Hard Power and Soft Power

[robav8r]

That's awfully cynical... and while I'm not going to defend the bloat of the MIC, the services are the ones writing the requirements and testing to the KPPs for the weapons systems they're buying, so I'm going to have to push back a bit on this assertion. The military is more or less getting what they've asked for and agreed to buy.

Yeah, a bit cynical, but also a lot of truth there. During my time in Pax I saw first hand how the MIC drives the requirements process. Case in point - let’s develop a premier ASW/ISR platform to replace the P-3 and EP-3. Oh, Boeing is here to help? We can convert a commercial airliner to meet ALL of your needs. I think the TACAIR community in all services is the exception here, but there are “outliers.” The MIC and their very powerful lobbying drives military acquisition. We used to have service chiefs that defined requirements and mandated weapons systems to meet those requirements. Now we have the MIC telling the service chiefs what is “best” for our Nation‘s defense.

 

[sevenhelmet]

Yeah, a bit cynical, but also a lot of truth there. During my time in Pax I saw first hand how the MIC drives the requirements process. Case in point - let’s develop a premier ASW/ISR platform to replace the P-3 and EP-3. Oh, Boeing is here to help? We can convert a commercial airliner to meet ALL of your needs. I think the TACAIR community in all services is the exception here, but there are “outliers.” The MIC and their very powerful lobbying drives military acquisition. We used to have service chiefs that defined requirements and mandated weapons systems to meet those requirements. Now we have the MIC telling the service chiefs what is “best” for our Nation‘s defense.

In the case of the P-3/EP-3 replacement, was a commercial airliner not the best choice for replacing an existing commercial airliner-based platform? Keep in mind clean-sheet designs cost billions on top of the mission-systems integration costs.

I will agree that the requirements shaping process is murky and prone to abuse on both sides. However, RFI requirements themselves are also often vague or poorly written, and may exclude contractors who can legitimately deliver the best fit product. Contractors also shape requirements to elbow out competition, which only makes it worse.

It is not a simple problem.

 

[robav8r]

In the case of the P-3/EP-3 replacement, was a commercial airliner not the best choice for replacing an existing commercial airliner-based platform? Keep in mind clean-sheet designs cost billions on top of the mission-systems integration costs.

I will agree that the requirements shaping process is murky and prone to abuse on both sides. However, RFI requirements themselves are also often vague or poorly written, and may exclude contractors who can legitimately deliver the best fit product. Contractors also shape requirements to elbow out competition, which only makes it worse.

It is not a simple problem.

We have "armed" 737's fulfilling ASW/ISR missions worldwide (and not just the U.S.). At some point, we have to get serious about weapon systems and acquisition programs that support the warfighter. Your comments (and I don't completely disagree btw), lend credence to the "frog in the boiling pot of water" analogy.

 

[sevenhelmet]

We have "armed" 737's fulfilling ASW/ISR missions worldwide (and not just the U.S.). At some point, we have to get serious about weapon systems and acquisition programs that support the warfighter. Your comments (and I don't completely disagree btw), lend credence to the "frog in the boiling pot of water" analogy.

Good analogy. Some open-ended questions:

Who needs to serious? How do you define getting serious? What does the 737 have to do with any of that?

 

[Brett327]

The military has done an extremely poor job addressing the perception of politicization of flag level officers running acquisition programs in the swamp that is Washington D.C. only to accept positions at the very same defense contractors they helped secure a contract for. But it's not just the flag officers. The warhawks on acquisition committees in Congress share some of that blame as well. Go look at the publicly available campaign contributions of some of those lawmakers and see for yourself how much comes from defense contractors.

Largely because of poorly written requirements that are not managed during the decade long (sometimes longer) acquisition process prior to IOC (or FOC or whatever anyone wants to use as their exit metric). This isn't just a major defense program issue either. It happens with programs/efforts of all sizes. I'm sure this board could probably come up with 3 or 4 for each category.

I don't disagree with either of the above posts, but I don't think this supports the theory that the MIC is intentionally giving DoD less than it needs so that it can't win wars and has to continually come back to the trough... at least not in any meaningful way.

Don't get me wrong, our weapons system acquisitions process is a huge mess, but I just don't buy the MIC puppet master conspiracy theory.

 

[WhiskeySierra6]

I don't disagree with either of the above posts, but I don't think this supports the theory that the MIC is intentionally giving DoD less than it needs so that it can't win wars and has to continually come back to the trough... at least not in any meaningful way.

Don't get me wrong, our weapons system acquisitions process is a huge mess, but I just don't buy the MIC puppet master conspiracy theory.

