What Rules to Follow?

[docpup]

A new thread posting virgin (please be gently and call me again), I have been reading multiple posts and have noticed some comments regarding "safety Nazi's" and ASO's that sparks questions.

In each platform and community there is a group mindset regarding which OPNAV / NATOPS / Safety rules to follow and ones that "are for Check rides" only. This did not include flight discipline and the sort, more along the lines of gear and personal comfort in the aircraft. These varied from boots that were unauthorized but still worn, to dog tags required but not worn, and procedures that were not completed or done (gunners belts, O2 masks, gloves worn, flight suit wear), etc. For instance, it is common in the helo community to take off a land while wearing a gunners belt even though it is designated by NATOPS for mission essential uses.

Here are the questions:

1. At what point and on what level does group mindset trump OPNAV/NATOPS /Safety guidance?

2. Is making your community or yourself look "Cool" or keeping the "NORM" more important than the rules that govern general aviation?

3. As leaders or future leaders, at what point is willful disregard of guidance acceptable for ourselves and those we lead?

4. Have you ever seen negative implications placed on "newbies" by not complying to overall community views and what individuals do even those said "newbie" was in compliance with the official guidance?

5. What is the general opinion of personal liberties vs. guidance as it applies to your community or yourself?

Prior to posting, please understand that I am just as guilty as anyone and I am not throwing stones. The question has been asked to me many times by students or junior crewman (why don't you have your visor down...why do you have your sleeves rolled up...why do you have a chew in...) and the only answer I had was the party line. Something along the lines of "I've been flying so long that.......but NATOPS / OPNAV / Safety says blah blah blah".

Thanks for the input..

 

[milky-f18]

So, this is a thread that seems ripe for some flaming, but as an ASO, I'll give my $.02

1. At what point and on what level does group mindset trump OPNAV/NATOPS /Safety guidance?

There is something known as command climate that is what you are referring to. Some of that can be community-wide. For example, in the Navy, we do not adhere to crew rest/ crew day at all like the Air Force. There are goods and others associated with that, but in the end, fatigue is usually a factor in mishaps. It's hard to say when that mindset takes over, but it is pretty obvious what things we consider important, and what we don't.

2. Is making your community or yourself look "Cool" or keeping the "NORM" more important than the rules that govern general aviation?

I think that it definitely differs by platform. Hornet guys (like me) are known to be very anal about everything and Tomcat guys are known to be the opposite. In reality, we meet somewhere in the middle, but you can definitely tell the difference in mindset from platform to platform. I know a lot of guys that don't fly anymore because they tried to look "cool," and I know most guys aren't really worried about impressing anybody.

3. As leaders or future leaders, at what point is willful disregard of guidance acceptable for ourselves and those we lead?

You have to decide that for yourself. Most pilots I know are more worried about not highlighting themselves than setting the example, but in the end, I guess you are setting an example whenever you do the right thing. Do you know of people that are just outright showing off regularly?

4. Have you ever seen negative implications placed on "newbies" by not complying to overall community views and what individuals do even those said "newbie" was in compliance with the official guidance?

I've never heard of anybody getting in trouble for doing the right thing except for crew rest/day. In the Hornet community, that seems to be about the only rule that people are encouraged to disregard at the detriment of your career if you do not.

 

[Gatordev]

There is something known as command climate that is what you are referring to. Some of that can be community-wide. For example, in the Navy, we do not adhere to crew rest/ crew day at all like the Air Force. There are goods and others associated with that, but in the end, fatigue is usually a factor in mishaps. It's hard to say when that mindset takes over, but it is pretty obvious what things we consider important, and what we don't.

I'm curious to hear how you're violating crew day/rest. I'm not saying you don't, just curious about what you're saying (and obviously not asking for names and such). 18 hours is a long-ass day and I have a hard time imagining aviators letting that get exceeded for very long.

 

[phrogdriver]

For instance, it is common in the helo community to take off a land while wearing a gunners belt even though it is designated by NATOPS for mission essential uses. ..

