USN Showdown between Super Hornet and F-35

[jackjack]

There is also the QUAD

The Quad countries pledge to promote an Indo-Pacific region that is 'undaunted by coercion'

U.S. President Joe Biden met the prime ministers of India, Japan and Australia on Friday for the first in-person Quad Leaders Summit in Washington.

www.cnbc.com

 

[Randy Daytona]

Your first point is to sell more Rhinos to I get countries. Good for Boeing’s bottom line and has a downstream effect for the Navy (I.e. extra funding/ testing for Rhino capes). But the Navy shouldn’t give a shit about ski ramps for its own purposes, hence my first reply.
For your second point, putting a small footprint of Rhinos on a small deck ship is not an effective use of assets in my opinion. I am all about looking into smaller classes of CATOBAR type CVN to up our distribution, but not going to happen. Instead we will probably pump the F-35B numbers up on the America class to fill that role.

Thank you for the info. I agree that the Navy (and Marines) would not willingly build an America class CATOBAR carrier - but circumstances could become so grave that there may not be any other option than to use the big deck gators as CVL’s. With the F/A-18 being tested for both India’s ski ramp carriers as well as the Queen Elizabeth, I was wondering if the US Navy would consider ski ramps for an extremis situation. Nobody thought we would launch twin engine Army bombers from carriers either…

That leads back to the last time, over 3/4 of a century ago, that we faced a peer competitor for control of the oceans. Within that first year, Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Tennessee, Nevada, West Virginia and Pennsylvania* had settled into the mud of Pearl Harbor. Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet were at the bottom of the Pacific. Saratoga was out of action for much of 1942 after being torpedoed on 2 separate occasions - leaving the Big E as our only carrier in the Pacific to carry the fight alone. And despite that, we were in better shape than Japan which did not have sufficient industry to replace their losses - which looks uncomfortably similar to our situation today since free trade and globalization have sent our steel factories, shipyards etc to China.

I’m simply saying that the Navy should be ready to maximize the gators. As the speed differential is too great between a nuke carrier and an amphib, I think it is more likely you would see Japan’s Izumo class or the UK’s Queen Elizabeth class folded into a US task force. As for the gators (in a high end fight), it might work to have them in mass (or as Jim123 says, a congregation) since a 5 amphib task force could bring roughly 10 squadrons of F-35’s to the fight. Only in this situation might I see 1 or 2 of the amphibs modified to have some type of arrangement to launch and recover tailhook aircraft if a workable solution is found for either the Indian or UK navies.

 

[Brett327]

If China sinks all our carriers, do you really think we're going to keep at it with what's left of our amphibs? That's completely insane. We're going to take our toys and go home long before we reach that point. This false nostalgia for WWII is breaking your brains.

 

[Treetop Flyer]

And what shipbuilding capability we have will be spent making new ships, not figuring out how to make a gator into a shitty carrier

 

[wink]

If China sinks all our carriers, do you really think we're going to keep at it with what's left of our amphibs? That's completely insane. We're going to take our toys and go home long before we reach that point.

Then why didn't we do that in WWII? You dismiss the "false nostalgia for WWII" ( I may not understand what that even is), as if there isn't anything of value in the experience. How we dealt with those desperate days inform how we would deal with future desperate circumstances. Why wouldn't we look to similar scenarios?

 

[Brett327]

Then why didn't we do that in WWII? You dismiss the "false nostalgia for WWII" ( I may not understand what that even is), as if there isn't anything of value in the experience. How we dealt with those desperate days inform how we would deal with future desperate circumstances. Why wouldn't we look to similar scenarios?

I'd ask you what similarities you find between a global conflict from 70 years ago, and one where we bizarrely focus on a hyper-regional territorial dispute. The fact that Taiwan is a democracy doesn't make it our responsibility to defend. That paradigm certainly wasn't in play when Russia rolled into Crimea. Why is Taiwan's independence worth trading a carrier or two to defend?

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Why is Taiwan's independence worth trading a carrier or two to defend?

I'd prefer to say because Taiwan is of much more strategy importance than Crimea. Let me remind that both King and Nimitz had avidly wanted Taiwan instead of Philippines at the eve of 1944 and it was only MacArthur's political weight that placed Manila first. For short, who controls Taiwan controls any aggression from the China's side out into big Pacific. Who controls Crimea controls just Blacksea salty lake.

