Appropos I think to the conversation - supports @picklesuit argument https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/...ican-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html
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USS Fitzgerald collision in C7F
- Thread starter Ken_gone_flying
- Start date
Under what conditions? I would argue that the primary reasons we haven't engaged in total war since WWII is nuclear weapons and 3rd party proxy conflict.
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I tend to think the global economy is more of a barrier to a large scale war. The old saying goes, if I owe you $100 I've got a problem, if I owe you $100 million, you've got a problem.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
I wouldn't call this a "sweet deal." It's a bad precedent to bring someone up on criminal charges for something like this. This is similar to being in a deadly car accident...even if you are at fault, unless you are doing something egregious like drinking and driving or driving like a maniac, you aren't going to be charged with involuntary manslaughter. She now has a criminal record that is going to follow her for the rest of her life. There is a difference between sucking at a dangerous job and being criminally negligent, and I think that she (and the rest of the watchteam) falls in the category of the former.
"She" didn't kill seven sailors, the entire watchteam as a collective managed to do that due to several breakdowns in basic processes that went unchecked by anyone, both ship's company and external inspections. She is part of that team and is responsible for their performance (or lack of it) as the OOD, but they all played a role in the event. As far as I can tell, nothing in the report says that the OOD received and summarily ignored several recommendations to avoid collision and report the contact to the CO.
Also, she lost more than 3 months pay; she lost her career as a naval officer. She's going to be administratively separated as an O-2 and will have to report her criminal charges on every job application for the rest of her life.
I can't speak for how the surface navy does workups/proficiencies/qualifications, but I can speak to the fact that the CNO is a submariner and we do have a workup process and that is centered on tactical proficiency (born out of the Hartford collision in '09 which had a similar impact to the submarine force without the criminal charges and media hype). If the CNO pushes this process on them - assuming it doesn't already exist - then I think it will have the outcome you want vice risk-adverse officers and extra layers of administrivia.
They apparently had no lookouts. As OOD, it is mind boggling to me how if you didn’t have lookouts, how you don’t either personally go check each bridgewing visually periodically or assign someone else to do the same. Not making a judgment on verdict, and I don’t know where the line between just sucking and criminal negligence is, but that is pretty damn bad. This isn’t a sub coming up to PD in a busy environment with nothing but sonar to figure shit out. This is IMO on par with sentry on watch falling asleep and getting people killed.
I don’t know what sub work ups or tactical proficiency has to do with not getting into collisions. I could see the value in having some kind of work up process coming out of extended yard periods to get bridge crews refamiliarized with each other after not having been underway for a long time...but there are going to be a lot of higher order effects from that, particularly taking more time away from crews...which could just make a bad problem worse.
As far as I understand, the purpose of criminal punishment is to prevent future crimes. It can use different methods but is primarily about deterrence. I fail to see how punishment in this case will deter future Officers from making the same mistakes.
This is retaliation not deterrence.
This is retaliation not deterrence.
exNavyOffRec
Well-Known Member
If she did everything she was supposed to but just didn't do it good enough then sure accidents do happen, but if she failed to make sure people were doing there jobs then she should be held accountable for being negligent.
If you have a load of supplies in your truck and it is properly secured but a strap breaks and debris hits and kills someone you will most likely not be looking at jail time, but if you have that same load of supplies in your truck and don't secure it and someone is killed you will be looking at jail time. That is how I believe the OOD should have been judged.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
Somewhat simplistic...how often were lookouts manned? Was it ship's practice to secure the lookouts? Even though she is an officer, she is a first-tour sailor and the only thing she knows is the institutional culture of her first ship.
The work ups ensure the ship and crew are proficient at key mission areas and core competencies using a fleet standardized grading criteria. One of them is RoR, where we have to be evaluated in trainers on our ability to conduct surface transits in foreign port visits, and evaluated at-sea based on live situations.
How many written exams do you have to take per year to maintain proficiency as OOD? I need to take several exams comprised of questions from an approved force exam bank. These include topics from basic navigation to torpedo presets to engineering casualties.
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Not a first tour sailor. She was a LTJG on her second ship. Her second FDNF-J ship.
Given DDG manning, more than likely standard practice for them to secure lookouts under normal steaming.
DDG reductions in manning is what made sustaining bridgewing lookouts infeasible.
But none of that is relevant. This was 20-30 minutes of nobody bothering to walk all of about 15 ft and look out a window.
Everybody does workups...they're not unique to the sub community.
The problem here was that FDNF-J surface ships were waiving away certification requirements because they don't do O-FRP and phased workups like everybody else does because they're "forward deployed"...but even that misses the point that you shouldn't need a cert to remind you that you need to maintain situational awareness.
4 RoR exams annually when I was a DivO. I'm not a SWO anymore but from the ships I have worked with, the requirements have only gone up from there with more sim time as well.
But if you need written exams or simulators to teach people to look out a window when they're driving...we are fucked.
And again, more time spent on certifications means more time not spent doing something else (when higher says everything is a priority).
Hasn’t happened yet. It’s just a recommendation to SD. Your headlines are shittier than those from the hacks at Task & Purpose.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
The ship's (and fleet's) normal practices are entirely relevant when you are considering whether someone was criminally negligent in an event like this. Additionally, the report cites substantially more breakdowns in the watchteam and training than simply "nobody bothering to look out the window." Every mishap is has several compounded human errors in it and this one is no different in that regard; the difference is that in the past the people involved weren't taken to GCM over them. I am not trying to say that the OOD or anyone else in that watchteam is free of fault for the collision, but I do think that making it a criminal matter vice administrative is a bad precedent. The Montpelier and San Jacinto collision was as close as you can get to being at fault of a single individual (CO took the conn on the sub without battlestations manned and bypassed several safety processes. Since he was considered a rock star the crew trusted that he knew what he was doing), and that was still handled administratively.
I didn't think workups were unique to the community, I just don't know what the workup cycle looks like on the surface side. Waiving away certifications can be dangerous and I think at the heart of why these things happen. You need training to build muscle memory and good habits, and to reinforce what happens if you don't do those things - even something simple like looking out the window. Ultimately the people in charge of safety of ship - the JOs standing watch - are inexperienced and the only way to build muscle memory along with recognition and intuition of a bad situation developing is to do trainers where they can create more difficult scenarios than anything you'll likely encounter in reality.
The right mix of certifications in the deployment cycle is well above my paygrade, but this statement is another in a long line of evidence that the watchteams shouldn't be brought up on criminal charges.
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Whoops. Reading is fundamental . . .Hasn’t happened yet. It’s just a recommendation to SD. Your headlines are shittier than those from the hacks at Task & Purpose.
FIFY