A little history on our current acquisition process

[bert]

Since most of our threads on new aircraft seem to include variations on the question "why do we do that?", and since I came across a well put together slide show on the recent history of our acquisition process, I thought I would put together a convenient set of links for those that want to learn more.

Most of you would only be interested in the first link (if even that), but if you want to talk intelligently about our acquisition process or what needs to be done to reform it then you have to understand what it is we are doing now. Good luck and enjoy for those of you who take a swing at it.

Slide show on the history of the DoD 5000.1
(It has been around for a little while, but I got it from here). EDIT: caution, annoying music on the slides

DoD 5000.01
(The current instruction, gives a big-picture overview of policies that apply to all acquisition programs).
Edit: the page defaults you to the foreword of the DAG, just click on 5000.01.

DoD 5000.02
(Much more detail, nerdy and regulatory by nature - lots of "shalls").

Defense Acquisition Guidebook

More into the weeds - from the forward:

The fundamental principles and procedures that the Department follows in achieving those objectives are described in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is designed to complement those policy documents by providing the acquisition workforce with discretionary best practice that should be tailored to the needs of each program.

Of course, this won't allow you to figure out what percent gets UAV's, but when somebody asks you why it is so hard to get sharks with friggin laser beams on their heads you will have an answer.

 

[RedFive]

So why is it that we're constantly changing the requirements/flaming hoops?

 

[bert]

So why is it that we're constantly changing the requirements/flaming hoops?

Short answer "because we can".

Long answer..... Different programs can suffer from this for multiple different reasons. Some have very powerfull users who can drive requirements without much recourse on the program side (for instance, White House staff driving VH-71 requirements). Others can suffer from disagreements between the buyers and the people actually paying (think JSF second source engine - DoD tried to cut it to save funds, Congress wants to keep it). Mission creep is a big culprit, whether legit or otherwise (think the briefly-named F/A-22). Sometimes, the requirements as bid are either mis-understood or flat out wrong. Then again, sometimes a technologically diffilcult target just can't be met under the budget as is, despite genuine best efforts from the contractor and service. Sometimes a new technology is developed after the contract is awarded that the service wants to take advantage of. The list goes on....

You have to understand, though, that requirements creep isn't a factor of people deliberately gold-plating a program in order to see it fail. Many (most?) are a result of smart people seeing a need from the front lines that they genuinely think it is worth spending the extra money to meet. That, of course, just comes back to the short answer I gave.

 

[eyes2theskies]

Interesting how "resources" suddenly became a noteworthy factor in the pre-acquisition process just last year. Did we think they were unlimited before?