But I would agree with you if your point is partially in that not the carriers should be the first line of the Taiwan defence. I'm sure the leading deterrent role in between Taiwan and Chinese landmass lays on the USN bubbleheads' shoulders since there's no other force in Pacific to lock the Chinese Navy into their bases while remaining unseen and unavailable for YouTube broadcasting.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

You dismiss the "false nostalgia for WWII"

There's nothing more to compare with. No real threats for carriers since then, except for Soviet anticarrier doctrine which was rather fanfic for Soviet top brass totally unexperienced in naval matter than something real. Yet let me remind that there were just seven carriers in WWII battles sunk by air solely, six of them Japanese: IJNSs Shoho, Ruyijo, Hiyo, Zuikaku (the only fleet carrier among them) Chitose and Zuiho, and British HMS Hermes. All the others disabled by air attacks were sunk by torpedoes of surface ships or submarines, those are: USS Lexington, IJNS Akagi, IJNS Kaga, IJNS Hiryu, IJNS Soryu, USS Yorktown, USS Hornet, USS Princeton, and IJNS Chiyoda, not counting USN CVEs since not a single of them was lost as a result of conventional air attack. Of total 16 fleet or light fleet carriers were gravely hit by air, all except for CVL-23 Princeton - by carrier air. In the meantime, Axis and Allies submarines have sank: HMSs Courageous, Eagle, Ark Royal, USS Wasp, IJNSs Shokaku, Taiho, Unryu, Shinano, i.e. 8 fleet and light fleet ones and this time it is fair to include CVEs since in some cases it was "hunting on the hunters": 4 Japanese, 2 American and 2 British "jeeps" were sank by diesel-electric submarines. Of total the same 16, all of them without any help from the air.
So historically it is sub that is the main carrier enemy. Soviet anticarrier doctrine in its childhood rejected those numbers in favor of betting on land-based air and surface-launching sea skimmers but in adult years got submerged, eventually.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

At least now it seems that VSTOL and CATOBAR worlds are not cross-connected with help of jets. And STOBAR is not the third world but rather a graveyard of ideas rejected by those two real worlds, yet wordwide interest for zombie style leads to awakening bells ringing over the tombs. Rumor about shipborne Felon hits the fan again, coupling 5th gen airpane with essentially 2nd+ gen carrier, that same sole rusty STOBAR. The sketch of that "Felon with hook" attached:
Russians clearly want to make a lot more selling fiction stuff for Chinese and Indian STOBARs

 

[Pags]

There's nothing more to compare with. No real threats for carriers since then, except for Soviet anticarrier doctrine which was rather fanfic for Soviet top brass totally unexperienced in naval matter than something real. Yet let me remind that there were just seven carriers in WWII battles sunk by air solely, six of them Japanese: IJNSs Shoho, Ruyijo, Hiyo, Zuikaku (the only fleet carrier among them) Chitose and Zuiho, and British HMS Hermes. All the others disabled by air attacks were sunk by torpedoes of surface ships or submarines, those are: USS Lexington, IJNS Akagi, IJNS Kaga, IJNS Hiryu, IJNS Soryu, USS Yorktown, USS Hornet, USS Princeton, and IJNS Chiyoda, not counting USN CVEs since not a single of them was lost as a result of conventional air attack. Of total 16 fleet or light fleet carriers were gravely hit by air, all except for CVL-23 Princeton - by carrier air. In the meantime, Axis and Allies submarines have sank: HMSs Courageous, Eagle, Ark Royal, USS Wasp, IJNSs Shokaku, Taiho, Unryu, Shinano, i.e. 8 fleet and light fleet ones and this time it is fair to include CVEs since in some cases it was "hunting on the hunters": 4 Japanese, 2 American and 2 British "jeeps" were sank by diesel-electric submarines. Of total the same 16, all of them without any help from the air.
So historically it is sub that is the main carrier enemy. Soviet anticarrier doctrine in its childhood rejected those numbers in favor of betting on land-based air and surface-launching sea skimmers but in adult years got submerged, eventually.

Your initial 16 were all destroyed by air attack with the exception of Yorktown. For the others it doesn't matter that their smoldering hulks we're eventually scuttled by other means, at the time of their scuttling they were useless as ships due to destruction by air power. Yorktown is an exception as she was under tow and might have been saved.

 

[Pags]

Then why didn't we do that in WWII? You dismiss the "false nostalgia for WWII" ( I may not understand what that even is), as if there isn't anything of value in the experience. How we dealt with those desperate days inform how we would deal with future desperate circumstances. Why wouldn't we look to similar scenarios?