Actually, my community is so safety conscious, somedays I yearn for a crewchief to ask for a lit smoking lamp in the back.

But, I did wonder about this line--wear the gunner's belt during t/o and landing as opposed to what? I'm guessing they're supposed to be strapped to a seat--90% of a crewchief's job is to lean out, look for obstacles, and call the landing. That's about as mission essential as it gets, not that I knew that rule even existed to begin with. I suppose he could lean out the hatch without a gunner's belt, but that seems even more precarious.

 

[docpup]

phrogdriver: In the 60S we have stroking crew seats behind the crew windows that have a similar six point harness to the pilots. These harnesses have retractor wheels. In a perfect situation, we can get to the main cabin door and/or have enough distance on the reels to stand up and lean out the window for obstacle clearance. We are instructed to use the gunners belts for cases where our harness will not enable us to complete the assigned mission.

The same rules for the gunners belts were in the 46D model, to my recollection. Again, it wasn't something we headed, but the rule was still there.

 

[Harrier Dude]

I'm curious to hear how you're violating crew day/rest. I'm not saying you don't, just curious about what you're saying (and obviously not asking for names and such). 18 hours is a long-ass day and I have a hard time imagining aviators letting that get exceeded for very long.

Who the hell has an 18 hour crew day? I've worked many 18 hour days, but never when I was flying.

The standard is 12 hours (10 for night) in my community. Have I "bent it" by a half hour or so before? Allegedly. But that was (I meant "supposedly would have been") my call against the command and not tolerated at all.

Our last mishap involved a crew day violation (in my opinion NOT causal) and the guy got hammered for it. The command did not know about it and would have stopped it.

As for the rest of these "minor violations" (i.e sleeves rolled up, non-standard boots, visors up, etc.), I attribute them to apathy and beaurocratic inertia. Some of these issues are out of date, ineffective, and stupid, but the process to change the rules is slow and often political. Challenging them (even when the facts support you) can get you labeled as a "safety violator" and bring you lots of harassment.

For example: we are required to do a hot brake check prior to entering the fuel pits, even during FCLPs (where we do not use the brakes for all practical purposes). Checking the Harriers brakes involves crawling under the jet and sticking your hand between the main tires. At night, this can be quite hazardous and risks injury to the PC. As the senior guy on scene, I directed that these checks NOT be performed one night. Since the entire community hasn't had a case of hot brakes in recorded memory, and NEVER during FCLPs, I thought that this was a wise use of ORM in order to minimize the risk of injury while optimizing operations.

I wound up being accused of "not caring about safety" and violating NATOPS. I am currently in the process of amending the fueling NATOPS to allow this, but that is a long and slow process.

Many people say the NATOPS is written in blood. While this is partially true, I can assure you that it is not handed down in stone tablets from God. It is written by people like us over time. Occasionally circumstances change, and old rules become unnecessary. You will find that adding a rule to any manual is far easier than getting it removed. Even when that rule is now adding risk instead of reducing it. "Conventional wisdom", and myth and urban legend often trump deliberate ORM when it comes to writing and maintaining regulations.

You could also add things like laser eye protection. I am required to wear laser eye protection when firing the laser on the litening pod. I was also required to wear it when controlling CAS on the hill. Did I do it? Frankly, no. Aside from TACP school, I have never been provided with these items. The visor will not work with NVGs in the cockpit. The glasses are hard to see through. I'd wager that none of us wears these things regularly and we are in direct violation of this order. Why? Because it's stupid, ineffectual, impractical, and inherently more risky than not wearing them. Getting that rule changed just isn't going to happen because nobody wants to be the guy to say that it's OK not to wear them. God forbid somebody eventually gets burned. They would be "the guy who allowed it to happen", even thought it is already happenning and will continue happen forever already.

This is the beginning of TRA and the end of common sense.

 

[robav8r]

Who the hell has an 18 hour crew day? I've worked many 18 hour days, but never when I was flying.

