Report on UPS mishap at Birmingham

[Recovering LSO]

Interesting, and sad - from Fox, and NYT article.

Any box carriers have anything to chime in WRT perceived inability to land without full automation, to "austere" runways. Kinda sounds like it isn't / wasn't the cause - but rather just another slice of cheese.

 

[e6bflyer]

I have read the CVR transcript and a few other snippets but am by no means an expert. That being said, it sounds a lot like they were flying tired into a runway with significant terrain clearance issues, were held up high, and then due to a lack of SA failed to manage the automation properly which got them low, failed to recognize how low they were on glidepath considering the terrain below them when they were hand flying, and balled it up. It is sad for the families and everyone involved and it is almost painful to read the transcript.

They do have a very interesting conversation a few pages in about how the FAR 117 rules don't apply to cargo pilots.

This is definitely a case of the Swiss cheese holes lining up. Sad, but hopefully someone can learn something from this and hopefully it will help advance the case for one level of safety for pax and cargo haulers.

 

[wink]

BHard to believe fatigue wasn't a major factor. But FAR Part 117, the new pax airline rest regs, are not a good answer. Frankly, there is little about Part 117 that has made my life any better. All they have done is move around the deck chairs. In the end we are flying more days for the same hours or less. In the end what matters is the quality of sleep and time of the day/night you get it. That is the real problem for cargo guys. We have a couple here that may comment and they will know best. Doing the all night stuff, paxs or boxes just sucks and there is no good way to really ensure you are going to be rested. Humans are not made to work all night. Back in the day on the very first 3 CV NORPAC exercise my ship had the all night shift and the other two the day shift. The battle group flew full on 24 hour ops for better than two weeks. We flew every night all night. They embarked all sorts of Docs and academics to study us. They turned the entire ship's sked around. breakfast was at something like 1800. Ship went X-ray during the daylight hours, the white lights off and the red lights were on below decks. Everyone, including ship's company was on the upside down sked. No paint chipping or announcements during daylight hours. In the end it made little difference. When you came back to the stack after 4+ hours flying and the sun was coming up you just felt tired. Didn't matter that dinner was being served in the galley at 0800 or the "nightly" movie rolled at 1000. That is what the cargo guys deal with. No regulation will ever make it as safe as flying 2.0 hours at 1300.

 

[BusyBee604]

Back in the day on the very first 3 CV NORPAC exercise my ship had the all night shift and the other two the day shift. The battle group flew full on 24 hour ops for better than two weeks. We flew every night all night. They embarked all sorts of Docs and academics to study us. They turned the entire ship's sked around. breakfast was at something like 1800. Ship went X-ray during the daylight hours, the white lights off and the red lights were on below decks. Everyone, including ship's company was on the upside down sked.

Sounds a lot like Yankee Station ops in the '60s. We normally had 24 hour target strike coverage with 2, occasionally 3 CVAs on station. They did not have a full day or night CVA per se, but split coverage to noon to midnight for one CVA, and midnight to noon on the other. When the 3rd carrier was available, it flew day only. It was quite tiring and confusing, for about the time you became used to your new shift, it reversed, and the transition (every 5-7 days), was crazy. Regular meals no longer existed, they fed round the clock, serving near anything you want re: breakfast/lunch/dinner at any time.

One unusual feature of this schedule was that one launch shift was a day (pinkie) cat shot w/ night trap, and the opposite for the other shift. Running this schedule for 30-40+ days with maybe 3 total stand down (no fly) days... required lots of extra rest during port calls and R&R opportunities. The result was like a continuous sensation of "jet lag"!
BzB

 

[hscs]

Shocked that the schedule would shift on the CVAs - once on the night schedule - you have to stay on it for some time to make it work.

I personally have to make sure that I am indoors before the sun starts peeking up or I am not getting sleep - no matter how tired I am. Not always executable, unfortunately.

 

[wink]

Yea, on the 81 NORPAC we stayed on the same sked for over two months. Always the night shift, usually 2 weeks ops then one or two no fly days, then back to work. Problem was the no fly days. The hotel services sked didn't change but it was hard to not want to take advantage of the daylight. Especially the mx crews. Well except for the fact it was 15-30 degress 20 knot ambient wind overcast and less than 3 miles viz most of the time.

