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Road to 350: What Does the US Navy Do Anyway?

You've lost me when you're going to cut snippets out of context.

In your entire post, you missed the point - is the CG a capability that we need? I think that answer is yes, or else we would have fully mothballed all of them years ago.

And if it is, then we need to replace them. Operational necessity is what drives the procurement. Flag officers having 'fully-informed' conversations are saying they need this capability. It's possible that dozens of people got it wrong, but I doubt it.

I get that Trump is calling their replacement a 'battleship,' but modern CGs are already the size of WWII era battleships.

Yes, it will require investing into shipbuilding and infrastucture to get there. There is quite a bit of risk in execution that's quite easy to poo poo on. But I think that criticism is more easily levied on someone who can't accept that the Emancipation Proclamation was signed at the antique desk in the WH, and not the Gettysburg Address. Which is why I postulate: let's strip back the emotion in assuming / thinking that Trump, Hegseth, and Phelan are incompent idiots, and have a more rational discussion in the CG(N)'s role in modern naval warfare. To the extent that's not possible *shrug*, you're part of the problem.

As for qualified nukes - we have already met FY26 recruitment goals for nukes. There are more people who want to be nukes than jobs available.

When our core gap is in numbers smaller surface combatants, why suddenly take a left turn into a needlessly large and expensive ship?

We can’t build frigates, and our current destroyer fleet has no room for growth? How about we address those problems before wasting money on a ridiculous boondoggle.

If we need more VLS cells, unmanned ships would be far better choices that a massive gold plated monstrosity.

This administration has no strategic vision other than its own self-dealing and glorification. I’d be shocked if a single simulation or war game was done to justify what could be an immense program.
 
You've lost me when you're going to cut snippets out of context. When they say people can't read above a 7th-8th grade level, they mean that people can't synthesize ideas more than 1-3 lines apart nor understand literary devices like inference, hyperbole, and metaphor.

You’ve lost me with the “out of context” thing. I quoted your whole comment and responded to each claim in the exact same commenting format you used. Every word you wrote was included.

In your entire post, you missed the point - is the CG a capability that we need? I think that answer is yes, or else we would have fully mothballed all of them years ago.

The point is whether this specific program makes any sense. These are not cruisers in any meaningful Ticonderoga-replacement sense, and they are clearly not being pushed as a replacement for the Ticos, all of which are being retired by the end of the decade. They are roughly twice as long, around four times the displacement, nuclear-powered, anywhere from 6x to 8x as expensive, and potentially 3x as manpower-intensive. That is not a CG replacement.


And if it is, then we need to replace them. Operational necessity is what drives the procurement. Flag officers having 'fully-informed' conversations are saying they need this capability. It's possible that dozens of people got it wrong, but I doubt it.

You brought up the LCS. If your argument is that dozens of informed people in the Navy and DoD probably cannot get something badly wrong, then what happened there? What happened with A-12? Zumwalt? Seawolf? The requirement can be real and the procurement answer can still be bad. Those are not mutually exclusive.

Yes, it will require investing into shipbuilding and infrastucture to get there. There is quite a bit of risk in execution that's quite easy to poo poo on. But I think that criticism is more easily levied on someone who can't accept that the Emancipation Proclamation was signed at the antique desk in the WH, and not the Gettysburg Address. Which is why I postulate: let's strip back the emotion in assuming / thinking that Trump, Hegseth, and Phelan are incompent idiots, and have a more rational discussion in the CG(N)'s role in modern naval warfare.

Phelan was fired so I can’t speak on how his competance was viewed by the administration. As I’ve already stated, BBG(X) isn’t a CG program and you’re misrepresenting the program by saying it is.

As for qualified nukes - we have already met FY26 recruitment goals for nukes. There are more people who want to be nukes than jobs available.

I’m not going to directly doubt your knowledge but I’m having a hard time believing this. It’s also retention just as much as it’s recruiting. Nuke Os are still getting 200,000+ to sign on for their DH tour.
 
I’m not going to directly doubt your knowledge but I’m having a hard time believing this. It’s also retention just as much as it’s recruiting. Nuke Os are still getting 200,000+ to sign on for their DH tour.
The USN always screams they need more nukes or they need to keep more nukes. Now if they really needed to keep more they wouldn't let nukes lateral to other designators, or the advancement rates for enlisted would be very high and they just aren't for all designators and paygrades.

The best one was when I was on sea duty and I was in my office hearing the RO talk to all the JO's about staying in and how the USN needed you to stay in so they needed to all go talk to the detailer when he came aboard in June I believe? Then when my DIVO went to talk to the detailer and asked about orders he was told this is what we have, he asked the detailer about different order since they needed JO's to stay in, what the detailer told him was that the USN already met the goal for JO's to stay for that FY and if he wanted to stay in or get out it didn't matter to him.