It can and does happen in the VP community. A normal preflight is 3 to 3.5 hours. But that can stretch to 5 or more with mission system malfunctions, troubleshooting, etc. A tactical mission can last anywhere from 5 to 11 hours depending on all kinds of stuff. And (this is my favorite part), if it's a mission that will yield a "qual" and readiness points, then we'll (the community) start considering every unnatural act possible to ensure the crew has the opportunity to get the "X" While common sense on the part of competent aviators usually prevails, it's not uncommon to have a crew push a little too hard for too long and find themselves in a bit of a crew rest quandry.

 

[Schnugg]

This answers some of the implied questions you posed regarding when the rules may not apply. From the Super Hornet NFM.

 

[webmaster]

Who the hell has an 18 hour crew day? I've worked many 18 hour days, but never when I was flying.

As Robav8r mentioned, in VP we have some really long days. In the past, I have broken the 18 hour day a couple times due to real world operations. On those days we had over 15 hours flying.

In regards to "what rules to follow"... in truth you need to be evaluating what the mission is, and expectations. Is it a routine bounce hop at home, a repo, combat related, in support of troops in contact, and weigh against the pressures associated, readiness, quals, getting the X, mission completion, etc... I would bend rules to save lives, SAR suport or at war (when "WARTOPS" replaces NATOPS). All else, no reason to bend them to get an X or check in the box. It gets hard to justify.

 

[phrogdriver]

Know what saying I hate in regards to pilot judgement? The saying that "It's a training hop, so it's not worth accepting any risk." That's a load of BS.

1. Just flying is a risk. If we really wanted to avoid all risk, we'd stay in the ready room, drink non-caffeinated soda, and just TALK about flying. Better yet, we could all stay home, play Microsoft Flight Sim over the internet and avoid the risk of driving to work.

2. Try downing aircraft over weak discrepancies (i.e. not MESM or SOP requirements) more than once. It's clear there is some acceptable risk.

3. The "no risk is acceptable in training" bit is really just a way to smack somebody over the head who really was just attempting to exercise good judgement and a reasonable amount of aggressiveness in accomplishing the mission.

Acceptable risk is a continuum, not a binary solution. If someone's life is at stake, I may push on despite a "land as soon as poss EP." If not, maybe it's time to put her down. What if it's no TACAN, or no RADALT, or no GPS, or maybe an odd sound or spark that's probably nothing, but would take a long time to troubleshoot. Those are the times that it's probably reasonable to push, but times which could get you burned should the TRA (Total Risk Avoidance) crowd turn the hindsight binoculars at you later.

 

[BourneID]

As Robav8r mentioned, in VP we have some really long days. In the past, I have broken the 18 hour day a couple times due to real world operations. On those days we had over 15 hours flying.

In regards to "what rules to follow"... in truth you need to be evaluating what the mission is, and expectations. Is it a routine bounce hop at home, a repo, combat related, in support of troops in contact, and weigh against the pressures associated, readiness, quals, getting the X, mission completion, etc... I would bend rules to save lives, SAR suport or at war (when "WARTOPS" replaces NATOPS). All else, no reason to bend them to get an X or check in the box. It gets hard to justify.

Damn those VP Preflights, Damn them. I will also atest to long days but the long days, and press on mentality, is only acceptable in certain situations.

 

[Harrier Dude]

Know what saying I hate in regards to pilot judgement? The saying that "It's a training hop, so it's not worth accepting any risk." That's a load of BS.

1. Just flying is a risk. If we really wanted to avoid all risk, we'd stay in the ready room, drink non-caffeinated soda, and just TALK about flying. Better yet, we could all stay home, play Microsoft Flight Sim over the internet and avoid the risk of driving to work.

2. Try downing aircraft over weak discrepancies (i.e. not MESM or SOP requirements) more than once. It's clear there is some acceptable risk.

3. The "no risk is acceptable in training" bit is really just a way to smack somebody over the head who really was just attempting to exercise good judgement and a reasonable amount of aggressiveness in accomplishing the mission.

