I think they actually teach that tactic at the USAF Air University. It's colloquially known as "Let Mikey Do It!"
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The interesting world of VQ
- Thread starter Deepsea 31
- Start date
phrogpilot73
Well-Known Member
Honestly, the only things that we have that they couldn't replicate in some manner is the AAV and the LAV. I would argue our amphibious/expeditionary capabilities are 90% doctrine and training and 10% equipment.
Look at a traditional amphibious assault. How would we do it? AAVs, LCUs, and LCACs. The Navy owns the LCUs and LCACs - and the Army has their own LCUs. The heliborne assault force would come on MV-22's/CH-53Es with a mix of attached/detached escort using AH/UH and AV-8. The Army could do the same with CH/MH-47, UH-60, AH-64, etc... The only gap would be the capabilities an AV-8B brings to the table. And really, some (not all) of that could be mitigated by the unique capabilities that the AH-64 has that the AH-1 doesn't.
The biggest pain in the ass would be the air component, because of the lack of folding blades. That's what tips it to 10% equipment vs. 5%
We used to has this debate out in the squadron long ago and I still debate it with a few folks at work now, a mix of VQ'ers and RJ types. It was also debated in the early to mid 90's in DoD at the same time they were looking at EA and came to the decision to keep both for a couple good reasons.
There are a couple of glaring differences between the RJ and EP-3 from capability to crews. The RJ is simply the more capable platform overallbecause the USAF and DoD pours an enormous amount of money into them. Not only is the mission equipment constantly upgraded but the airframe is as well, it has new engines and a glass cockpit too. The crew on the RJ is well-trained and capable but is run completely differently, the crew came three different squadrons and didn't have an MC and suffered as a result. In the past they were not as tactically focused or as savvy when it came to directly supporting current air ops, this was mainly as a result of their 'strategic' focus from the Cold War that never really went away.
All that aside the main reason DoD kept both platforms was simply numbers. There was and still is a pressing need for ISR all over the world and since both fleets were still viable and relatively healthy, with 'new' EP-3s coming out of the mod shop at the time it was an easy decision to keep both. With the 'parent' airframe being retired now and the airframes not getting any younger it is becoming less economical to keep such a small and unique fleet.
The problem with the RJ becoming the sole primary ES platform though is how the USAF deploys and how willing they will be to support the Navy. They have a pretty set number of aircraft they will deploy, a much lower percentage of their fleet than the Navy deploys, and it won't increase unless we buy new airframes which is unlikely. They are also very rigid when it comes to deployment sites and even flight schedules. To put it bluntly, while the Navy made it work with Prowlers when we were handed the USAF EA mission the USAF won't change much if anything when it comes filling the gap for Navy ISR support when the EP-3 is gone. The national missions will get done but the fleet support ones, not going to happen.
On a side note I will be interested to see how the RAF does with their new RJs, their Nimrod R1 crews were always really sharp and very operationally focused.
magnetfreezer
Well-Known Member
Couple exceptions: B-1s: http://www.dyess.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123272299, B-52s: http://www.barksdale.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123118162
as well as Mining Ops.
Good stuff. The only thing I'll point out (mostly for those who don't know the mechanics of such things), how and where the assets (I.E. RJ assets) are assigned and used is largely up to how they're divied up among the COCOMS, and the individual services have very little say in how "their" national assets are employed. So, this idea I've seen floated about how the USAF does or does not support the Navy is up to the COCOMs who have the RJs CHOP'd to them.
I'll buy the numbers issue in terms of total platforms we have available, but we're going to have to learn to do less with less - that's the breaks, folks.
MasterBates
Well-Known Member
I thought we did more with less, until we broke all of the less, and then did everything with nothing?
Yes and no, the COCOMs do determine that but the services can and do influence it in various ways. And by not training to support the fleet the RJs can get themselves out of supporting the fleet. And the services still largely determine how much can be deployed in the first place as force providers and the USAF has long been a laggard compared to the Navy in that respect.
Sorry guys for the gap in responses...that j.o.b.
Brett: The Marine comparison might indeed have been a bridge too far (see what I did there) however, the point remains. There are few problems of specialization that can't be solved with a healthy dose of training/doctrine or a strap on capability to an existing platform...at some point however, you just have to say "You know, they truly are doing something a bit different" and support that specialization with equipment/money etc...