Because Randy's analysis is totally missing the fact that although Enterprise held the line in SOPAC for a few desperate months that at that time multiple other carriers of the Essex and Indepence class were under construction.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Yorktown is an exception as she was under tow and might have been saved.

As did Hornet. She was under tow, either, and her black gang tried to get steam from forward boilers to an after turbines (a scheme far from normal) but failed to notice that main condencer in aft machinery spaces is broken by the second torpedo blast. But from time to time USS Northempton had taken her in slow towing. Then there was a third aerial torpedo that ended all hopes. But up to that moment this ship could have been saved, too.

 

[Flash]

You are right Flash as usually but remember that post-Meiji Japan obediently followed the British rules until obtained needed stuff and then took Singapore. Then-British soil. Asian style of behaviour in a nutshell...

I'm not thinking the Indians will be able to replicate the success of the Japanese any time soon, Exhibit A:

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Offspring of Gripen and Mirage 2000;-))

 

[Griz882]

Then why didn't we do that in WWII? You dismiss the "false nostalgia for WWII" ( I may not understand what that even is), as if there isn't anything of value in the experience. How we dealt with those desperate days inform how we would deal with future desperate circumstances. Why wouldn't we look to similar scenarios?

There is, of course, a remarkable wellspring of knowledge from WWII (Pacific) that will come into play in any war with the CHICAPS but we tend to break apart complex history into easy to swallow bites. Let's look at carrier actions in 1942.

Yes, the US was is in a dire position until June of 42 when it comes to carriers, but broad US strategy never saw the carrier as anything more than a temporary power-projection platform. Only at Midway wwre carriers used to screen the critical island bases at Hawaii - prior to that they jabbed and slapped at Japan's power in an effort to establish an island based chain to surround Japan. Look at the timeline...

The first "official" US combat aircraft arrived in the CBI on 1 February, 1942. By 17 Feb the US secured the southern approaches by taking Bora Bora thus keeping French Polynesia secure. By 24 Feb the US Navy had effectively isolated Wake robbing it's potential use from Japan. By 26 Feb the first major shipment of US long-range combat aircraft arrived in Australia and just a week or so later, March 4, the US started airbase construction on the Marcus islands while the new aircraft in Aussie land started bombing New Guinea further threatening Japan's advances. Even as we move towards April it is important to note that the Philippines have not fallen (although everyone knew they were doomed). By April 2 CBI aircraft are attacking IJN shipping in the Indian Ocean and airfields in Burma. Of course, by 18 April we add in the publicity stunt called the Doolittle Raid and note that the US is now over division strength for land forces in Australia.

The Japanese are undoubtedly seeing significent success during this time to include the eventual fall of the Philippines in May, 1942, but already the US has established a chain of "unsinkable carriers" and have landed enough hits to push the Japanese toward their greatest mistake - exposing their fleet at Midway in June of 1942. Almost exactly two months later the US builds its first close-in airfield at Guadacanal and the rest is history.

This is where the "jeep" carrier comes in. It is quite wrong to assume that CVEs were on the shipways in 1942, they were not, but the merchant hulls they were built on were. The CVE wasn;t intended as a combat ship - it was susposed to move carriers and pilots across the ocean to fall in on Essex Class fleet carriers keeping them supplied with the grist of PTO warfare...planes and pilots. Only when the US found itself stretched across two strategic approaches (Nimitz and McArthur) did the CVEs really come into their own.

So...what does all this mean for a war with China?

1. India (CBI) is critical.
2. Islands are critical.
3. Geography is critical (by utilizing a series of SOPAC islands we can strike their coastal industrial base - they would need Mexico or Canada to accomplish the same).
4. Allies are critical.
5. Keeping your enemy constantly occupied even in small ways is critical.
6. Industrial innovation is critical.

This is why I am encouraged by ideas like...

1. Easily built and abandoned expeditionary airfields on islands.
2. Rapidly deployable rocket systems (rockets will be to this war what F-6 Hellcats were to WW2).
3. Putting launchers (or easily removed launch cells) in merchant ships to dilute China's fleet striking power.
4. Playing nice to India, Japan, Korea, Australia/NZ, and even Vietnam.

My simple take is that the Chinese are likely deeply worried by the idea that we can "win" a war with them and never put one boot on the Chinese mainland but they can not do the same.