Agreed. The ire of my post is directed mostly at our acquisition process/community (of which I am a member). The Big 5 have done some really dumb shit chasing profit though. That's not helpful when we've already put ourselves behind the proverbial 8 ball. Ultimately, there's plenty of blame to go around. Most of it is DOD's but the contractors bear some of it as well.

 

[robav8r]

Good analogy. Some open-ended questions:

Who needs to serious? How do you define getting serious? What does the 737 have to do with any of that?

Putting MPR aircrews in a 737, regardless of the onboard mission/weapons systems is not serious. I understand the acquisition process, and I understand how we got here. I'm using my prior community (and ASW/ISR experience) as an example of how we haven't given "MPR" warfighters the very best platform to accomplish their mission. But this is a conversation about our nation's ability, and more importantly, our "capacity" to meet the needs of our warfighters. We are failing, from ship building, to ship repair, to ammunition production, to worldwide logistic support, the list goes on, and on, and on, and on. I'm hopeful that the current administration can right the ship wrt all the things I have mentioned . . .

 

[Brett327]

We have "armed" 737's fulfilling ASW/ISR missions worldwide (and not just the U.S.). At some point, we have to get serious about weapon systems and acquisition programs that support the warfighter. Your comments (and I don't completely disagree btw), lend credence to the "frog in the boiling pot of water" analogy.

Counterpoint, we had a very successful weapons system that met the ASW needs of the Navy throughout the Cold War, and continued on in a multi-mission, maritime patrol and ISR role for 60 years called the P-3 Orion... based on a militarized version of an airliner.

 

[Brett327]

Putting MPR aircrews in a 737, regardless of the onboard mission/weapons systems is not serious.

This is a puzzling take. Why isn't it serious? What capability does that P-8 lack that is imposed by the 737 airframe? What would be a more appropriate platform for the VP community? Has our venerable KC-135, KC-10, E-3 and RC-135 fleet been "unserious" all this time too?

 

[robav8r]

Counterpoint, we had a very successful weapons system that met the ASW needs of the Navy throughout the Cold War, and continued on in a multi-mission, maritime patrol and ISR role for 60 years called the P-3 Orion... based on a militarized version of an airliner.

Yep, we are both familiar with that airframe. My wife's family flew on that airframe while working for Eastern Airlines. And your example flows into the EA-18G. In the Mission Assurance world, we advocate for "risk management" strategies that are aligned with DoD fiscal realities, but i'm not convinced the MIC is ready to surrender stockholder profits, for national defense priorities.

 

[robav8r]

This is a puzzling take. Why isn't it serious? What capability does that P-8 lack that is imposed by the 737 airframe? What would be a more appropriate platform for the VP community? Has our venerable KC-135, KC-10, E-3 and RC-135 fleet been "unserious" all this time too?

Does the KC-135, KC-10, E-3, and RC -135 deploy and fly with ASW and ASUW weapons? Is the threat presented by the platforms you mentioned the same as an "armed" 737 A/C fulfilling an ASW/ASUW mission in hostile waters? How would Russia and China view an MPR P-8 operating in an ISR track versus the platforms you mentioned above?

 

[Brett327]

Does the KC-135, KC-10, E-3, and RC -135 deploy and fly with ASW and ASUW weapons? Is the threat presented by the platforms you mentioned the same as an "armed" 737 A/C fulfilling an ASW/ASUW mission in hostile waters? How would Russia and China view an MPR P-8 operating in an ISR track versus the platforms you mentioned above?

Are you asking for an ASW version of the B-21? Every platform has survivability concerns. I don't think it's realistic to expect that an aircraft doing the MPRA mission would be able to operate with impunity in "hostile waters" as you've outlined without significant support. I'd also surmise that wasn't in the P-8 requirements document.

Could a stealthy ASW aircraft be designed? Maybe, but even our LO assets (manned or otherwise) can't just saunter around in a MEZ forever. So, I don't think your concept is plausible... and if it were, it would be prohibitively expensive... so you get a 737 and have to work within the constraints of the platform, just like every other platform in the inventory. I'm also not aware of any TTPs that put the MPRA aircraft on the leading edge of the strike package. The CSG is going to hold the threat at arm's length, so why would MPRA need to be that far forward? Probably why that isn't in the requirements document.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I'm not convinced the MIC is ready to surrender stockholder profits, for national defense priorities.

Why should they have to? I wholeheartedly agree we need business engagement with the USG to be beneficial to the warfighter. In order for that to happen, it also has to be beneficial to the businesses involved. The only other option is complete nationalization of the MIC, which I oppose on several grounds.