 

[CommodoreMid]

I found a nice dose of Advil PM whenever I need to go to bed to sustain some kind of 24 hour flap-ex flight schedule works wonders.

 

[wink]

Works for me too, but not if going to work. FAA requires more hours after use before flight then we typically have on a layover. Same for melatonin, one of my favs for international travel off duty.

 

[A7Dave]

BHard to believe fatigue wasn't a major factor. ..... No regulation will ever make it as safe as flying 2.0 hours at 1300.

Bingo. It is just a fact of life in this job. We used to primarily fly at night. That sucked, but by day 3 you were pretty much acclimated. Not as in "rested and fully awake", but acclimated. The line between "adequate rest" and fatigue can be a fine one. Over the past ten to 15 years our schedules constantly transition between circadian cycles. You're flying when you were sleeping the day before. All you can do is sleep as much as possible and take power naps when you can. Internationally, you hopefully get an RFO. Domestically, lots of the old pure night or day flying now run through sleep-work cycles all week. You can get 8 hours sleep every time you hit the hotel and you're still essentially landing with a mental deficit equivalent of a beer or two because you're at your circadian low.

That's why we have to protect ourselves and keep good cockpit discipline. The companies don't give a damn about fatiguing schedules until a crash. Don't accept approaches to non-precision runways unless absolutely necessary and if it is, treat it like an emergency procedure. If you can afford to take a turn or two at the marker while they get the ground crew off the good runway, do it rather than accept a non-precision to the short runway with a high CFIT risk. A lot of controllers just want you to take a visual and get you off their hands. They're tired as well and just want to get back to that hot cup of coffee. That is part of the problem. Everyone is tired and it is easy to take the path of least resistance - in this case, (ATC) "You are cleared the visual, runway 18...." to the non-precision, short runway with high terrain in the approach area, instead of (Crew) "I'd like vectors to runway 6 ILS final. How long until runway 6 is open?"

FedEx's crash at Tallahassee was very similar. The mishap final report blamed all kinds of factors, but the primary cause was the Captain and F/O were fatigued which lead to decisions to take a visual to the non precision runway. No one questioned taking it over the precision runway. Fatigue makes you take what seems to be the easy way out. It is an insidious threat.

 

[ea6bflyr]

That's why we have to protect ourselves and keep good cockpit discipline. The companies don't give a damn about fatiguing schedules until a crash. Don't accept approaches to non-precision runways unless absolutely necessary and if it is, treat it like an emergency procedure. If you can afford to take a turn or two at the marker while they get the ground crew off the good runway, do it rather than accept a non-precision to the short runway with a high CFIT risk. A lot of controllers just want you to take a visual and get you off their hands. They're tired as well and just want to get back to that hot cup of coffee. That is part of the problem. Everyone is tired and it is easy to take the path of least resistance - in this case, (ATC) "You are cleared the visual, runway 18...." to the non-precision, short runway with high terrain in the approach area, instead of (Crew) "I'd like vectors to runway 6 ILS final. How long until runway 6 is open?"

I must be missing something. I see that KBHM has an RNAV and a LOC approach to RWY 18. Why did the flight crew not elect an alternative published approach?

 

[wink]

I must be missing something. I see that KBHM has an RNAV and a LOC approach to RWY 18. Why did the flight crew not elect an alternative published approach?

A7Dave was making reference to non precision approaches (which in reality include visual approaches), those without a instrument glide slope info in the cockpit. LOC approach is a non precision approach. True, there is a procedure for vertical guidance, but it requires more work load possibly including multiple descents and level offs at different vertical speeds. Some newer planes like the Airbusi can calculate and display a vertical path for you in a LOC approach, but it is still technology dependent and has to be built up (work load) properly by the crew in a box. More opportunity for error. A RNAV approach is usually a non precision approach. No vertical guidance coming from the ground self monitored for accuracy. Again, in some planes you can get a small needle displaying a calculated vertical path, but the display isn't usually part of your normal scan like an ILS needle or flight director. To your point, if they weren't using a published non precision approach as a reference during the visual, maybe it would have helped because of the terrain awareness built into those procedures. Even CAVU, I ALWAYS crank in whatever electronic approach guidance I have for that runway or airport. Also helps prevent landing at the wrong airport, which has been in the news.