Acceptable risk is a continuum, not a binary solution. If someone's life is at stake, I may push on despite a "land as soon as poss EP." If not, maybe it's time to put her down. What if it's no TACAN, or no RADALT, or no GPS, or maybe an odd sound or spark that's probably nothing, bet would take a long time to troubleshoot. Those are the times that it's probably reasonable to push, but times which could get you burned should the TRA (Total Risk Avoidance) crowd turn the hindsight binoculars at you later.

Exactly.

The key element here is recognizing that there will always be some level of risk. What most people misinterpret about ORM is that it reduces risk. While that may be true to some degree, it's really more about ensuring that whatever risk that you do take (and there will be some) is worth it in terms of operational necessity. It's a risk-centered cost benefit analysis.

The typical misguided ORM discussion (or application) centers on the severity of any given consequence. The probability of that consequence and the benefit of the original action (or the cost of not doing it) is rarely discussed. Instead of "TRA", it might better be called "Total Consequence Reduction".

To keep the "hot brake in the Harrier" example going, consider this:

At the Harrier RAG 3 plane captains in 6 months were nearly run over while checking hot brakes. This resulted in lots of group ass-chewings about paying attention to hand signals before we end up running somebody over. Did that help? No. There is a failure rate associated with every task or function. Checking hot brakes is no exception.

Instead, I asked "Why do we even do these things? When was the last time a Harrier justed showed up at the line with hot brakes?" Answer: never in recorded history. There were several cases (a handful) where Harriers had hot brakes, but they were always after predictable events (high speed aborts, conventional landings without PNB, and long heavy weight taxiing). QA (with decades worth of experience) could not even remember a Harrier just showing up with hot brakes.

Adding to the cause of the near run-overs was ordnance Marines dearming empty ITERs and pinning empty expendable buckets. When the ordies and the PC went under the jet (between 3 and 5 Marines), often an incomplete count came out from under it. The pilot started moving with somebody still underneath the jet.

So I asked, "When was the last time an ITER just flew off a pylon in the line (or any other time)? When was the last uncommanded expendable release on the deck (particularly from an EMPTY bucket)? Answer: NEVER.

So, I asked, "Why don't we just skip all of that and do it in the line when he jet is shut down?" After all, if nobody ever goes under a turning jet, they can't be run over by it.

Answer: "Because we never do it that way. That's not what our procedures say (that we wrote). It's not safe. If a flare went off, there could be a huge fire" Right.

To recap:

The Old Way: 3-5 Marines risked. Worst case, death. Probability, unlikely (say 1/1000).

The Proposed Way: 0 Marines risked (unless you count the cumulative risk of being hit by a rouge ITER or flare). Worst case, injury or fire. Probability, extremely unlikey(say, 1/1,000,000).

In other words, we would rather take a 1/1000 chance of killing a Marine than a 1/1,000,000 risk of injuring one.

What's the cost benefit result? With the old way it takes longer to take a greater risk.

Any guesses on how they do it now? (hint: being cynical doesn't mean that you aren't correct).

 

[bert]

Pup and I have quite a few flights in common in our logbooks in more than one command, so I will dispense with pretending I've never deliberately busted a rule. We were at -5 together back when it was the last of the wild west, so I will limit myself to saying that while he has seen me make decisions that my judgement was better than "official guidance", at least I never killed him the process so that will get me some slack. Keeping that in mind, I'll only answer #3:

"When we are right". Schnugg is a clever fellow and his quote is a standard blurb from any NATOPS. What it doesn't say is that if you attempt to use that paragraph and are wrong they will (rightly) kick you firmly in the nads and carry on smartly without you.


Glad to see you are still a recidivist, Pup. Fly safe.

 

[robav8r]

This whole "crew rest" issue is a great lesson for you junior folks out there. No matter who you are, what platform you fly in, or what community you associate yourself with, being a professional military aviator means knowing when to push when it is appropriate, and when to say "screw you" when your chain of command is pushing you for the wrong reasons. For those of you that have been there, you know what I'm talking about. For those that haven't, learn the rules, learn the mission, but never lose your common sense.

 

[phrogdriver]

The problem often lies in commands where everyone is pushing it, and when something happens, the command goes,"Whoa, he was waay out there...what a lone wolf!"