When on recruiting duty each year we always met our Nuke O goal with many months to spare.
 
You’ve lost me with the “out of context” thing. I quoted your whole comment and responded to each claim in the exact same commenting format you used. Every word you wrote was included.



The point is whether this specific program makes any sense. These are not cruisers in any meaningful Ticonderoga-replacement sense, and they are clearly not being pushed as a replacement for the Ticos, all of which are being retired by the end of the decade. They are roughly twice as long, around four times the displacement, nuclear-powered, anywhere from 6x to 8x as expensive, and potentially 3x as manpower-intensive. That is not a CG replacement.




You brought up the LCS. If your argument is that dozens of informed people in the Navy and DoD probably cannot get something badly wrong, then what happened there? What happened with A-12? Zumwalt? Seawolf? The requirement can be real and the procurement answer can still be bad. Those are not mutually exclusive.



Phelan was fired so I can’t speak on how his competance was viewed by the administration. As I’ve already stated, BBG(X) isn’t a CG program and you’re misrepresenting the program by saying it is.



I’m not going to directly doubt your knowledge but I’m having a hard time believing this. It’s also retention just as much as it’s recruiting. Nuke Os are still getting 200,000+ to sign on for their DH tour.

It's a waste of time arguing with him. His ideas are as outlandish as they seem, and he cannot be reasoned with. I'm impressed by your level of knowledge on this stuff and I think it makes a meaningful contribution to the thread.
 
When our core gap is in numbers smaller surface combatants, why suddenly take a left turn into a needlessly large and expensive ship?

We can’t build frigates, and our current destroyer fleet has no room for growth? How about we address those problems before wasting money on a ridiculous boondoggle.

If we need more VLS cells, unmanned ships would be far better choices that a massive gold plated monstrosity.

This administration has no strategic vision other than its own self-dealing and glorification. I’d be shocked if a single simulation or war game was done to justify what could be an immense program.
I don't think that the majority of senior SWOs would agree that the 'core gap is number of smaller surface combatants.' And they're the ones putting the demand signal into the CNO, SECNAV, and SECDEF on what to buy.

You're describing an engineering unicorn in your post if you think we can mass produce frigate-sized ships with equal to or more ordnance capability than a DDG while operating with less manpower and sustainment costs. The LCS class kind of proved that there's not much room for small ships in our force given that our doctrine requires operating thousands of miles from shore. Small ships are a pain in the ass to sustain (less space for fuel / food) and they actually lose a lot of cost efficiency for manning and weapons loadout. If your only design criteria was to maximize VLS tubes for minimum cost and manpower support, you'd want to build one ship the size of a super tanker.

The technology isn't there for fully unmanned ships, not to mention working through the policy and legal issues with using an autonomous robot to engage a target. When we've effectively replaced FTs / FCs with AI to execute a TLAM strike package on a manned ship, we can talk about transferring that capability to a fully unmanned system. But as of right now, we're still using a half dozen human beings (not counting the people operating the rest of the ship) to launch TLAMs.

The vision for unmanned ships in the near-mid term is to operate in conjunction with manned forces as a force multiplier. That takes up space - hence you might want to procure a ship the size of a CG or battleship to employ them.

The procurement of a battleship does not pose an existential threat to naval aviation nor submarines.
 
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The USN always screams they need more nukes or they need to keep more nukes. Now if they really needed to keep more they wouldn't let nukes lateral to other designators, or the advancement rates for enlisted would be very high and they just aren't for all designators and paygrades.

The best one was when I was on sea duty and I was in my office hearing the RO talk to all the JO's about staying in and how the USN needed you to stay in so they needed to all go talk to the detailer when he came aboard in June I believe? Then when my DIVO went to talk to the detailer and asked about orders he was told this is what we have, he asked the detailer about different order since they needed JO's to stay in, what the detailer told him was that the USN already met the goal for JO's to stay for that FY and if he wanted to stay in or get out it didn't matter to him.

When on recruiting duty each year we always met our Nuke O goal with many months to spare.
Retention and recruiting are two different issues and it's important not to muddy the water between them.

It is true that retaining JOs for DH tour has been a consistent issue since the early 2010s as retention fell from 30-35% to 20-22%. Aside from a recovered (and still booming) economy, the additional of female officers mathematically was going to make retention fall into the 20-25% realm as historical data shows that you need 8 female JOs vice 3 male JOs to make a DH. The military tends not to be a desirable career for women just like career fields like auto mechanics and plumbing. We did not increase JO inventory high enough to account for this (we need 25-28% to be 'healthy').

You run into a similar issue for zone B reenlistees for enlisted nukes. Zone A is over 100% thanks to STAR reenlistments.