Many military suppliers (including my employer) already do quite a bit of development work at their own financial risk, in order to earn a seat at the table to even reach the RFP part of the process. More often than not, they'll fail to ever sign a contract, and all that work is essentially a sunk cost. Business leaders have to position defensively against that risk in order to keep the lights on and all those expert people employed. As a result, the defense acquisitions part of a business is frequently not the most profitable part. Exhibit A is T-7A with "loss leader" pricing in order to win the contract. Boeing is very publicly losing money on the initial sales of that aircraft, which I am sure they hope to make up with subsequent sales and SEPM support.

Businesses in industry can survive by having a diversified portfolio (eg. commercial sales, FMS & direct foreign sales, etc.), and/or locking in the occasional big win such as F-35, T-7, or JPATS, built on a sea of lost contracts and much smaller wins.

There are a (very) few big winners in this business. Our modern system cannot support more than a few big defense contractors. For the rest of us, the margins are very thin in all but the worst economies. You don't survive without having other irons in the fire.

 

[BigRed389]

Why should they have to? I wholeheartedly agree we need business engagement with the USG to be beneficial to the warfighter. In order for that to happen, it also has to be beneficial to the businesses involved. The only other option is complete nationalization of the MIC, which I oppose on several grounds.

Many military suppliers (including my employer) already do quite a bit of development work at their own financial risk, in order to earn a seat at the table to even reach the RFP part of the process. More often than not, they'll fail to ever sign a contract, and all that work is essentially a sunk cost. Business leaders have to position defensively against that risk in order to keep the lights on and all those expert people employed. As a result, the defense acquisitions part of a business is frequently not the most profitable part. Exhibit A is T-7A with "loss leader" pricing in order to win the contract. Boeing is very publicly losing money on the initial sales of that aircraft, which I am sure they hope to make up with subsequent sales and SEPM support.

Businesses in industry can survive by having a diversified portfolio (eg. commercial sales, FMS & direct foreign sales, etc.), and/or locking in the occasional big win such as F-35, T-7, or JPATS, built on a sea of lost contracts and much smaller wins.

There are a (very) few big winners in this business. Our modern system cannot support more than a few big defense contractors. For the rest of us, the margins are very thin in all but the worst economies. You don't survive without having other irons in the fire.

I’ve worked very closely with the big primes in defense so I don’t have a particular hatred of them or the MIC.

However, one of the things that is worth looking at is what has happened after the “Last Supper” to the remaining primes. Start up creation for defense or commercial entry into defense technology has been just about non existent.

To an extent, I’d argue the symbiotic relationship between industry and government and the MIC really blurs the lines between the two.
It gets way worse for things where the Federal government owns all the licenses or permits that allow a company to operate in any meaningful capacity.

There been commentary about how the broader MIC relationship as is doesn’t make sense - here’s an example:

Raytheon is Now Run Under the Portfolio Theory of the Firm

The storied electronics manufacturer and defense contractor is now just one of a few distinct subsidiaries of a holding company. It is a dead player with no autonomy despite its unique specialties.

brief.bismarckanalysis.com

Long article but it really is best towards the end with stuff like:

This dynamic takes the planning and decision-making power in the defense industrial base out of the hands of defense contractors and puts it exclusively in the hands of the Pentagon. But, having taken this power, if the Pentagon does not engage in planning, then there is simply no planning whatsoever. The load-bearing parts of the defense industry, like specific manufacturing plants or traditions of knowledge in engineering, continue on autopilot even while financiers rearrange titles and administrative divisions to create new companies, on paper, with better financial metrics. This does not result in immediate catastrophe but also eliminates the possibility for live players to successfully plan the defense industrial base to respond to likely long-term scenarios and changes in technological, industrial, or geopolitical conditions.

There’s definitely some truth to this when you get to the portfolio level of a corporation.

US solid rocket motor manufacturing is…interesting if you dig into who does what (and such limited capacity), and why it was a disastrous wake up call when Ukraine made us realize munitions production capacity is a real thing worth caring about. Orbital ATK and AMRAAM rocket motor likely didn’t go to shit overnight…but the Norwegian company we had to source to (which is somewhat nationalized at 50% govt ownership) has been doing fine for decades. Shipyards are another one - shipyards have zero incentive to make long term investments into efficiency, because stockholders (and therefore company boards) don’t care about what only breaks even in 10 years, even if it provided capacity in a national strategic capability. Not sure what the answer is, but the article seems to hint towards the government needing to take on stewardship of its industries…which is at the least, not pure free market.

 

[Mos]

we haven't given "MPR" warfighters the very best platform to accomplish their mission

As a current MPR warfighter, I'd like to know what you think the best platform looks like, as I don't think you've answered that question.