-everything ship.
So what do we name after the man who did not want the high-end, super-expensive ship????
At the time, the Navy was still operating four (six if you count Dolphin and NR1) of submarines in pretty good numbers. I don't think the future if the sub force was ever in question. All we did was transfer the risk of RT and E into the Seawolf class which was produced at an abysmal unit cost due to it being cut off at three units. This brought the sub force kicking and screaming into the 80's as far as technology. Seawolf just wasn't sustainable. It was a political no-go due to all the things that make acquisition projects go bad, chief among them the fact that the contract was awarded solely to EB.
I have never been on a VA class boat, so I really can't comment on it too much. Seawolf, though, was a huge leap from what we were working with on the LA class boats.
You want to talk about great acquisition projects? SSGN was the slickest project of this century.
This innovation cell is not going to be the Jesus of acquisitions, but with luck, it will help get some minor gear useful to the end user in the fleet.
A group of dudes sitting around isn't going to fix the abortion that is military acquisitions as a whole. To do that, you need buy-in up to the SecNav level, and he isn't going to trust that to a bunch of JOs.
The solution to the late-term abortions that are (for example) JSF, LCS, and the new LHA is flag officers willing to fall on their swords. Unless both the personnel and acquisition policy are changed, that isn't going to happen.
The wrong people are in charge of the acquisitions process, and those people also get a gateway to lucrative private-sector paydays. It's a self-perpetuating disaster.
A group of dudes sitting around isn't going to fix the abortion that is military acquisitions as a whole. To do that, you need buy-in up to the SecNav level, and he isn't going to trust that to a bunch of JOs.
The solution to the late-term abortions that are (for example) JSF, LCS, and the new LHA is flag officers willing to fall on their swords. Unless both the personnel and acquisition policy are changed, that isn't going to happen.
The wrong people are in charge of the acquisitions process, and those people also get a gateway to lucrative private-sector paydays. It's a self-perpetuating disaster.
http://hamptonroads.com/2014/12/navy-spy-fish-could-be-operational-next-year
They made a robo-fish. Neat.
They made a robo-fish. Neat.
No laser beams? Not interested.
It's actually a robotic version of an ill-tempered sea bass.