However, this is the first year in over a decade that NR is denying students at USNA / NROTC who want to be nukes and the DEP pool is filling up.
 
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Retention and recruiting are two different issues and it's important not to muddy the water between them.

It is true that retaining JOs for DH tour has been a consistent issue since the early 2010s as retention fell from 30-35% to 20-22%. Aside from a recovered (and still booming) economy, the additional of female officers mathematically was going to make retention fall into the 20-25% realm as historical data shows that you need 8 female JOs vice 3 male JOs to make a DH. The military tends not to be a desirable career for women just like career fields like auto mechanics and plumbing. We did not increase JO inventory high enough to account for this (we need 25-28% to be 'healthy').

You run into a similar issue for zone B reenlistees for enlisted nukes. Zone A is over 100% thanks to STAR reenlistments.

However, this is the first year in over a decade that NR is denying students at USNA / NROTC who want to be nukes and the DEP pool is filling up.
People do always confuse retention and recruiting, if you lose a 6 year fully qualified LT you just can't immediately replace with a brand new Ensign.

I should have clarified that when I was talking about Nuke O goal I was specific about OCS as each accession source has it's own goals.
 
I don't think that the majority of senior SWOs would agree that the 'core gap is number of smaller surface combatants.' And they're the ones putting the demand signal into the CNO, SECNAV, and SECDEF on what to buy.

You're describing an engineering unicorn in your post if you think we can mass produce frigate-sized ships with equal to or more ordnance capability than a DDG while operating with less manpower and sustainment costs. The LCS class kind of proved that there's not much room for small ships in our force given that our doctrine requires operating thousands of miles from shore. Small ships are a pain in the ass to sustain (less space for fuel / food) and they actually lose a lot of cost efficiency for manning and weapons loadout. If your only design criteria was to maximize VLS tubes for minimum cost and manpower support, you'd want to build one ship the size of a super tanker.

The technology isn't there for fully unmanned ships, not to mention working through the policy and legal issues with using an autonomous robot to engage a target. When we've effectively replaced FTs / FCs with AI to execute a TLAM strike package on a manned ship, we can talk about transferring that capability to a fully unmanned system. But as of right now, we're still using a half dozen human beings (not counting the people operating the rest of the ship) to launch TLAMs.

The vision for unmanned ships in the near-mid term is to operate in conjunction with manned forces as a force multiplier. That takes up space - hence you might want to procure a ship the size of a CG or battleship to employ them.

The procurement of a battleship does not pose an existential threat to naval aviation nor submarines.

You think there was a demand signal for a battleship from naval leadership? Really?

Our biggest gap is in the number of hulls. The surface Navy simply can’t be everywhere it’s needed. Buying a class of ship that will be 5x the cost of a DDG and 10x the cost of an FFG only makes the problem worse.

Unmanned ships don’t need to engage targets. They only need to hold the missiles. VLS capacity was the ONLY positive of a BBG, and USV can do that part for a fraction of the cost.

This is a fucking boondoggle. Nobody wants it, but they also want to keep their jobs, and don’t dare tell Cheeto Jesus that the emperor has no clothes/is fat/senile/corrupt.
 
You think there was a demand signal for a battleship from naval leadership? Really?
I think that there's a demand signal to replace CGs, as they are materially unable to be put to sea in most cases.

Our biggest gap is in the number of hulls. The surface Navy simply can’t be everywhere it’s needed. Buying a class of ship that will be 5x the cost of a DDG and 10x the cost of an FFG only makes the problem worse.
We have 82 active CRUDES in the US Navy and we put around 20 of them to sea at any one time. The biggest issue is that we need to get that number closer to 35.

I also reiterate that you're doing a lot of hand waiving for the logistical issues that come with smaller combatants. How we're going to sustain ships inside the WEZ of a near-peer conflict is one of those 'oh shit, we didn't think about' problems that people are trying to solve right now.
 
I think that there's a demand signal to replace CGs.

I also reiterate that you're doing a lot of hand waiving for the logistical issues that come with smaller combatants. How we're going to sustain ships inside the WEZ of a near-peer conflict is one of those 'oh shit, we didn't think about' problems that people are trying to solve right now.
There is a demand signal for a larger surface combatant. The Burkes have limited range and limited magazines, so even though the carriers are nuclear powered, the escorts are not. And yes, I expect any future cruiser / strike cruiser / battlecruiser / battleship to have substantially larger magazines. It needs to be both large and small combatants, not either/or - even if that means purchasing from civilian and international shipyards. Time is of the essence.

The logistics issue is something, as you said, hand waived. There is no doubt China has studied the lessons of the last Pacific War and both our fuel depots and oilers at sea will be high priorities.
 
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