As to the utilization argument that Flash brought up: It's important to remember that ISR assets tend to be dual hatted....that is that an RJ or EP-3 sitting at an undisclosed location in SWA and CHOP'ed to CENTCOM for tasking at the CAOC can be taken away at the drop of a hat by national strategic tasking in many different guises. We are never truly "organic" in that sense. Yes, the COCOM's decide whether they will allow us to be CHOP'ed to the CSG or we will fly our scheduled OIF mission but there is a level of decision making well above them that can remove that asset from play as well.
The Air Force seems to make it there stock in trade to underutilize there fantastic assets in a very inflexible manner. Good on them, I guess for putting QOL and budget line ahead of being true team players...but if you think that the ISR support quantity and quality deployed CSG's get from EP-3's can be gotten from the RJ community than you just haven't worked with them. Capable? Absolutely. Willing? Not at all, and despite orders...that willingness is encapsulated in institutional momentum that will take DECADES to change.
True story...you'll note that the ingress route from "an undisclosed location in SWA" to Afghanistan passes close to a "target of interest" that sometimes puts warships to sea/conducts exercises we may be interested in etc...Well, during one of those exercise we came up with the great idea that we could maximize our ISR coverage of their activities by asking the RJ to pass us any information/tippers/a quick "who's who in the zoo" if you will about what was going on...you know....since they were flying right over it about three hours before we did. Turns out, the RJ wasn't even monitoring their sensors for the transit. That's right, they would take off, transit for 3 hours into Afghanistan the entire time within smelling range of Iran and right over a major Naval exercise...and their sensors weren't even active. We suggested, and had our Chain of Command suggest that there might be a better way and were told flatly, "That's not in our tasking order. We can't do that."
Brett: The Marine comparison might indeed have been a bridge too far (see what I did there) however, the point remains. There are few problems of specialization that can't be solved with a healthy dose of training/doctrine or a strap on capability to an existing platform...at some point however, you just have to say "You know, they truly are doing something a bit different" and support that specialization with equipment/money etc...
As to the utilization argument that Flash brought up: It's important to remember that ISR assets tend to be dual hatted....that is that an RJ or EP-3 sitting at an undisclosed location in SWA and CHOP'ed to CENTCOM for tasking at the CAOC can be taken away at the drop of a hat by national strategic tasking in many different guises. We are never truly "organic" in that sense. Yes, the COCOM's decide whether they will allow us to be CHOP'ed to the CSG or we will fly our scheduled OIF mission but there is a level of decision making well above them that can remove that asset from play as well.
The Air Force seems to make it there stock in trade to underutilize there fantastic assets in a very inflexible manner. Good on them, I guess for putting QOL and budget line ahead of being true team players...but if you think that the ISR support quantity and quality deployed CSG's get from EP-3's can be gotten from the RJ community than you just haven't worked with them. Capable? Absolutely. Willing? Not at all, and despite orders...that willingness is encapsulated in institutional momentum that will take DECADES to change.
True story...you'll note that the ingress route from "an undisclosed location in SWA" to Afghanistan passes close to a "target of interest" that sometimes puts warships to sea/conducts exercises we may be interested in etc...Well, during one of those exercise we came up with the great idea that we could maximize our ISR coverage of their activities by asking the RJ to pass us any information/tippers/a quick "who's who in the zoo" if you will about what was going on...you know....since they were flying right over it about three hours before we did. Turns out, the RJ wasn't even monitoring their sensors for the transit. That's right, they would take off, transit for 3 hours into Afghanistan the entire time within smelling range of Iran and right over a major Naval exercise...and their sensors weren't even active. We suggested, and had our Chain of Command suggest that there might be a better way and were told flatly, "That's not in our tasking order. We can't do that."
That's the Marine Corps. It's been doing more with less for so long, it's now expected to do everything with nothing...forever.
Okay...very shit hot. Thanks for the info.Couple exceptions: B-1s: http://www.dyess.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123272299, B-52s: http://www.barksdale.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123118162
as well as Mining Ops.
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That guy totally knows what he is talking about.. Read this gem... He's totally on to us.
http://theaviationist.com/?s=E-6b&submit=Search
Credible source...got it.